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Abstract 
Corporate governance can play a significant role in financial market stability and 
economic development.  Corporate governance scholars have provided controversial 
results with respect to the relationships between corporate governance and both corporate 
financial performance and market value.  Based on agency theory and institutional 
theory, the purpose of this correlational study was to investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms, financial performance, and market value in Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia’s 116 firms from 2010 to 2014.  Financial performance was measured by 
return on assets and return on equity, while market value was measured by Tobin’s q.  
Corporate governance mechanisms involved in this study were board size, board 
independence, board committees, ownership structure, and executive compensation.  The 
financial statements and corporate governance mechanisms collected from the websites 
of sampled firms and the Saudi stock market (Tadawul).  The findings of multiple 
regression tests revealed a statistically significant relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and both corporate financial performance and market value.  
This study may contribute to social change by building confidence in the Saudi capital 
market and improving the lives of stakeholders and community in general.  The results 
may help business leaders understand the influence of corporate governance on their 
firms’ success and the country’s growth.  Academic researchers, investors, regulatory 
bodies, practitioners, and experts in the area of corporate governance may benefit as well. 
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study 
Many international leaders of known firms have been involved in famous 
financial scandals, such as the leaders of Enron, Anderson, WorldCom, Xerox, Parmalat, 
Merrill Lynch, Maxwell, Allied Irish Bank, and Sellafield (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2014; 
Cretu, 2012).  The financial scandals caused stock markets to drop sharply, employees to 
lose their jobs, capital providers to lose their investments, and tax collections to shrink.  
A common cause for this failure resulted from weak internal control which arises from 
poor corporate governance of organizations (Darus & Mohamed, 2011).  Furthermore, 
auditors’ failure to reveal inadequacies in financial records and increase reliability and 
confidence in the use of financial reports was significant factor among these scandals 
(Bonna, 2011).  The financial scandals have placed a significant doubt on the abilities of 
stock market authorities, policy makers, and professional accounting and auditing 
associations to regulate the proper corporate behavior (Adegbite, 2012).  These high-
profile corporate failures intensified the debate on the effectiveness of corporate 
governance as a tool for improving firm performance and protecting investors 
(Mangunyi, 2011).   
The financial scandals and several cases of corporate mismanagement have led to 
increasing attention on corporate governance rules and regulations, in close relation with 
business ethics issues (Mangunyi, 2011; Roudaki, 2013).  In addition, the financial crises 
have served as justification for new rules and legislations to regulate corporate 
governance practices in developed and developing countries (Jen, 2014).  The financial 
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scandals and financial crises resulted in the legislators and regulators of most nations 
seeking to strengthen and enhance their corporate governance rules and regulations, 
disclosure, and transparency levels (Lopatta, & Kaspereit, 2014; Pandya, 2011; Sáenz 
González & García-meca, 2014).  For example, United States legislators enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.  As per the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, stock exchanges’ 
administrators should impose corporate governance rules and regulations on listed 
companies regarding audit independence, board independence, and reliability of 
corporate disclosures (Ali, 2014; Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2014).   
The legislators of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) passed corporate governance 
regulations in 2006.  These regulations constitute the governing principles for all firms 
listed on Saudi Capital Market-Tadawul (KSA’s Corporate Governance Regulations, 
2006).  The legislators and regulators of many other markets re-examined their legislation 
and regulations within the framework of corporate governance, including developing 
markets (Ergin, 2012; Logan & Gooden, 2014).  The efficacy of corporate governance 
regulations can be different in developed and developing countries due to the differences 
in political, cultural, and economic backgrounds.  The legislation of corporate governance 
has evolved considerably, becoming the real addition that the companies’ managers and 
board of directors can demonstrate, in disclosures to their stakeholders (Cretu, 2012). 
Background of the Problem 
The key objective of corporate governance is to achieve long-term stockholder 
value, as the firms’ leaders adopting best practices in corporate governance may achieve 
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better financial performance and market value for their companies (Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, 
& Fadzil, 2014; Ghazali, 2010; Meesiri, 2014).  A robust system of corporate governance 
is considered an important tool for mitigating the conflict of interests between 
stakeholders and management (Pandya, 2011).  Researchers affirm that corporate 
governance is acknowledged as a crucial element in financial markets stability and 
economic development (Bonna, 2011; Mangunyi, 2011).   
Corporate governance is needed to protect the interest of all stakeholders, 
including shareholders.  Corporate governance secures confidence for not only 
shareholders, but also other stakeholders, such as (a) government, (b) employees, (c) 
suppliers, and (d) customers in ensuring the firms’ leaders are accountable for their 
decisions.  Weak-governance companies have higher input costs, lower labor 
productivity, lower equity return, lower value, and lower operating performance than 
good-governance companies (Zaharia & Zaharia, 2012).  On the contrary, good corporate 
governance guarantees that shareholders will get the best performance for their 
investment, resulting in wealth increase and general economic growth (Cretu, 2012).   
Corporate governance regulations include standards and rules for helping the 
managers of publicly traded companies to ensure their adherence and compliance with 
the best corporate governance practices and systems that would ensure the protection of 
both shareholders’ rights and other stakeholders’ rights.   These regulations alleviate the 
conflict of interests between the principal and agent (KSA’s Corporate Governance 
Regulations, 2006).  Corporate governance monitors the relationship between the firms 
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and all their stakeholders (Adiloglu &Vuran, 2012).  Corporate governance consists of a 
set of mechanisms for mitigating the principal-agent problem and improving 
stockholders’ welfare (Ergin, 2012; Habbash & Bajaher, 2014).  Although countries’ 
regulators and legislators have taken many measures to mitigate conflict of the interest, 
financial crises, and corporate scandals, more research is needed (Ferreira Caixe & 
Krauter, 2014; Starbuck, 2014). 
The effect of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate performance and 
market value of corporations has gained widespread prominence in the stock market 
economy (Adiloglu & Vuran, 2012).  Management scholars examined the relationship of 
corporate governance with firm performance and market value.  However, the findings 
are mixed and not convergent (Mangunyi, 2011).  Whether corporate governance 
enhances company performance and market value is another question to which the 
answer is not clear; with no concurrence among researchers (Ergin, 2012).   
In this study, I sought to investigate the impact of corporate governance on both 
corporate financial performance and market value of publicly listed companies in KSA to 
identify whether strong corporate governance implementation leads to better financial 
performance and market value.  The pressing need for mitigating the conflict of interest 
between management and different stakeholders, as well as restoring the reliability and 
confidence in global financial markets support and motivate this study.  The focus for this 
study was on corporate governance mechanisms in areas of control and incentives, as 
well as corporate financial performance and market value by examining the relationship 
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between corporate governance, and financial performance and market value.  The 
findings from this study may be generalized to other publicly listed companies in KSA. 
Problem Statement 
Investors and regulators have become more interested in the rules and regulations 
of corporate governance because of the high-profile collapse of a number of large 
corporations in the last decade of the 20th century.  In addition, the world financial crisis 
of 2008 has led to a pressing need for establishing sound corporate governance practices 
as an emergent demand (Pandya, 2011).  Therefore, management scholars have focused 
on the relationships between corporate governance and (a) financial performance, and (b) 
company value (Dhamadasa, Gamage, & Herath, 2014).  The general business problem is 
that there is a lack of consensus with respect to the relationships between corporate 
governance, and (a) financial performance, and (b) company value (Coskun & Sayilir, 
2012; Mangunyi, 2011; Nicolaescu, 2012; Vintila & Gherghina, 2012).  These divergent 
findings may undermine business leaders’ adherence and compliance with the best 
corporate governance practices (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012).  The specific business problem 
is that some business leaders of KSA publicly listed companies do not have sufficient 
knowledge of the relationship between corporate governance, financial performance, and 
market value to determine the relevance and importance of implementing corporate 
governance rules and regulations. 
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Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between five mechanisms of corporate governance and (a) financial 
performance, and (b) market value in KSA’s 116 companies for the time period 2010 to 
2014.  The corporate governance independent variables are (a) board size, (b) board 
independence, (c) board committees, (d) shareholding ownership structure, and (e) 
executive compensation.  The dependent variables are corporate financial performance 
and market value.  The implications for positive social change include the potential 
clarification of the importance of corporate governance on corporate financial 
performance and market value.  Findings from this study may help firms’ leaders and 
boards to understand which variables influence their companies’ performance and market 
value.  Also, the legislators may benefit from the findings of this study in identifying the 
corporate governance mechanisms that can promote economic growth for the benefit of 
society. 
Nature of the Study 
There are three different types of approaches for conducting research: qualitative, 
quantitative, and mixed methods (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013).  Qualitative 
methodology is useful for exploring and understanding a corporate governance 
phenomenon.  However, qualitative methodology is less suitable for the purpose of this 
study.  Qualitative design findings cannot be replicated, and generalizations to broader 
groups of organizations or people are limited (Tacq, 2011).   
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The quantitative researcher focuses on testing hypotheses and theories.  
Quantitative research is useful for answering questions ( a) how much, (b) how many, (c) 
where, (d) who, and (e) what is the relationship between specific variables (independent 
and dependent variables) (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013).  A quantitative method was the 
most suitable for this study because the purpose of this study was to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and the financial performance and market 
value of the publicly listed companies in KSA.   
The correlational design was best for this study because the purpose for the study 
was examining the relationship among known variables (Stanley, 2011).  The correlation 
design was chosen after careful consideration of other quantitative design choices.  
Experimental design and quasi-experimental design were not appropriate for this study.  
A characteristic of experimental design is to the identification of cause-and-effect 
relationships.  The advantage of experimental design is showing greater internal validity.  
However, experimental design provides less external validity (Chan, Landry, & Tory, 
2011).   
Quasi-experimental design helps predict the casual effect of an intervention on a 
target population of a study (Hamoudi & Dowd, 2013).  The quasi-experimental design is 
characterized by a control group and a treatment group.  However, quasi-experiment does 
not contain random assignment of participants to groups (Currie, Ray, & Neidell, 2011).  
The quasi-experiment approach reduces threats to external validity as the natural 
environments do not face the same issues related to artificiality as compared to a well-
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controlled laboratory setting.  However, the quasi-experiment approach increases threats 
to internal validity because the treatment and control groups may not be comparable at 
starting point (D'Onofrio, Lahey, Turkheimer, & Lichtenstein, 2013).    
Research Questions 
The purpose of research is to find answers to research questions (Berete, 2011).  
Researchers repeatedly pose a question regarding whether the proper implementation of 
corporate governance improves financial performance and market value of firms (Berete, 
2011; Schultes, 2011).  In this study, data on corporate governance mechanisms, 
corporate financial performance, and market value were analyzed to answer specific 
research questions.  Financial performance was measured by two different measures, 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), while market value was measured by 
Tobin’s q (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012).  The research questions are 
RQ1: Is there a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance 
and corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA? 
RQ2: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board size and 
corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA? 
RQ3: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board independence 
and corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA? 
RQ4: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board committees and 
corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA? 
9 
 
 
 
RQ5: Is there a statistically significant relationship between shareholding 
ownership structure and corporate financial performance for publicly listed 
companies in KSA? 
RQ6: Is there a statistically significant relationship between executive 
compensation and corporate financial performance for publicly listed 
companies in KSA? 
RQ7: Is there a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance 
and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA? 
RQ8: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board size and market 
value for publicly listed companies in KSA? 
 RQ9: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board independence 
and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA? 
 RQ10: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board committees 
and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA?  
RQ11: Is there a statistically significant relationship between shareholding 
ownership structure and market value for publicly listed companies in 
KSA?  
RQ12: Is there a statistically significant relationship between executive 
compensation and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA?  
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Hypotheses 
Hypotheses are assertions of what the answers of the study’s research questions 
will be (Schultes, 2011).  I sought to test the following hypotheses based on the theory 
and empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate governance (independent 
variables) and companies’ performance and companies’ values (dependent variables).   
H01: There is not a statistically significant relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance. 
Ha1: There is a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance. 
H02: There is not a statistically significant relationship between board size and 
financial performance. 
Ha2: There is a statistically significant relationship between board size and 
financial performance. 
H03: There is not a statistically significant relationship between board 
independence and financial performance. 
Ha3: There is a statistically significant relationship between board committees and 
financial performance. 
H04: There is not a statistically significant relationship between board committees 
and financial performance. 
Ha4: There is a statistically significant relationship between board committees and 
financial performance. 
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H05: There is not a statistically significant relationship between shareholding 
ownership structure and financial performance. 
Ha5: There is a statistically significant relationship between shareholding 
ownership structure and financial performance. 
H06: There is not a statistically significant relationship between executive 
compensation and financial performance. 
Ha6: There is a statistically significant relationship between executive 
compensation and financial performance. 
H07: There is not a statistically significant relationship between corporate 
governance and market value. 
Ha7: There is a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance 
and market value. 
H08: There is not a statistically significant relationship between board size and 
market value. 
Ha8: There is a statistically significant relationship between board size and market 
value. 
H09: There is not a statistically significant relationship between board 
independence and market value. 
Ha9: There is a statistically significant relationship between board independence 
and market value. 
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H010: There is not a statistically significant relationship between board 
committees and market value. 
Ha10: There is a statistically significant relationship between board committees 
and market value. 
H011: There is not a statistically significant relationship between shareholding 
ownership structure and market value. 
Ha11: There is a statistically significant relationship between shareholding 
ownership structure and market value. 
H012: There is not a statistically significant relationship between executive 
compensation and market value. 
Ha12: There is a statistically significant relationship between executive 
compensation and market value. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of this study was based on two theories: agency theory 
and institutional theory.  An agency problem arises when there is imperfect alignment of 
interest between the principal (shareholder or owner) and the agent (managers).  If there 
is a conflict of interest between the two parties, the wealth and welfare of the 
shareholders and other stakeholders are not maximized.  Managers need to be 
compensated for maximizing the wealth and welfare such that they also benefit from 
good corporate performance and market value (Schultes, 2011).  Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) presented the agency theory as a theoretical basis of corporate governance, which 
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identifies governance mechanisms that can minimize the conflict of interests resulting 
from the separation of ownership and management of firm resources (Syriopoulos & 
Tsatsaronis, 2012).  The major focus of corporate governance mechanisms is to design 
effective corporate control to assure executives act in the best interest of stakeholders 
(Awotundum, Kehinde, & Somoye, 2011).  However, agency theory does not cover 
corporate governance fully; combining the agency theory with institution theory 
establishes a foundation that redefines the model of corporate governance (Al Mamun, 
Yasser, & Rahman, 2013).  
  There are multiple roots of the institutional theory, but the principal contributors 
to the development of institutional theory were DiMaggio and Powell (1983).  The 
proponents of institutional theory posit that executives seek the support and endorsement 
of a wide group of stakeholders for gaining legitimacy for their firms.  Internal and 
external stakeholders exert pressure on firm’s leaders by assessing its conformity and 
adherence to existing rules and laws and their own value systems.  Therefore, firms gain 
legitimacy when its goals and activities confirm and adhere to stakeholders’ goals and 
expectations (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011; Surroca, Tribó, & Zahra, 2013).  The role of 
institutions’ leaders in a country’s economy is to mitigate both information and 
transaction costs by mitigating uncertainty and establishing proper structure that 
facilitates the interactions among firms (Yi, Liu, He, & Li, 2012).  The enforcement of 
the rules and regulations positively affect the corporate performance (Al Mamun et al., 
2013).  
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  The emphasis of agency theory is on the management ethics; while the emphasis 
of institutional theory is on the formation of social culture of firm life (Yi et al., 2012).  
Corporate governance mainly depends on the large environments within which business 
leaders behave; these include the legislative environment, such as the stakeholders’ 
protection laws, and enforcement and compliance capabilities (Adegbite, 2012).  The 
focus of agency theory is the management and principles for stakeholders’ protection; 
while the focus of institutional theory is the rules and regulations for monitoring and 
controlling firms, and enforcement of these rules and regulations (Al Mamun et al., 
2013).   
Bonna (2011) concluded that corporate governance mechanisms may help 
improve company financial performance and market value, and mitigate financial risk in 
publicly listed companies.  In consistency with agency theory, the weakness of corporate 
governance system leads to the conflict of interests and opportunistic actions by 
managers, while sound corporate governance aligns the interests between the principal 
and the agent, which may result in better performance of firms.  Thus, it is hypothesized 
that robust corporate governance system may positively affect both corporate 
performance and market value.   
Definition of Terms 
The following definitions are the key terms within this study: 
Board committees:  Committees are specialized in specific functions such as 
auditing (audit committee), structuring the executive compensation (nomination and 
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remuneration committee) and assuring compliance with corporate governance best 
practice (compliance committee) or risk evaluation (risk committee).  Firms may create 
other committees depending on their particular needs and challenges (Przybylowski, 
Aluchna, & Zamojska, 2011). 
Board of directors:  Board is the link between people who supply the capital (the 
shareholders or investors) and the people who use and invest the capital to create value 
(the managers) (Przybylowski et al., 2011).  
Board independence:  All or most of a board’s members do not have a 
relationship with the company except as executives (Pandya, 2011).  
Board size:  Board size is the number of the board of directors’ members of a 
company elected by the shareholders, including independent and non-independent 
members (KSA’s Corporate Governance Regulations, 2006). 
Corporate governance:  Governance is the system of internal controls and 
procedures by which individual companies are managed.  Corporate governance provides 
a framework that specifies the rights, and roles and responsibilities of different groups, 
such as management, and the board and shareholders within an organization 
(Awotundum et al., 2011).   
Executive compensation:  Compensation is total payments in the form of salary, 
bonuses, and stock options for services provided by corporate managers (Bonna, 2011; 
Lin, 2010).  
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Financial performance:  A measure of how well a company can utilize assets 
from its primary activity of a business and yield profits for investors; it is a measure of a 
company’s effectiveness (Stanwick & Stanwick, 2010). 
Governance index:  The G-Index (GI) is the total of one point for the existence or 
the absence of each provision (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003).   
Market value of equity:  The total dollar market value of all of a firm's outstanding 
shares, common and preferred shares; it is synonym for market capitalization (Coskun & 
Sayilir, 2012). 
Ownership structure: Ownership structure is one of the most important corporate 
governance mechanisms, which includes level of equity, nature of equity, and the check-
and-balance of the shareholding structure (Mangunyi, 2011). 
Tobin’s q:  Tobin’s q is the market value of equity plus total book value of 
liabilities divided by total book value of assets (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012). 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions are facts considered to be true, but are not actually verified. 
Assumptions carry risk and should be treated as such.  Researchers make assumptions 
about phenomenon and theory under investigation, the instrument, the method of 
analysis, the methodology, the sample, and the results (Simon, 2011).  Limitations refer 
to potential weaknesses of the study.  Limitations are those items the researcher cannot 
control and monitor (Brutus, Aguinis, & Wassmer, 2013).  Delimitations refer to the 
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bounds or scope of the study (Simon, 2011).  The delimitations are related to theories, 
practices, and business problem (Simon, 2011).   
Assumptions  
The first assumption was corporate governance standards are more organized and 
sustainable in developed countries as compared to developing countries where political, 
cultural, and economic backgrounds are sufficient.  Corporate governance in developing 
countries is not mature and sound, because of the lack of professional management 
strategies and investment confidence.  The data in this study were gathered from existing 
data sets.  The data were secondary and not originally intended for this study.  Therefore, 
the second assumption for this study was that the business leaders of the firms under 
study reported honest, complete, and accurate data for the subject study period.  The third 
assumption was the theoretical framework based on agency theory and institutional 
theory was relevant for the phenomenon of corporate governance under study in Saudi 
publicly listed companies.   
Limitations 
This study contained several potential limitations.  The first potential limitation of 
this study was the use of the available existing data that were not originally intended for 
this study.  The secondary data could be a potential source of errors, which may hamper 
the findings to be generalized to all publicly listed companies.  Overcoming this 
limitation requires using various data sources, such as (a) companies’ websites, (b) 
annual reports, and (c) Saudi stock market’s website (Tadawul).  Data triangulation can 
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eliminate or minimize such limitation through using various data sources, rather than a 
single data source (Bonna, 2011).   
A second limitation of this study was related to variables measurements.  The 
financial performance and market value of companies were precisely considered financial 
indicators exclusively.  Academic researchers do not concur on specific measures 
assessing financial performance and market value.  
 A third limitation was related to this proposed study’s focus.  The focus of this 
study was on the internal processes of a firm, rather than external factors.  Along with 
internal factors, external factors have a significant effect on firm financial performance.  
Interest rate policy, foreign exchange, macro economy, and inflation may have a more 
significant impact on firm financial performance than on how a firm is regulated and 
monitored internally.  Therefore, the researchers should not compare findings from this 
study with previous researchers who addressed the relationships being studied.   
Delimitations  
The purpose of this study was investigating the relationship between corporate 
governance on both financial performance and market value of companies.  The focus of 
this study was on the traded companies in KSA for the years 2010- 2014.  Only the 
companies with availability of both corporate governance and financial data throughout 
the study period were examined.  The variables of corporate governance were limited to 
(a) board size, (b) board independence, (c) board committees, (d) ownership structure, (e) 
and executive compensation.  Financial performance was represented by only ROA and 
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ROE, while market value was restricted to Tobin’s q.  The purpose of the research did not 
include identifying the causation of financial performance or market values of the 
corporations.   
Significance of the Study 
Corporate governance systems are important and necessary for contemporary 
business environment, because accounting standards, legislation, and economic theories 
are not effective in mitigating the conflict of interests between firms’ managers and 
stakeholders.  In addition, rules and regulations of corporate governance may enhance a 
firm’s financial performance and market value in pubic listed companies (Bonna, 2011).  
The effectiveness and efficiency of corporate governance systems can be different in 
developed and developing stock markets, such as Middle East markets.  This difference is 
because of the disparate international corporate governance structures resulting from 
dissimilar regulatory, economic, and social conditions (Rouf, 2011).  Accordingly, the 
result of implementing corporate governance in both types of markets may be different.  
The benefits gained from a particular corporate governance practices vary depending on 
company and country characteristics (Ionescu, 2012).   
Contribution to Business Practice 
The focus of this study was on examining the relationship of corporate 
governance with both financial performance and market value of publicly listed 
companies in KSA.  Based on the robust procedures of this study, the results can be 
generalized to other companies in KSA.  The financial performance and market value 
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directly affect the investment return of the shareholders and accordingly impact 
shareholders’ wealth.  Also, the financial performance and market value affect the 
strategic decisions of the firms’ leaders in investing their firm’s resources.  Shareholders’ 
wealth is the appropriate goal for the leaders of any for-profit company.  There is a 
positive and often direct relationship between corporate financial performance and stock 
price, and consequently shareholder wealth.  When a firm’s managers try to maximize the 
wealth of their shareholders, managers are trying to increase the firm’s stock price 
(Berthelot, Morris, & Morrill, 2010).  Sound corporate governance practices and policies 
can play an important role in improving corporate financial performance and market 
value (Zaharia & Zaharia, 2012). 
Furthermore, firms’ leaders can use the findings of this study to reduce 
investment risk and increase investor confidence in companies’ performance.  Business 
leaders can differentiate their companies and send credible signals to attract investors by 
self-adopting good corporate governance practices and policies.  Business leaders may 
reduce the cost of capital, and enhance market value and reputation for their companies, 
and raise the fund required for operation and expansion when improving companies’ 
corporate governance practices (Ionescu, 2012).  Based on this study’s findings, the 
concerned parties of corporate governance can build a corporate governance model, 
which maximizes the companies’ values and protects stakeholders’ rights. 
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Implications for Social Change 
At the community or society level, the business leaders and regulators can benefit 
from the study’s findings to fight corruption, encourage more investments, and develop 
capital markets.  The protection of the shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ interests is 
one of the important factors for creating efficient and competitive stock markets, as well 
as maximize the benefits of the countries’ citizens (Koncevičienė, Ščebrina-Dalibagienė, 
& Levišauskaitė, 2012).  Corporate leaders and regulators can use the findings of this 
study to build a corporate governance model, which protect stakeholders’ rights and 
reduce bankruptcies.  Thus, promoting and implementing good corporate governance, as 
well as utilizing the study’s findings can affect a country’s financial stability, leading to 
affecting its economic growth.   
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
Because of increasing demand of corporate governance rules and regulations, and 
the pressure put on the business leaders to address firms’ economic and social effects, the 
academic literature of corporate governance has expanded in the last decade of the 20th 
century.  The key purpose of this literature review is to provide an overview of relevant 
previous and current studies addressing the importance of corporate governance and its 
relationship with corporate financial performance and market value.  This literature 
review is focused on research that supports the research questions, hypotheses, and 
theoretical framework.  
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The searching strategy was focused on peer-reviewed references that were within 
5 years of expected CAO approval of the completed study.  I collected the references that 
support this study using several methods.  Relevant articles and dissertations were 
obtained from data bases such as Business Source Premier, Academic Source Premier, 
ABI/INFORM, and ProQuest Central.  Relevant books were collected through college 
libraries.   
The review of the professional and academic literature heading is organized into 
six principal headings:  (a) corporate governance theories and their assumptions, as well 
as their strengths and weaknesses, (b) the concepts and definition of corporate 
governance, (c) the practices of corporate governance in developing countries and KSA, 
(d) corporate governance mechanisms (independent variables) and practices in both 
developed and emerging markets, (e) exploring the different corporate governance 
indexes, and (f) the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
dependent variables: firm performance and market value.  This study contains 158 
references, of which 136 references were published within 5 years of expected CAO 
approval of the completed study.  Peer-reviewed references are 100% of the total study’s 
references.  Frequently used search terms included (a) corporate governance, (b) 
corporate governance mechanisms, (c) corporate governance theories, (d) financial 
performance, (e) market value, (f) developing countries, (g) developed countries, (h) 
KSA, and (i) publicly listed companies. 
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Corporate Governance Theories 
In this section, some of the corporate governance theories, especially agency 
theory and institutional theory as the basis of the theoretical framework of this study, are 
reviewed for understanding how they relate to corporate governance.  Researchers 
developed several theories that highlight the key objectives of the company and how the 
company meets its obligations and responsibilities toward stakeholders.  Corporate 
governance started from agency theory and based on emerging problems and issues; other 
theories such as stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, institutional theory, and resource 
dependency theory are developed (Htay, Salman, & Meera, 2013).  In this study, the 
discussion of corporate governance theories included the five key theories that affected 
the development of corporate governance: agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship 
theory, institutional theory, and resource dependency theory. 
Agency theory.  The proponents of agency theory specify a contract that abides 
owners and executives as a principal-agent relationship.  As per this contract, managers 
have one objective, that of serving and satisfying the interests of owners.  Accordingly, 
any deviation away from this contractual relationship results in an agency problem 
(Ngoungo, 2012).  Thus, agency problem arises when the welfare of a person (agent) 
depends on another (principal).  Agency problems arise when management set some 
goals contradicting of those owners.   
As the agent is a person that act on behalf of the principal and the principal is the 
person affects the action.  The executives of the companies can pursue their interests even 
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to the detriment of shareholders’ interests which becomes a problem.  The executives 
have superior information and may exploit the company resources for achieving their 
own goals and lower the owners’ profits (Pelayo-Maciel, Calderon-Hernandez, & Serna-
Gomez, 2012).  When executives’ stakes are low, there exists a greater probability that 
the executives involve themselves in value decreasing works.  Accordingly, executives 
tend to conceal information from the shareholders and take decisions to pursue their 
interests.  Thus, the proponents of agency theory believe that the management is not 
always likely to behave and act in the best interest of the owners (Al Mamun et al., 
2013); those scholars focus on that management is self-serving (Shin-Ping & Hui-Ju, 
2011). 
The interest of the agency theory proponents is how to minimize the conflict of 
interests resulting from the separation of ownership and management of firm resources 
(Habbash, Lijuan, Salama, & Dixon, 2014).  The objective is to resolve conflict of 
interests not only between the shareholders and management, but also between all 
external and internal stakeholders, thereby improving firm performance and shareholder’s 
wealth (Nuryanah & Islam, 2011).  In the most cases, the divergence of interests between 
the principal and agent is due to lack of corporate governance mechanisms for efficient 
and effective control, and approval and sanctioning of management decisions (Ongore & 
Kobonyo, 2011).   
An agent cannot be trusted; therefore monitoring mechanisms are substantial to 
mitigate the conflict of interests between an agent and principal (Darus & Mohamed, 
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2011).  Sound control over management actions would reduce agency problems, and 
enhance company performance and market value.  There is a pressing need for corporate 
governance mechanisms to control management’s behaviors and actions to protect 
shareholders’ interests and align these interests with management’s interests 
(Dimitropoulos & Tsagkanos, 2012).   
The proponents of agency theory spell out corporate governance mechanisms that 
can minimize conflict of interests between the agent and principal, which include 
incentive schemes for executives to reward them financially for maximizing 
shareholders’ interests and wealth.  The most famous incentive schemes include such 
things as bonuses, stock options, and prerequisites, which are related to long-term value 
maximization of the company and shareholder wealth (Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012).  
Monitoring and reward structures are meant to align the interests of owners with the 
incentives of management (Shin-Ping & Hui-Ju, 2011).  Furthermore, to ensure capital is 
applied to its intended purpose and improve its control, shareholders choose individuals 
from their rank to represent them on the board of directors (Mangunyi, 2011).   
Shareholders (principals) incur agency cost for reducing the failings of 
management and board by hiring external auditors to control management actions that are 
approved by the board (Ongore & Kobonyo, 2011).  Owners bear agency cost to 
overcome management opportunistic activities (Samaha & Abdallah, 2012).  Thus, 
agency cost occurs from the misalignment of interests between the owners and 
management (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011).  This cost can reach the lowest level, if there is 
26 
 
 
 
close alignment between the goals of principal and agent (Gherghina, Vintila, & Tibulca, 
2014; Pelayo-Maciel et al., 2012). 
Stakeholder theory.  The concept of stakeholders has gained widespread 
popularity among scholars, corporate executives, and media.  Stakeholders are any 
individual or group who are affected or can affect the achievement of the firm objectives 
(Al Mamun et al., 2013).  Stakeholders can include shareholders, suppliers, customers, 
employees, lenders, governments, local charities, and various interest groups.  
Stakeholder theory balances between the interests of firm stakeholders and their 
satisfaction.  The proponents of stakeholder theory require firm managers to design and 
implement proper methodologies to identify the nature of the relationship between the 
managers and interested parties to achieve their goals.  The economic value for any firm 
is created by parties who voluntarily come together, coordinate, cooperate, and then 
improve and enhance everyone’s circumstances (Mangunyi, 2011).  The proponents of 
stakeholder theory clarified the awareness of stakeholders’ perspectives and 
organizational justice on the equity of corporate governance.  Stakeholder theory 
challenges the assumption that corporate governance aligns between shareholders, of 
being residual risk-takers (Mason & Simmons, 2014).   
Different scholars have given different definitions of stakeholder theory.  The 
wider and more balanced definition considers stakeholders as those groups who are vital 
to the success and survival of the firm (Al Mamun et al., 2013).  This definition is 
corporation oriented and is considered as part of a larger social system.  Business leaders 
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should provide to all stakeholders, directly or indirectly affect the survival of the firm, 
how the firm is affecting them (Al Mamun et al., 2013).   
Stakeholder theory is a combination of philosophical ideas from law, ethics, and 
economics.  The proponents of stakeholder theory extend the responsibility of the 
management toward corporate social responsibility, profit maximization, and business 
morality (Htay et al., 2013).  Despite stakeholder theory is useful in developing and 
maintaining good relationships with stakeholders through disclosing necessary 
information, which reduce an agency problem, the academic scholars do not state the 
type of information should be disclosed.  Stakeholder theory provides management a 
greater capability and more resources to face firms’ internal problem (Al Mamun et al., 
2013).   
Stewardship theory.  Stewardship theory evolved from psychology and 
sociology; while agency theory had its origin in economics (Al Mamun et al., 2013).  The 
proponents of stewardship theory assume that management aspires to high objectives by 
high levels of responsibility and achievement, and self-motivation, as well as protecting 
the firm through collective actions.  Under stewardship theory, management acts 
selflessly for the benefits of the firm and owners (Pelayo-Maciel et al., 2012).   
Also, the proponents of this theory assume that the key duty of management is 
maximizing company performance and market value; thereby creating more benefits for 
steward and principal (Al Mamun et al., 2013).  According to this definition, 
management is defined as steward who works for the principal.  In another perspective, 
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stewardship theory is defined as act or behavior that spells out the long-run interest of the 
firm, as well as owners a head of individuals' self-interest.   Management plays its role as 
steward by aligning its own benefit and interest along with the firm objectives.  
Accordingly, the management aims to protect the principals and make profits for them, 
while in agency theory, corporate leaders work for their self-interest (Al Mamun et al., 
2013). 
Under stewardship theory, the principal empowers management with the 
information, equipment, and power assuming that the best interests of the firm are 
achieved (Al Mamun et al., 2013).  The principal should ignore the assumptions resulting 
from agency theory and build a trusting relationship with the steward to avoid any 
monitoring and control structure.  Lack of trust with respect to ethical behavior and 
authority is replaced, which is one of the main distinguishing assumptions and features of 
stewardship theory (Mangunyi, 2011).  Giving full authority helps management make 
decisions independently for the best interest of the company (Al Mamun et al., 2013).  
 Under agency theory, the effectiveness of the board of directors is achieved by 
the separation of the CEO and Chairman positions.  On the contrary, in stewardship 
theory CEO duality may be a good corporate governance practice with positive 
consequences for firm financial performance, because of integration and unification of 
the authority chain, leading to faster decision making process (Vintila & Gherghina, 
2012).  Accordingly, the interests of CEOs and principals are aligned, and CEOs 
endeavor to balance the interests of all stakeholders, including shareholders and seek to 
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make decisions for their benefits (Pelayo-Maciel et al., 2012).  Thus, companies that 
espouse CEO duality achieve faster, better, and more efficient decisions.  This is because 
the executives are inherently trustworthy and good stewards of the firm assets and 
resources (Vintila & Gherghina, 2012).  Therefore, there is no problem resulting from 
management’s motivations as stewardship run companies outperform other firms 
(Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012).  However, according to KSA’s Corporate 
Governance Regulations (2006), the combination of chairman post and any executive 
position, such as CEO, managing director, or general manager, is strictly prohibited. 
Institutional theory.  The proponents of institutional theory address the 
uncertainties of firm transactions between economic agents. (Al Mamun et al., 2013).  
The role of institutions in an economy is to reduce both information and transaction costs 
by eliminating uncertainty and establishing proper structure that facilitates the 
interactions between firms.  This gives corporations the equal opportunity for an active 
role in an institutional environment if enterprises have the ability to move beyond 
institutional constraints.  Institutional environment is defined as a set of legal, social, 
economic, and political conventions that create the foundational basis for producing 
product, services, and exchange (Yi et al., 2012).  This environment as an external factor 
is very important for companies in a transition economy (Yi et al., 2012).   
According to institutional theory, the corporation is not just a place where 
operations happen; rather these are also cultural and social systems (Yi et al., 2012).  
Accordingly, the firm cannot survive without legitimacy.  The perspective of institutional 
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theory is best met in an environment with high levels of efficient legislations.  Thus, 
corporate governance is considered as an institutional arrangement by which investors 
ensure an adequate return on their investment.  The key feature of institutional theory is 
the openness about firm practices and human behavior.  The formation of social culture 
of the firm is an important factor in institutional theory (Yi et al., 2012).   
Resource dependency theory.  Resource dependency theory was developed by 
Pfeffer (1972), which posited that companies depend on one another for getting the 
required resources; thereby links are created (Ovidiu-Niculae, Lucian, & Cristiana, 2012).  
Multiple firms create and maintain social relationship for the continuance of this 
interlocking directorship.  This directorship can be achieved by a person who is a 
member of the boards of both firms.  The unique combination of the quality of top 
management and wide experience and expertise of the board would positively affect the 
strategic decision making, leading to better performance of the organization (Ovidiu-
Niculae et al., 2012).  According to this theory, there are motivations and incentives for a 
company to create linkages with outside parties, as this help to reduce the environmental 
uncertainties the company faces.  The companies will consider the advantages of linking 
and engaging in open dialogue by taking into account the costs and direct benefits 
associated with their decisions due to their commitment to dialogue.  Also, companies 
that have a good relationship with the key stakeholders can create value for the 
companies and reduce their risks.  Accordingly, companies with strong relationship with 
stakeholders face less uncertainty (Rehbein, Logsdon, & Buren, 2013).   
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More powerful firms want to monitor and control their external environments and 
possess greater power to form their response to the social issue than less powerful firms.   
Companies with these combined factors are in a sound position to solve tough issues such 
as human rights issues, labor problems, and environmental codes and social 
responsibilities without having to worry about the negative reaction from other 
stakeholders (Rehbein et al., 2013).  Under resource dependency theory, a board with a 
high level of connections to the external environment would improve and ease access to 
valuable resources, such as finance and capital, improving corporate governance practices 
(Vo & Nguyen, 2014). 
A corporate board role in developing access to required resources is a factor of the 
resource dependency theory (Rehbein et al., 2013).  The proponents of both stakeholder 
theory and resource dependence theory assert the involvement of the board members in 
decision making through the service roles of the board.  Stewardship theory authors 
describe board of directors’ involvement in both decision control and decision 
management through the strategic roles of the board; whereas the legalistic perspective 
reflects board of directors’ involvement in decision management through the execution of 
decision control roles (Ovidiu-Niculae et al., 2012; Pfeffer, 1972).  Academic scholars 
criticized both resource dependence theory and stewardship theory over time.  Resource 
dependency theory is criticized for not focusing on the decision making and internal 
process, while stewardship theory is questioned for its lack of details about board of 
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directors activities, as well as not describing how firm directors take their decisions 
(Ovidiu-Niculae et al., 2012).   
In summary, corporate governance theories have been used in developing the best 
practices and mechanisms of corporate governance (Htay et al., 2013).  There is no 
corporate governance theory that is valid and applicable all the times and in all 
circumstances.  There is no one ideal corporate governance theory, but a combination of 
two or more theories can provide the business requirements and maintain the firm 
operational, while aligning the interests of both principal and management (Al Mamun et 
al., 2013).   
The Concepts and Definitions of Corporate Governance  
In the last decade of the 20th century, corporate governance gained high 
importance and discussed not only in the finance literature, but also in other academic 
literature in terms of ownership structure of the company, economic efficiency and 
product market competition, international context, and general discussion (Kim, 2011).  
Corporate governance arises when the firm faces agency conflict between the 
shareholders and managers.  The efficient contract between the two parties is not enough 
to remove that conflict of interest (Martani & Saputra, 2009).  Corporate governance is a 
vital tool used by companies’ leaders to solve the conflict of interest by convention.  
Through corporate governance, business leaders lay down strategic targets and goals of 
the firm; corporate governance helps leaders decrease the operational risk of the firm to 
the lowest level through the efficient internal and external controls (Kim, 2011).     
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Corporate governance includes the rules, regulations, and mechanisms a 
company’s managers adopt to manage interests and conflicts of corporate outsiders 
(customers, suppliers, shareholders, society, state, peers) and insiders (employees, 
managers, executive directors), company value maximization, and aiming agency conflict 
minimization (Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012).  The structure of corporate governance 
includes law and regulation, corporate charter, board control internal control, and market 
control (Martani & Saputra, 2009).  Stronger rule of law and investor protection are 
related to corporate governance practices and company performance (Awotundum et al., 
2011).  The quality of corporate governance in the developed and developing countries 
mostly depends on the regulatory framework (Koncevičienė et al., 2012).  Corporate 
governance practices rely on company and country characteristics (Ibrahim, Rehman, & 
Raoof, 2010).   
The sound and proper corporate governance may prevent controlling shareholders 
and misbehavior of company management, and reduce the risk to small investors.  Firms 
without controlling group may adopt higher quality corporate governance.  The 
enhancement and improvement by lawmakers and regulatory authorities of corporate 
governance rules, regulations, and practices are widely recognized as a significant 
element in strengthening and improving the foundation for the long-term and short-term 
economic performance of countries and organizations.  Corporate governance system can 
be divided into two main categories: Insider system and outsider system.  There is a 
conflict of interest between weak and strong shareholders in the insider system, while in 
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the outsider system the conflict of interest is between strong managers and widely 
dispersed shareholders (Ibrahim et al., 2010).  Corporate governance system has two key 
objectives: The first objective is integrity management, while the second one is guidance 
to maximize the created value for shareholders (Bostan & Grosu, 2010).   
Sound corporate governance gives important benefits to countries and firms.  
From the country’s point of view, well-organized corporate governance increases the 
image and reputation of the country, attracts foreign capitals, and prevents capital flights.  
It also increases the competitiveness of capital market and economy, ends crisis in a 
minimum damage, helps distribute resources more effectively, and provides and 
maintains high welfare (Dagli, Eyuboglu, & Ayaydin, 2012).  
 When it comes to firm’s perspective, robust corporate governance means 
decreasing the cost of capital, and increasing liquidity and opportunities of finance.  Also, 
good corporate governance helps firms overcome crisis easily.  Firms with well-
organized corporate governance have more success than other firms (Murcia, Murcia, 
Rover, & Borba, 2014; Zeitoun, Osterloh, & Frey, 2014).  Investors are ready for paying 
a higher price for the shares of firms which adopt well-organized corporate governance 
(Dagli et al., 2012).  Sound corporate governance may improve the corporate financial 
performance and the market value in the longer term without endangering the 
sustainability of the firm.  It also helps solve the conflict of interests between the firms 
and the stakeholders who are related with the firm (Dagli et al., 2012).  Finally, the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mainly depends on the effective operation and 
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decisions of the board of directors and the power exercised by investors or shareholders 
(Ngoungo, 2012).   
However, there is a threat of overregulation by governments.  The overregulation 
may not always lead to the desired results in terms of economic and corporate stability, 
and effective performance and higher market value of the firm.  The corporate 
governance can be more costly than the targeted benefits and can also hinder or limit 
managerial freedom of initiative, leading to negative performance (Koncevičienė et al., 
2012; Meesiri, 2014).  
Corporate governance concepts.  For a better understanding of the legal systems 
of the corporate governance in both developed and emerging markets, it is necessary to 
understand the concept of corporate governance.  Corporate governance is a formal 
distribution of power between three main parties:  The board of directors, managers, and 
shareholders for assuring that the decisions of management do not conflict with the 
shareholder interest (Ngoungo, 2012).  The main concern of corporate governance system 
is managing the relationship among various corporate stakeholders.   
There are narrow and broad concepts of corporate governance (Pandya, 2011; 
Rahim & Alam, 2014).  In a narrow concept, corporate governance includes a set of 
relationships among the company’s shareholders, board of directors, management, 
auditors, and others (Pandya, 2011).  In the broad concept, corporate governance is the 
extent to which firms are run in an honest and open manner, which is important for the 
efficiency of capital allocation, overall market confidence, and development of the 
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overall wealth and welfare of the countries (Fülöp, 2014; Pandya, 2011).  Both concepts 
result in efficient and effective allocation of resources (Pandya, 2011)    
Corporate governance can be approached through two other different 
perspectives: A restraint approach and a large approach.  In a restraint approach, 
corporate governance can be defined as the totality of legislative and economic means, 
which helps achieve the owners’ interests (Cretu, 2012).  Accordingly, the types of 
investments in any country have a significant part in the orientation of balanced and 
powerful corporate governance.  In a wider perspective, corporate governance represents 
the totality of mechanisms and control norms applied to harmonize and protect the 
interests of all the firm’s stakeholders (Cretu, 2012; Velte, 2014).  The studies conducted 
by World Bank considered the larger approach of corporate governance, considering the 
main stakeholders of the firm without focusing on the relationships between managers 
and owners (Cretu, 2012).  The philosophy of corporate governance depends on the 
disclosures and transparency that improve the trust in firms by increasing public 
confidence in those companies.  Sound corporate governance refers to a trend toward 
greater and more binding corporate responsibility, as well as conducting a business as per 
the acceptable ethical principles and standards of the country (Abels & Martelli, 2011).  
As a result, firms safeguard stakeholder’s rights and focus on better operational and 
financial performance. 
Corporate governance definitions.  There is no standard definition of corporate 
governance among the researchers; rather management scholars have defined corporate 
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governance in different ways and relate their definitions to specific aspects of corporate 
governance (Onakoya, Fasanya, & Ofoegbu, 2014; Talamo, 2011).  However, based on 
the literature review and contemporary studies of the various definitions of corporate 
governance, two main sets of corporate governance definitions are classified.  The first 
set of definitions that identify behavioral patterns of firms with regard to financial 
structure, growth, efficiency, performance, and relations with stakeholders and 
shareholders (Talamo, 2011).  The second set of definitions that identify the normative 
framework in terms of rules and regulations governing, controlling, supervising and 
influencing the corporate activity (Ferreira Caixe et al., 2014; Man, 2013).  There exists 
an overlap between the two sets.  For the purpose of this study, a variety of corporate 
governance definitions were discussed, in particular, those that are consistent with agency 
theory and institutional theory.    
The majority of definitions relate corporate governance to supervision and control 
of the management or of the firm, or of the managerial behavior (Talamo, 2011).  The 
term of corporate governance means the control mechanism governing the management 
activities monitored by board of directors (Abels & Martelli, 2011).  Corporate 
governance is defined as a system by which firms are controlled and directed 
(Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012).  This traditional approach has ignored the unique 
influence that shareholders exert on the board of directors and by extension, the 
management, to behave in a particular way in their interest (Ongore & Kobonyo, 2011).  
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Therefore, scholars have defined corporate governance in different ways to avoid the 
criticisms to the traditional approach (Rambo, 2013).  
 Corporate governance is defined as a system of rules and regulations that are 
likely to be institutional market in the area arising or pursuing different categories of 
management, shareholders, stakeholders, customers, personnel dependent public, and so 
on (Bostan & Grosu, 2010).  The company leaders must practice sound corporate 
governance to get a better financial return in the future.  Similarly, corporate governance 
is defined as a system by which firms are directed, monitored, controlled, and governed 
through the distribution of rights and responsibilities of different people in the firm such 
as the board of directors, shareholders, stakeholders, and managers (Pelayo-Maciel et al., 
2012).  The focus of this definition is that companies are controlled and governed, 
especially the relationship between shareholders and companies’ leaders.   
Also, corporate governance is defined as a set of rules and norms that monitor the 
relationship among principals and agents of the firm, the employees, governments, 
creditors, and other stakeholders relating to the rights and responsibilities (Nuryaman, 
2012).  This definition focuses on the system that regulates the firm by which business is 
directed and controlled.  Furthermore, corporate governance refers to the collection of 
institutions, policies, and rules influencing how a company is managed and controlled 
(Donaldson, 2012).  Ccorporate governance is considerably depends on the large 
environments within which companies work; these include the legislative environment, 
such as the enforcement capabilities and efficiency of the judiciary, shareholder 
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protection laws, and the general environmental support for business (Adegbite, 2012).  
This group of definitions focuses on corporate governance as a system by which a firm is 
governed, monitored, and controlled for identifying responsibilities and rights among 
different participants in that firm, thus achieving the interest of the different stakeholders 
of a firm. 
Another definition, which is the most widely used one, is that OECD defined 
corporate governance as distribution of rights and responsibilities among different levels 
in the firm, such as (a) shareholders, (b) managers, (c) directors, and (d) other interested 
parties in the company performance; identifying the rules and procedures improves the 
right decisions on firm’s activities and affairs (Dagli et al., 2012; Jen, 2014).  According 
to this definition, corporate governance should provide the proper structure that set the 
objectives of the firm and the means of achieving those objectives, as well as to 
determine performance monitoring.   Thereafter, OECD defined corporate governance as 
a key element in enhancing and improving economic efficiency, and growth, as well as 
enhancing investor confidence in firm performance.  Corporate governance system 
comprises a set of relationships between firm’s management, shareholders, board, and 
other stakeholders, as well as providing the structure that lays down firms objectives and 
the procedures of achieving those objectives and controlling performance (Dagli et al., 
2012).      
Other management scholars defined corporate governance as the set of 
mechanisms, both institutional and market-based, that affect the directors of a company 
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to determine the right decisions that maximize the performance and market value of the 
company for its shareholders (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011).  In other words, corporate 
governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of funds to firms confirm obtaining a 
proper return on their investments.  This definition of corporate governance is based on 
the principal-agent relationship and agency theory, which contends that the delegation of 
management authorities and responsibilities by the shareholder to the managers creates 
problem of moral hazard and adverse selection that lead to agency cost (Berthelot et al., 
2010).  Thus, the composition, size, and involvement of the board of directors are 
significant in corporation activities.  
Another definition, corporate governance is defined as a structure and processes 
by which the management of firm business is performed for improving corporate 
accountability and business prosperity, as well as improving the investor’s value and 
protecting the other stakeholders’ interests (Shah, Kouser, Aamir, & Hussain, 2012).  
This definition is based on the collective interests of all the stakeholders, along with the 
interest of the individual, and connects corporate governance practices to the strategic 
decisions of the firms.  Similarly, corporate governance is defined as the structure and 
process through which a company’s affairs and operations are directed by enhancing 
corporate accountability and business prosperity with the ultimate goal of improving 
owners’ wealth (Vintila & Gherghina, 2012).  This group of definitions relates corporate 
governance to business prosperity, and value of firms and shareholders. 
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The variation between the above definitions of corporate governance clarifies the 
different perspectives taken by the scholars.  This variation is due to the wide variety of 
subjects covered by corporate governance and by different authors who have different 
viewpoints when examining companies, especially if they have different intellectual 
backgrounds or interests.  Thus, every scholar revises the definition of corporate 
governance based on the investigated issue.  However, these large numbers of corporate 
governance definitions all share, implicitly or explicitly, some common factors.  All of 
the above definitions of corporate governance refer to the presence of a conflict of 
interest between firms’ management and stakeholders, and insiders and outsiders arising 
from the separation of ownership and management (Okpara & Kabongo, 2010).        
Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and KSA  
Corporate governance affects the developed countries, as well as developing 
countries throughout the world.  Corporate governance standards could be more 
organized and sustainable in developed countries as compared to developing countries 
where political, cultural, and economic backgrounds are sufficient (Mulili & Wong, 
2011).  This section explores the practices of corporate governance in developing 
countries and KSA. 
Corporate governance in developing countries.  Corporate governance in 
developing countries sounds like innovation, because of the lack of professional 
management strategies, human resource capabilities, and investment confidence, as well 
as weak legal and judiciary systems (Mulili & Wong, 2011).  Most of the previous 
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studies found that the corporate governance systems are variable and weak in developing 
countries.  Because of the severe financial crisis and influence of international financial 
bodies, such as World Bank, most of the developing countries tried to establish corporate 
governance standards and principles, such as KSA, Egypt, and South Africa.  For 
providing financial aid, World Bank and IMF have imposed structural development 
programs to the developing nations, which require radical changes in corporate 
governance practices (Aylin & Crowther, 2008).  Investor protection and ownership 
structures are a fundamental factor affecting corporate governance practices in developed 
countries as well as developing countries.  The concentrated ownership structure of 
emergent markets is accepted due to the weak property right systems in these countries, 
as most companies are owned and controlled by families (Aylin & Crowther, 2008).  
In most developing countries, there are rules and regulations for conducting 
business, legal and regulatory systems to protect the obligations and rights of investors, 
and penalties for violators.  However, the problem lies with the lack of monitoring and 
enforcement of these systems, laws, rules, and regulations, as well as adopting improper 
processes precluding effective implementation of corporate governance (Donaldson, 
2012; Mande, Ishak, & Idris, 2014).  Therefore, legal and regulatory systems should 
include not only enacting rules and regulations, but also of setting up a mechanism for 
enforcing those rules and regulations, as well as should have good standards of 
supervision compliance to the rules and regulations.  Thus, the legal framework in 
developing countries for effective corporate governance exists, but the compliance and 
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enforcement are nonexistent or weak (Okpara & Kabongo, 2010).  The practices have 
demonstrated that enforcement can be more important than the law on paper in 
developing countries (Trivun & Mrgud, 2012).   
In general, annual reports and websites of publicly listed companies in developing 
countries are weak in terms of voluntary disclosure (Aylin & Crowther, 2008).  Lack of 
disclosure and transparency, and corruption among companies in developing countries 
are greatest barriers to economic development, growth, and stability in these countries 
(Aylin & Crowther, 2008).  Finally, there exists a pressing need for a legislative overhaul 
that creates regulatory agencies and contains their functions and enforcement mechanism 
(Okpara & Kabongo, 2010).  
Corporate governance in KSA.  KSA has an open economy since its inception 
as a modern state in 1932, but its financial sector delayed because the ruling regime 
depends on Sharia Law that prohibits interest-based transactions.  KSA mainly depends 
on oil exporting revenue, which negatively affected the development of its securities 
market.  However, the recurring volatility in oil prices has raised the need of new sources 
to diversify and thus reduce the effect of the fluctuation in the oil markets.  Accordingly, 
KSA has started on a progressive economic reform program that requires pressing need 
for a modern financial market that complies to international standards of corporate 
governance (Piesse, Strange, & Toonsi, 2012).   
Corporate governance has attracted financial experts and researchers especially 
with the advent of the twenty-first century as Saudi stock market grows and develops, as 
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well as firms adopt contemporary corporate governance practices.  KSA exerts ongoing 
attempts for adopting international accounting and auditing standards thus enhancing the 
acceptance and understanding of the inevitability of corporate governance (Al-Qarni, 
2010).  Accordingly, KSA has undergone radical reforms to its corporate governance 
mechanism resulting in the issuance of Corporate Governance Regulations in 2006 to 
augment and expedite the development of corporate governance.  The key purpose of this 
legislation is to protect the rights of all stakeholders, such as shareholders, creditors, 
employees, and lenders.  The principles emphasized by this legislation are the 
responsibility, accountability, transparency, and fairness.  All publicly listed companies 
on Tadawul should abide by this legislation and imposed disclosure in their annual 
reports and other forms imposed by Saudi capital market (Al-Qarni, 2010).   
Despite the extensive regulatory reforms undertaken to improve corporate 
governance regulations, as well as strict supervision by Saudi Capital Market Authority 
on the implementation, there are still firms listed on Tadawul that experience poor 
compliance and weak performance.  The leaders of publicly listed companies have 
interpreted these regulations differently; the implementation of one rule varies from 
company to another.  To ensure high compliance by listed companies, regulatory 
agencies in KSA should enforce unified implementation of corporate governance rules 
and regulations through law.   
Most Saudi firms have some specific characteristics, which affect the process of 
adoption of corporate governance mechanisms.  KSA, like many other Middle East 
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countries, has high ownership concentration, along with dominance of family controlled 
firms.  Most companies are held by families, executives, directors, government, and 
institutional or foreign ownership.  Most ownership and management in Saudi firms are 
aggregated, and the owners are usually unwilling to delegate their authority and 
responsibility.  Control is concentrated in the hands of dominant shareholders.  Boards of 
directors are dominated by majority shareholders to the extent that their effectiveness and 
efficiency are doubtful.  Other stakeholders appear to be marginalized in the actual 
practices of companies and the legal framework (Piesse et al., 2012).  The low levels of 
disclosure and transparency, and the high levels of controls and concentrated ownership 
differentiate the corporate governance in KSA from that in developed countries.   
The agency problem in KSA is between the minority shareholders and dominant 
shareholders.  Agency problem is often created through an ownership structure of 
complex pyramidal structures (Shah et al., 2012).  Independent directors or non-executive 
directors are mandated by law to protect the minority shareholders and improve firm 
performance (Kumar & Singh, 2012).  Hassan Al-Tamimi (2012) examined the 
relationship between corporate governance and Saudi banks' performance and found a 
positive relationship between the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and 
financial performance, whereas found an insignificant relationship between the efficiency 
of corporate governance mechanisms, and bank performance of government and local 
ownership groups. 
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Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
In the aftermath of global financial crisis and financial scandals of a large number 
of entities, corporate governance has become a significant issue in both developed and 
developing countries.  Much of the solutions built on the effective corporate governance 
mechanisms in order to protect investor rights and their wealth (Kumar & Singh, 2012). 
These mechanisms are designed to reduce the inefficiencies arising from adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Vintila & Gherghina, 2012).   
There are two types of mechanisms: Internal audit mechanisms and external 
monitoring mechanisms.  All the companies’ activities are monitored and controlled 
through internal mechanisms, while external mechanisms comprise the control exercised 
over firms by external stakeholders (Vintila & Gherghina, 2012).  Corporate governance 
utilizes internal monitoring mechanisms (Ngoungo, 2012).  However, both types of 
mechanisms could be used to align the interests of stakeholders and managers (Vintila & 
Gherghina, 2012).  In this heading, some of the corporate governance mechanisms that 
represent the independent variables of this study are reviewed for understanding how they 
reduce the inefficiencies that arise from opportunistic human behavior, as well as 
understanding the relationship between each mechanism and both firm performance and 
market value.  The corporate governance mechanisms of this study are board size, board 
independence, board committees, ownership structure, and executive compensation. 
Board size.  The board of directors is the top executive unit of a firm and 
responsible for laying down the strategies and policies, and monitoring the company 
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activities (Maztoul, 2014; Pandya, 2011).  The board is seen as a team of members with 
fiduciary responsibilities of directing and leading company activities with the key 
objective of protecting the interests of company’s shareholders and other stakeholders.  
The board is assigned with three critical functions: Agency theory responsibilities, 
resource dependence responsibilities, and legal responsibilities (Brédart, 2014; Pandya, 
2011).   
Under agency responsibilities, the board is responsible for protecting the 
stakeholders’ interests by ensuring the decisions taken for the company benefit, rather 
than the self-interests of executives, thereby the board becomes the guardian of the 
owners’ interest.  Under resource dependence responsibilities, the board is responsible for 
acquiring resources for the company based on its relationship with other companies.  The 
legal responsibilities are a fiduciary responsibility; thereby the board fulfills a particular 
requirement to represent the legal rights of all stakeholders.  These responsibilities 
include the hiring of the CEO and the evaluation of company performance (Stanwick & 
Stanwick, 2010).  In KSA, the board becomes an important tool complementing the weak 
and inefficient corporate mechanisms to mitigate conflict of interests among the 
interested parties of a firm.   
Board size is an important mechanism that could alleviate an agency problem; it 
is considered an important determinant of corporate governance effectiveness (Shin-Ping 
& Hui-Ju, 2011).  Board size affects the extent of supervision, controlling, monitoring, 
and decision making in a firm.  The scholars have not concurred on one optimal size for 
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the board of directors.  Some scholars concluded that there is an inverse relationship 
between a company value and board size.  The small board can help enhance firm 
performance (Vintila & Gherghina, 2012).  From the agency perspective, small board is 
more likely to allow members to engage in genuine interaction and debate (Reddy & 
Locke, 2010).  Also, these scholars argued that a large board may lead to a significant 
and negative impact on the future investment return (Tai, 2015).  When the board 
members grow too big, boards become more symbolic, while a small board mitigates the 
agency problem and become more effective in the management process (Vintila & 
Gherghina, 2012).  The incremental cost of poor communication may exceed the benefit 
associated with a large board.  The difficulties in communication and coordination may 
increase when the board size increases.  This causes more cost and greater agency 
problem (Habbash & Bajaher, 2014; Sáenz González & García-meca, 2014).  
 Some scholars recommended that the board members should be limited to seven 
or eight (Reddy & Locke, 2010).  When the board of directors exceeds eight members, 
the board is less likely to control effectively; this paves the way for the CEO to control.  
Alternatively, fewer scholars concluded that a larger board may provide greater 
management supervision, increased pool of experience, and access to a wider range of 
resources (Brédart, 2014; Reddy & Locke, 2010).  Consistent with this perspective, the 
dependence theory assumes that larger board size may result in higher profitability and 
market value because of the different expertizes knowledge and skills of board members 
(Ghazali, 2010; Habbash & Bajaher, 2014).  However, the effect of board size on 
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performance and market value may differ for different types of organizations (Habbash & 
Bajaher, 2014; Nicolaescu, 2012).  In KSA, Corporate Governance Regulations limit the 
minimum number of directors to be at least three and maximum eleven (Habbash & 
Bajaher, 2014). 
Board independence.  Most the efforts exerted by countries regulators have 
focused on the issue of board independence for reducing the CEO’s influence over the 
board of directors (Joseph, Ocasio, & Mcdonnell, 2014).  These regulators have required 
a minimum fraction of the board members to be independent.  The rationale of these 
regulations is that if directors are independent of the executives, they are more likely to 
protect and defend shareholders and other stakeholders interests (Ahmed & Gábor, 2012).  
The independence of the board is a crucial mechanism, because outside directors 
represent true controls and can discipline the management to achieve firm objectives 
(Ongore & Kobonyo, 2011).   
From the agency theory perspective, external or independent directors are more 
valuable than the insider directors, because they are less committed to the firm’s 
management and its goals (Ivashkovskaya & Stepanova, 2011; Misangyi & Acharya, 
2014).  In addition, the insiders may be beholden to the CEO for their jobs; thereby they 
would not be keen to raise the sensitive issues of CEO actions and performance.  Outside 
directors or independent directors are those board members who do not hold a large 
percentage of a company’s shares, or they do not have professional relationships with the 
company they monitor (Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012).  The outside directors bear the 
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same legal responsibilities as the inside directors, but they accomplish the effectiveness 
by influencing company decisions, rather than monitoring and controlling operations.  
However, outside directors face difficulties in performing their responsibilities as they are 
not directly associated with the management (Pandya, 2011).   
The independence protects shareholder interest, and conducts control and 
monitors functions in a better way to align managers’ interests and stakeholders’ 
interests.  Therefore, to reduce the agency cost, the board is required to include a majority 
of independent directors, because they make the strategic planning role and monitoring 
role of the board more effective (Bouchareb, Ajina, & Souid, 2014; Kumar & Singh, 
2012).  The independent directors are more efficient and specialized to control the board 
than the executives and inside directors, as they have the capability to mitigate the 
concentrated power of the CEO, resulting in preventing the misuse of firm resources and 
improving its performance and market value.  However, sometimes independent directors 
are more likely to align their interests with the management, rather than the shareholders, 
because they hold an unimportant stake in the firm (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011).  From a 
different perspective, the proponents of stewardship theory argue that inside directors 
possess all necessary and vital information to take better managerial decisions, so they 
claim that a superior performance is associated with a majority of insiders (Syriopoulos 
& Tsatsaronis, 2012).   
The findings of some research on the relationship between board independency 
and firm performance are mixed (Darus & Mohamed, 2011; Habbash & Bajaher, 2014; 
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Ghazali, 2010; Nuryanah & Islam, 2011; Vintila & Gherghina, 2012).  Several authors 
found that the independent directors improve company performance and protect 
stakeholders in some cases in which there exists an agency problem, whereas others 
found either negative impact or no significant impact of independent directors on 
company performance (Kumar & Singh, 2012).  There are several reasons for these 
contrasting findings, such as differences in samples, performance measures, time frames, 
and sometimes the operational definition of independent directors (Dimitropoulos & 
Tsagkanos, 2012).  Accordingly, the selection of independent directors does not 
guarantee an improvement in the firm performance.  The success of a firm mostly 
depends on the balanced composition of a board combination of outside and inside 
directors (Ahmed & Gábor, 2012).  The findings of most research found that the optimal 
level of independent directorship is between 25% and 50% of the total board size 
(Pandya, 2011).  Considering as an important attribute of an efficient board, KSA’s 
Corporate Governance Regulations made it compulsory in 2006 that at least two or one- 
third of the members whichever is greater should be independent directors in order to 
improve core competencies of companies (Habbash & Bajaher, 2014). 
Board committees.  One of internal corporate governance mechanisms is board 
committees, which ensures that managers behave in the best interest of the stakeholders, 
including shareholders (Reddy & Locke, 2010).  Suitable number of board committees is 
created according to the firm circumstances and requirements to help the board of 
directors to do its duties and responsibilities in an efficient and effective manner.  These 
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committees are formed in accordance with the policies, rules and procedures laid down 
by the board, showing the responsibilities, duties, powers, and duration of each 
committee, as well as the manner in which the board controls and monitors its duties and 
responsibilities.  Each committee should comprise sufficient numbers of the independent 
and non-executive members that are concerned with activities and actions that might 
contain a conflict of interest, such as determination of remuneration, appointment of 
CEO, and integrity of financial and non-financial reports (KSA’s Corporate Governance 
Regulations, 2006).  The three common committees in Saudi publicly held companies are 
audit committee, nomination and remuneration committee, and executive committee. 
Audit committees.  According to KSA’s Corporate Governance Regulations 
(2006), the board of directors should form an audit committee and its member should not 
be less than three, among them a specialist in accounting and financial matters.  The 
committee members should be independent or non-executive directors.  The shareholders 
general assembly should issue the rules for the formation and appointing the audit 
committee members and identify the duration and procedure to be followed by the 
committee.  The key duty of the audit committee is to review the internal accounting 
system and control process, as well as hold meetings with the external auditors regularly 
to review financial statements (Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorty, & Wright, 2014; 
Maztoul, 2014; Samaha & Abdallah, 2012).   
Consistent with the agency theory, an independent audit committee acts as an 
additional monitoring mechanism that makes sure that the interests of shareholders are 
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protected (Ahmed & Gábor, 2012).  Accordingly, the audit committee mechanism 
improves the monitoring of management and communication between external auditors 
and the board (Samaha & Abdallah, 2012).  Audit committee plays an important role in 
enhancing company performance and value by implementing the principles of corporate 
governance, though Nuryanah and Islam (2011) revealed a negative relationship of an 
independent audit committee when the members have accounting and finance 
qualification, and performance.  This is inconsistent with the recommendation of the best 
practice for sound corporate governance (Cohen et al., 2014; Nuryanah & Islam, 2011).   
The independence principles require that the audit committee should work 
independently and discharge its duties and responsibilities with professional care (Gill & 
Obradovich, 2012).  Audit committee independence allows its members to challenge the 
executives’ decisions because of a lack of a personal relationship with firm’s managers 
(Darus & Mohamed, 2011).  The audit committee helps alleviate agency problems 
through monitoring mechanisms that improve the flows of information quality between 
firm shareholders and managers (Gill & Obradovich, 2012).  However, the previous 
studies revealed mixed findings with respect to the relationship between the audit 
committee and its member independence, and financial information reliability and 
internal control.  Some researchers found a positive relationship between the reliable 
financial information and independent audit committees; whereas some researchers 
concluded that the independent audit committee did not improve the reliability of 
financial information (Maztoul, 2014; Rambo, 2013; Rouf, 2011).  Others found a 
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positive association between sound internal control and the presence of audit committee 
independence.  The financial specialist of audit committee increases the likelihood that 
material misstatements will be detected and corrected in a timely fashion and discloses 
more information compared to firms without independent audit committee (Darus & 
Mohamed, 2011; Gill & Obradovich, 2012).   
Nomination and remuneration committees.  According to KSA’s Corporate 
Governance Regulations (2006), the board of each publicly listed company shall set up a 
committee of nomination and remuneration.  The shareholders general assembly shall 
issue rules for appointment of the committee members, their remuneration, and 
committee duration, as well as the procedures to be followed by the members.  The main 
responsibility and duty of nomination and remuneration committee is recommending to 
the board the appointment of board members.  Also, the committee reviews the structure 
of the board and recommends the proper changes, reviews the skills of board members, 
spells out the strength and weakness points of the members, lays down clear policies 
regarding the remuneration and indemnity of top executives and board members, and 
finally ensures the independence of the board members and the absence of any conflict of 
interests related to the members (KSAs Corporate Governance Regulations, 2006).  
Reddy and Locke (2010) found a positive association between the existence of a 
nomination and remuneration committee and both firm performance and value, but they 
noted this relationship is not considerably significant. 
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Executive committees.  The board of directors may create a committee to be 
named executive committee (KSA’s Corporate Governance Regulations, 2006).  This 
committee may meet to make decisions about issues that arise between scheduled board 
meetings, as these issues should not be postponed until the next scheduled meeting of the 
board.  The main responsibilities and duties of the executive committee are to provide 
organizational direction on behalf of the entire board and make decisions ranging from 
policy, strategy planning, investment and risk, and then report upward its actions to the 
entire board.  Furthermore, executive committee may be responsible for other duties, 
such as evaluating company executive directors.  However, this committee does not have 
authority regarding certain actions, such as dividend distributions, merger or sale of 
corporate assets, appointing or removing directors and officers, amending article of 
association, or determining committee members’ compensation.      
Ownership structures.  Ownership structure is one of the most important factors 
in corporate governance mechanisms, which shapes governance system of any country, 
as this factor identifies the nature of the agency problem.  Ownership structure is 
important in laying down the discipline of managers, company’s objectives, and 
shareholder wealth.  Corporate governance rules both shareholders and managers to have 
unified goals and objectives of maximizing company performance and value (Ibrahim & 
Samad, 2011; Liao, Shyu, & Chien, 2014).  There exist two important aspects of firm 
ownership structure as composition and concentration.  Ownership composition 
determines who the shareholders are and who belongs to the controlling groups 
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(Mangunyi, 2011; Sáenz González & García-meca, 2014).  According to agency theory, 
the better overlap between shares ownership and business control result in mitigation in 
conflicts of interests, thereby increasing organization value (Mangunyi, 2011).   
The degree of ownership concentration in a company identifies how power and 
authority are distributed between the managers and shareholders.  Concentrated 
ownership considers the proportion of the company shares owned by the greatest 
shareholders, which may tend to exert pressures on managers to adopt a corporate 
behavior maximizing their wealth (Ojo, 2014; Vintila & Gherghina, 2012).  However, 
there are competing arguments between alignment theory and expropriation theory on 
whether ownership concentration is beneficial or detrimental to the company outside 
shareholders (Leung & Horwitz, 2010).   
As per the alignment theory, when the ownership is concentrated in the hand of 
some shareholders, shareholding control tends to be sound and agency cost would be less.  
Accordingly, ownership concentration plays a significant role in controlling and 
monitoring a firm’s management, as a result, the interests of both shareholders and 
management are aligned.  Therefore, the ownership disperses leads to poor shareholder 
monitoring.  The shareholders with small stakes are less likely to be active and interested 
in monitoring activities because they would bear high monitoring costs and get less 
benefits (Mangunyi, 2011).  As per the exploitation theory, there is a problem with the 
ownership concentration, as controlling shareholders who may act in their own interests 
would exploit minority shareholders.  The ownership concentration enables the 
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shareholders who have a significant stake in a company to appoint and fire managers that 
will hinder them from external control mechanisms.  Therefore, ownership concentration 
intensifies the conflict of interest between minority and majority shareholders (Leung & 
Horwitz, 2010; Soltani, 2014).  The previous studies produced mixed results with respect 
to the relationship between the ownership concentration and firm performance (Leung & 
Horwitz, 2010).   
The check and balance of ownership is very important governance mechanism in 
solving the ownership concentration debate and improving firm performance (Mangunyi, 
2011).  The check and balance of ownership exists when many large shareholders share 
the control and monitor for a firm.  Accordingly, no one major shareholder of the firm 
can solely monitor the business and the process of decision making, rather, the decision 
making is done through the coordination and negotiation among several large 
shareholders, leading to good performance (Mangunyi, 2011).   
There are three different kinds of ownership in KSA as managerial ownership, 
foreign ownership, and government ownership.  Agency theory assumes that the 
managerial ownership can help mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and 
managers, because the manager who owns the significant portion of the firm shares has 
more motivation and incentives to make better decisions to maximize firm value.  
Contrary to agency theory, managerial ownership may make value-reducing decisions to 
protect their interests in the company regardless the interests of outside shareholders, and 
hence communication and coordination problems would increase, resulting in reducing 
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the company value (Garcia-Meca & Juan Pedro, 2011).  However, the empirical research 
with respect to the relationship between managerial ownership and both firm 
performance and market value are mixed (Ghazali, 2010).  If the ownership structure of a 
firm contains a large proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders, indication are that 
foreign shareholders have confidence in the performance of that firm, leading to positive 
effect on market value.   
Previous studies found that firms with a higher portion of foreign shareholders 
disclosed significantly more operating and financial information in their annual report in 
order to attract more investors (Ghazali, 2010).  Government ownership is another 
common feature of the business environment in KSA.  The government ownership in 
publicly listed companies in KSA ensures close control and monitoring of the activities 
of these companies.  The government monitoring would lead to ongoing success of these 
companies, so that the stability of stock market and economy is met.  Thus, it may be 
expected that these companies may perform better than others.  However, the results of 
previous studies on the relationship between government ownership and both firm 
performance and market value are mixed as are kinds of ownership structure (Ghazali, 
2010).         
In KSA, the ownership was found concentrated, particularly in family companies.  
Moreover, boards of directors are more dominated by the majority of shareholders to the 
extent that their effectiveness in monitoring decision making process is doubtful.  In 
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KSA, Stakeholders, other than shareholders, sound to be marginalized in the actual 
practice of firms (Habbash & Bajaher, 2014; Piesse et al., 2012).     
Executive compensation.  Executives with no or little ownership stake in the 
companies they run have little incentive and motivation to manage the company in a 
manner consistent with the owners interests.  This conflict is essentially contractual in 
nature that can be solved through executive compensation combined with board of 
directors and capital market oversight (Carney, Gedajlovic, & Sur, 2011).  Executive 
compensation is a tool designed to strengthen the ability of board and shareholders to 
control management actions (Campbell, Ghosh, Petrova, & Sirmans, 2011).  Executive 
compensation can include basic salaries and variable compensations, such as share 
options, dividends, and bonuses, as well as fringe benefits (Lin, 2010).  Consistent with 
agency theory, executive compensation is an important factor of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, which can reduce agency conflicts between shareholders and 
executives (Mangunyi, 2011; Nuryanah & Islam, 2011).   
Shareholders can use compensation schemes for rewarding the managers 
financially to align company interests with shareholder interests.  The schemes include 
plans where executives get shares, mostly at a discount price.  Furthermore, these 
schemes may link levels of benefits and executive compensation to firm value and 
shareholders returns; part of this compensation is deferred to the future to reward long-
term value maximization.  A significant portion of executive compensation must be 
“locked” in for a period ranges from 5 to 10 years and based upon the achievement of 
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long-term success of the firm (Alam, Chen, Ciccotello, & Ryan, 2014).  Such schemes 
hinder short-term managers’ actions, which can be detrimental to firm value (Syriopoulos 
& Tsatsaronis, 2012).  Thus, firms can resolve agency problems and maximize their 
values via compensation systems (Lin, 2010).   
Some previous empirical studies found that increasing executive compensation 
can directly improve firm performance based on supervision mechanisms (Lin, 2010).  
Furthermore, they found a positive association between executive compensation and firm 
share prices.  However, others found no association between executive compensation and 
corporate performance (Lin, 2010).        
Corporate Governance Indexes 
There are no generally accepted corporate governance mechanisms by the 
different countries.  Furthermore, management scholars use different corporate 
governance definitions, instrumentations, and indices depending on the researcher’s 
interest and purpose (Bonna, 2011; Mulili & Wong, 2011).  Therefore, several indexes 
have been used to measure corporate governance mechanisms.   
Gompers et al. (2003) created a G-Index as a measure of corporate governance 
and the strength of shareholder rights using corporate takeover defenses, bylaw 
provisions, and firm rules.  The G-Index varies from 0 to 24 (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 
2014).  Each parameter of shareholder rights is given a zero/one score.  Zero shows no 
particular limitation on shareholder rights, whereas a one indicates the existence of a 
limiting provision.  A lower number shows greater management entrenchment, less 
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transparency, and existence of more provisions limiting shareholder rights.  A higher 
number shows a greater emphasis on shareholder rights, a relative absence of 
management entrenchment provisions, and greater transparency of information and 
processes (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2014).  Thus, a higher G-Index is combined with robust 
shareholder rights and higher financial performance; whereas a lower G-Index is 
combined with weak shareholder rights, lower financial performance, and lower market 
value.  This index does not accurately reflect the relative impacts of the various 
provisions.  In addition, it does not require any judgments about the effectiveness or 
wealth effects of any of these provisions; it only considers the impact on the balance of 
power. 
Brown and Caylor (2004) also constructed governance composite indexes using 
publicly available data compiled by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).  This 
governance index composite score was identified as G-Index (GI).  The results showed 
that higher indexes show higher firm value (Tobin's Q ) and higher market return, and  
better financial and operating performance (ROA and ROE).  Brown and Caylor 
calculated the index from 52 of the variables, which firm characteristics and governance 
provisions including executive compensation and executive mandatory retirement age.  
The feasible range of scores is 0 to 52 with each variable equally weighted by "1".  A 
higher index score is associated with more robust corporate governance effectiveness, 
with a G-Index of 51 being the highest. 
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Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) developed an E-Index based on IRRC 
publicly available data.  Bebchuk et al. used a 6-provision subset of the G-Index. The 
index ranges from 0 to 6.  A lowest score of 0 is related to high shareholder rights, 
whereas a highest score of 6 is related to weak shareholder rights.  Consistent with G-
index, E-index gives an equal weight to each of set provisions by assigning one point to 
each of the provision a firm has. 
In addition, the Corporate Library, a leading independent source for corporate 
governance data constructed a governance index.  The benchmark score of this index is 
based on board composition, board classification, board tenure, board size, boards 
interlock, open adoption of corporate governance policies, CEO compensation structure, 
and the age of directors’ retirement.  The index ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 100.  
The index is developed by overweighting the data believed to most likely impact 
governance practices (Bonna, 2011). 
Corporate Governance Effect on Financial Performance and Market Value 
Theoretically, good corporate governance can achieve better financial 
performance and value in both developed and emergent markets.  Financial performance 
and market value have several dimensions, including asset quality, capital adequacy, 
returns on capital, and share price among other parameters (Rambo, 2012).  Also, 
financial performance and market value are impacted by several factors other than 
corporate governance.  These factors are sales growth, technology, environment, legal 
and social environment, macroeconomic, liquidity, firm size, leverage, management 
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competence, qualified employees in the top managerial staff, and so on (Bonna, 2011).  
In this section, the findings of the previous research with respect to the relationship 
between corporate governance and both corporate performance and market value are 
explored.  
 The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance.  The 
literature of corporate governance in developing and developed countries provided 
controversial findings regarding the relationship between corporate governance, and the 
company economic and financial performance (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012).  Various 
researchers have linked corporate governance to performance of corporate entities, but 
the results are not convergent (Abels & Martelli, 2011; Chahine & Safieddine, 2011; 
Coskun & Sayilir, 2012; Ivashkovskaya & Stepanova ,2011; Lama, 2012; Moradi, Aldin, 
Hevrani, & Iranmahd, 2012;  Nicolaescu ,2012;  Nuryanah & Islam, 2011;  Pelayo-
Maciel et al., 2012; Rambo, 2013; Ştefănescu, 2014; Ur Rehman & Mangla, 2012; 
Vintila & Gherghina, 2012).   
Most researchers revealed that the corporate governance is an important 
ingredient for the overall growth of the firm performance, as well as the country’s 
economy (e.g., Abels & Martelli, 2011; Chahine & Safieddine, 2011; Ivashkovskaya & 
Stepanova ,2011; Lama, 2012; Moradi, Aldin, Hevrani, & Iranmahd , 2012;  Nicolaescu 
,2012;  Nuryanah & Islam, 2011;  Pelayo-Maciel et al., 2012; Rambo, 2013; Ştefănescu, 
2014).  The results drawn by different researchers are positive and direct, as corporate 
governance plays an important role in enhancing the performance of the firm (Abels & 
64 
 
 
 
Martelli, 2011; Chahine & Safieddine, 2011; Ivashkovskaya & Stepanova ,2011; Lama, 
2012; Moradi, Aldin, Hevrani, & Iranmahd , 2012;  Nicolaescu ,2012;  Nuryanah & 
Islam, 2011;  Pelayo-Maciel et al., 2012; Rambo, 2013; Ştefănescu, 2014).  However, 
some researchers also had drawn negative and indirect results, as well as neutral and 
mixed relationships (Ahmed & Gabor, 2011; Bagchi, 2011; Hassan Al-Tamimi, 2012; 
Ibrahim et al., 2010;  Mangunyi, 2011; Pandya, 2011; Peni & Vahamaa, 2012; Vintila and 
Gherghina, 2012).  For the purpose of this study, I reviewed 39 empirical researches; 25 
studies showed a positive relationship, one showed a negative relationship, four showed a 
neutral relationship, and nine revealed a mixed relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance. 
Positive relationships.  The majority of researchers have supported the positive 
relationship between corporate governance and financial performance (Abels & Martelli, 
2011; Chahine & Safieddine, 2011; Ivashkovskaya & Stepanova ,2011; Lama, 2012; 
Moradi, Aldin, Hevrani, & Iranmahd , 2012;  Nicolaescu ,2012;  Nuryanah & Islam, 
2011;  Pelayo-Maciel et al., 2012; Rambo, 2013; Ştefănescu, 2014).  Martani and Saputra 
(2009) used the mean equality test and multiple regression to examine the effect of 
corporate governance to the performance of the firm measured by Economic Value 
Added (EVA).  Martani and Saputra found that the corporate governance has a significant 
impact on EVA.  However, the corporate governance index is superior in affecting ROE 
more than ROA and EVA.   
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Leung and Horwitz (2010) used a regression model to examine the effects of 
management ownership and other corporate governance variables on Hong Kong firms’ 
stock performance following the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–98).   The results showed 
that firms with more equity ownership by non-executive directors, along with the duality 
of CEO/chairman position experienced a smaller stock price decline.  By testing 
companies' responses to the nine high level principles and guidelines promulgated by 
New Zealand Securities Commission (NZSC), Reddy and Locke (2010) addressed the 
relationship between corporate governance practices, which based on the principles, and 
the financial performance of large publicly traded firms.  Panel data for the top 50 
companies listed on New Zealand capital market over the period 1999-2007 were used 
and analyzed using two stage least squares (2SLS) regression techniques and ordinary 
least squares (OLS).  The findings revealed a positive relationship between the NZSC 
recommendations and firm performance, as well as remuneration committee and firm 
performance (Reddy & Locke, 2010).  This study provided a comprehensive picture of 
performance outcomes that have not been achieved in previous studies.   
Using the classic model approach, Ivashkovskaya and Stepanova (2011) 
examined the impact of ownership structure, board of directors’ activity, and capital 
structure on corporate performance.  The results of the study found that the board's 
composition and the investors with significant voting power affect firm performance 
positively.  In addition, the results found the impact of government ownership varies 
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depending on the country, while the independent directors and related shareholders seem 
add more value to corporations.  
 Nuryanah and Islam (2011) examined the impact of the corporate governance 
mechanisms and corporate financial performance in Indonesia.  Nuryanah and Islam 
assumed that the results on the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the 
corporate performance, which is relevant to developed stock markets, were not 
appropriate for emerging stock markets, because the cultural and political environments 
are different between the two markets.  The findings of the study revealed that all internal 
corporate governance mechanisms except size of both audit committee and board, and 
management ownership have a significant relationship with firm performance (Nuryanah 
& Islam, 2011).   
Abels and Martelli (2011) investigated the compliance status within the largest 
500 firms in the United States to uncover the status of the extent in which CEO duality 
exists within the US.  The results revealed little evidence to support that a two-tier system 
improves sales revenue, profits, or shareholder returns.  Despite the large sample, the 
findings cannot be generalized on the medium and small revenue-producing firms, 
because the sample was selected among the top revenue-producing firms.  Also, Chahine 
and Safieddine (2011) investigated the relationship between board size and its 
composition, and bank   performance in Lebanon using a fixed-effect model.  Chahine 
and Safieddine used 749 firm years of data from 1992 to 2006.  The results found that the 
bank performance is positively related to board size and board independence.   
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Using a sample of 54 firms listed companies on the Nairobi Stock Exchange 
(NSE), Ongore and Kobonyo (2011) examined the interrelations among ownership, board 
and manager characteristics, and firm performance.  PPMC, logistic regression, and 
stepwise regression were used to achieve the purpose of the study.  The findings found a 
significant positive relationship between corporate performance, and institutional, insider, 
foreign and diverse ownership forms, as well as managerial discretion, whereas the 
relationship between corporate performance, and government and ownership 
concentration was significantly negative (Ongore & Kobonyo, 2011).  In the same year 
and based on empirical analyses of 11 large Tunisian commercial banks during 1997-
2006, Rachdi and Ines (2011) analyzed board characteristics and its effect on 
performance and incentives to take the risk in the banking industry.  The results found 
that bank board structure is a determinant factor for bank risk taking and bank 
performance, which supported the idea, commonly accepted. 
Lama (2012) used the Pearson correlation to test the association between firms’ 
corporate governance structure and a firm’s operating outcomes.  Mid-sized Australian 
ASX firms were used to proxy the sample companies’ corporate governance quality.  
Lama found significant positive relationships between a firm's operating performance and 
the mid-size companies who did not implement corporate governance well adversely 
affected their shareholder returns.   
Using a sample of 84 publicly listed companies on Tehran Stock Exchange from 
year 2007 to 2011, Moradi et al. (2012) investigated the effects of financing activities and 
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corporate governance mechanisms on firms' performance.  The authors concluded that 
financing decisions, capital structures, and corporate governance are affected by 
companies’ performance (Moradi et al., 2012).  Capital structures and corporate 
governance can increase profitability and shareholder's value in the long term.  
Nicolaescu (2012) analyzed and discussed the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on company performance in China during the crisis.  Nicolaescu concluded 
that the corporate governance mechanisms, corporate board, and ownership structure 
affect company performance.  Using a sample of 43 publicly listed companies on 
Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2009, Nuryaman (2012) examined the impact of 
corporate governance practices on the firm’s financial performance.  Nuryaman used 
multiple linear regression and concluded that corporate governance has a positive effect 
on both stock performance and firm's operational performance.   
Furthermore, Shah et al. (2012) examined the relationship among the corporate 
governance, firm’s performance, ownership structure, and the firm’s risk taking behavior.  
Using regression models, the authors  found  that the improvement in the corporate 
governance practices has a positive effect on both the company's financial performance 
and the decreases in the risk level,  whereas, corporate governance has a negative 
relationship with the concentration of ownership (Shah et al., 2012).  Using data of 43 
shipping firms listed on two major US stock exchanges, NASDAQ and NYSE, 
Syriopoulos and Tsatsaronis (2012) investigated the relationship between CEO duality 
and corporate financial performance of shipping firms.  The results of the study found a 
69 
 
 
 
positive relationship between CEO separation and corporate financial performance of 
shipping firms; these findings support agency theory.   
Moreover, Koncevičienė et al. (2012) examined the relationship between the 
introduction of new EU directives regulating corporate governance issues and the capital 
markets performance of EU countries.  The authors selected three EU countries as 
representative of developed markets and emerging market; Germany and United 
Kingdom represented the developed markets, while Lithuania represented the emerging 
markets.  Koncevičienė et al. (2012) found that developed capital markets, represented by 
Deutsche Börse and London SE demonstrated the increasing change tendencies of their 
indexes and other performance indicators of these capital markets till the end of 2007 
when the world financial crisis happened.  In addition, the results showed that developed 
markets represented by Germany and United Kingdom demonstrated better performance 
after the transposition of the directive (Koncevičienė et al., 2012).  However, these 
findings cannot be generalized, because of the limited number of EU countries.  
 Pelayo-Maciel et al. (2012) discussed the effect of the structure of corporate 
governance on financial performance and human resource management in Colombia.  
The authors analyzed the concept and structure of corporate governance, and discussed 
both the stewardship theory and agency theory.  Pelayo-Maciel et al. (2012) found that 
the structure of corporate governance can positively affect the functioning of the firm 
itself and improve its financial performance.  Also, Chou and Hardin (2012) investigated 
whether firms with strong governance generate higher returns, as well as examined the 
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association between mutual fund corporate governance preference and fund performance 
segmented by fund investment style.  The sample period was from 1990 to 2008 and data 
obtained from three sources:  The corporate G-index was from the IRRC, stock returns 
were from the CRSP stock file, and mutual fund returns and fund characteristics were 
from the CRSP Survivor Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database.  A direct relationship 
was found between overall mutual fund corporate governance preference and the 
corporate governance premium.  There is evidence that the investment preferences of 
mutual funds forecast the change in the corporate governance premium and investment 
activities of institutional investors can affect stock performance (Chou & Hardin, 2012). 
Dimitropoulos and Tsagkanos (2012) examined the impact of corporate 
governance quality on the profitability and viability of European Union's football clubs 
over the period 2005-2009.  Dimitropoulos and Tsagkanos found that the corporate 
governance quality leads to greater levels of profitability and viability.  However, the 
results of this study cannot be generalized, because the data set covered a single sport 
activity (football) and was restricted within a specific region (EU).   
Ergin (2012) investigated whether or not investors considered the ranking of 
corporate governance when evaluating the share price, as well as the entire effect of 
corporate governance on the share price.  A price model was used to examine all the rated 
firms quoted to ISE for the years 2006 to 2010.  The financial performance and 
accounting performance were found significantly and positively associated with the 
corporate governance rankings.  The components of corporate governance that have a 
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positive and significant association with the financial performance are stakeholders, 
public disclosure, and transparency.   
Reyna (2012) studied the relationship between ownership structure and 
performance of 90 companies listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange for the period 2005-
2009, excluding companies that do not include enough information in their financial 
statements, non-profit companies, and financial institutions.  Reyna (2012) founds that 
the ownership concentration significantly affects the company performance.  The 
corporations with high levels of ownership concentration seek a better way to protect and 
maximize their interests, but this high concentration, especially in family companies, 
leads to the use of additional corporate governance mechanisms.  Tin-yan and Shu-kam 
(2012) examined the relationship between board committees and firm performance and 
the moderating effect of family ownership for public companies in Hong Kong.  The 
sample comprised of 346 firm-year observations for the periods 2001-2003.  The authors 
found a significant relationship between a nomination and remuneration committee and 
company performance, depending on the independence of its composition (Tin-yan & 
Shu-kam, 2012). 
Rambo (2013) used one-way ANOVA, multiple regression models, and Pearson's 
correlation coefficients to examine the relationship between corporate governance factors 
and the financial performance of Kenyan commercial banks.  Rambo found a positive 
relationship between corporate governance and bank performance, but unlisted and listed 
commercial banks were significantly different in terms of financial performance and 
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other factors.  Doğan, Elitaş, Ağca, and Ögel (2013) examined the impact of CEO duality 
on the firm performance using a sample of 204 traded companies on Istanbul Stock 
Exchange from the years 2009-2010.  The authors found a negative relationship between 
CEO duality and company performance, which is consistent with the agency theory 
(Doğan et al., 2013).  The shareholders would get a better return in companies that have 
separate CEO and chairperson positions in terms of share of profit and price.   
Ştefănescu (2014) analyzed the relationship between corporate governance and 
both corporate performance and strategies of banking institutions at European Union 
level. The findings of the analysis revealed that corporate governance has positive effect 
on bank performance measured by ROA and ROE.  However, these findings cannot be 
generalized, because of the limited number of independent factors, restricting the sample 
to the banks, and the use of a one year of data for analysis. 
Negative relationships.  Using the cross-sectional multiple linear regression 
models, Vintila and Gherghina (2012) examined the relationship between corporate 
governance ratings and firm performance.  The models included both a global measure of 
corporate governance and four sub-indices as corresponding audit, board structure, and 
shareholder rights and compensation, provided by Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS).  Vintila and Gherghina found a negative relationship between firm performance 
and corporate governance global rating.  The findings also showed a negative relationship 
between firm performance and corporate governance sub-indices, with some exception.  
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However, when the authors excluded the firms belonging to real estate and financial 
sector, the results supported the same findings. 
Neutral relationships.  Several other studies have found neutral relationships 
between corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance.  Ghazali (2010) 
evaluated the impact of the implementation of the new regulations of Malaysian 
government on corporate performance.  Ghazali used data of 87 non-financial listed 
companies included in the composite index; the data were extracted from the year 2001 
annual reports.  Ghazali found no one of the corporate governance variables was 
statistically significant in explaining corporate performance.  However, the government 
as a substantial shareholder and foreign ownership were statistically significantly 
associated with corporate performance.  The results of this study were limited and cannot 
be generalized, because the regulations on corporate governance were implemented in 
2001, so it was early to reach a proper conclusion for the financial year 2001 as 
regulatory changes may take several years before they show positive or intended results.   
Bagchi (2011) examined whether corporate governance affects market returns.  
Bagchi used descriptive statistics, vector auto-regression, and ordinary regression; as well 
as conducted a test of significance for means and variances of the series.  The effect of 
economic shocks on the capital market performance of the higher governance index firms 
was found similar to moderate and low governance indexed firms (Bagchi, 2011).  These 
results disagreed with the results of some previous research, which found that a portfolio 
containing sound corporate governance companies had gained more investment return as 
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compared to the return of a portfolio containing weak corporate governance firms 
(Bagchi, 2011).   
Using a sample of twelve banks out of which there are eight public sector banks 
and four private sector banks, Pandya (2011) examined the effect of corporate 
governance structures on the corporate performance.  Data were obtained from the annual 
reports of the selected Indian banks from the websites of the banks for two different 
periods: Year 2005-06 and 2008-9.  Pandya founded no significant impact of the 
corporate governance structures on the banks’ financial performance.  However, the 
results obtained are restricted and cannot be generalized because of sample size is small. 
Finally, Coskun and Sayilir (2012) examined the relationship between corporate 
governance, and both company value and profitability performance of Turkish 
companies.  The authors found no significant relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance.  However, the study findings are limited because of using 
only observation of 31 companies of different periods, 2006-2010 (Coskun & Sayilir, 
2012).   
Mixed relationships.  By taking a sample from Canadian Businesses ' rankings of 
the top 25 worst board of directors and the top 25 board of directors for 2007, Stanwick 
and Stanwick (2010) examined whether a good corporate governance yields higher 
financial performance than poor corporate governance for Canadian firms.  Stanwick and 
Stanwick found that the effects of firm board on firm performance are mixed and 
discovered a positive association between the board of directors with a high 
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accountability level and firm performance, while found a significant negative relationship 
between board independence and financial performance.  In general, the authors revealed 
that the overall corporate governance helps improve the financial position of the 
companies (Stanwick & Stanwick, 2010).  However, the results of this study were limited 
and cannot be generalized, because the sample was small.  
Using a sample of 40 bank managers within Nairobi City in Kenya, Mangunyi 
(2011) examined the impact of corporate governance, in particular ownership structure, 
on Kenyan’s bank performance.  Mangunyi used a semi-structured questionnaire which 
consisted of both closed and open-ended questions.  The author found a significant 
difference between corporate governance and financial performance of banks, whereas no 
significant difference between the ownership type and bank performance, and between 
corporate governance practices and banks ownership structure (Mangunyi, 2011).  
Ahmed and Gabor (2011) examined the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on corporate financial performance of 27 listed banking companies in 
Bangladesh for the period of 2003-2008.  Ahmed & Gabor found no significant effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on financial performances, while found an 
insignificant negative effect of independent directors and non-independent non-executive 
directors on the level of bank performance.  Ahmed and Gabor recommended that 
companies should balance between corporate governance mechanisms and their 
performance by adopting risk management and strategic decision, along with efficient 
utilization of company’s resources.   
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Vintila and Gherghina (2012) examined the effect of CEO characteristics and 
corporate governance mechanisms on U.S. listed firms' performance using a random 
sample of 155 U.S companies for year 2011.  Vintila and Gherghina used the cross-
section multiple linear regression and found mixed results between corporate governance 
and firm performance.  Vintila and Gherghina found a positive relationship between 
insider shareholdings and price-earnings ratio and, and also found no significant 
relationship between firm performance and the number of independent directors from the 
board, and there were mixed findings with respect to the relationship between corporate 
performance and board size.   
Abels and Martelli (2012) examined the independence of CEO and Chairmen, 
which can impact both the perceived independence of management and company 
performance to compliment the literature.   Abels and Martelli selected the top 500 
companies in the U.S. in terms of sales revenue.  Abels and Martelli found that CEO 
duality was neither important nor significant to corporate performance.  Abels and 
Martelli also found that CEO age was important and significant to corporate 
performance.  Hassan Al-Tamimi (2012) investigated the impact of corporate governance 
on UAE national banks’ performance and financial distress.  The study population 
included the heavy banks involved in corporate governance of the UAE national banks.  
Hassan Al-Tamimi found a significant positive relationship between financial distress 
and corporate governance practices of UAE national banks and no significant relationship 
between corporate governance and performance level.   
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Furthermore, Peni and Vahamaa (2012) examined whether or not the sound 
corporate governance mechanisms of the banks were associated with better stock market 
performance and higher profitability amidst the crisis of 2008.  The selected sample 
consisted of 62 large publicly traded U.S. banks and 248 firm-year observations for the 
years 2005–200 8 (Peni &Vahamaa, 2012).  Peni and Vahamaa found that the effects of 
corporate governance on bank performance are mixed.  Strong governance may have 
negative effects on stock market values of banks amidst the crisis; despite the findings 
revealed a strong relationship between the corporate governance mechanisms and the 
high profitability in 2008 of the banks.  However, Peni and Vahamaa contended that 
strong corporate governance may have alleviated the adverse impact of the financial 
crisis on bank credibility.   
Ur Rehman and Mangla (2012) investigated the relationship between corporate 
governance variables and the firm performance of thirty banks in Pakistan for the 
period of 2001-2009.  Ur Rehman and Mangla found a significant effect of corporate 
governance variables, especially board size, on the performance of the overall banking 
sector in Pakistan, whereas no significant effect of corporate governance practices on 
the foreign banks performance.  Further studies are recommended to generalize these 
results by increasing the sample period and replacing or increasing the different corporate 
governance variables of the study. 
Using a sample of nine banks in Nigeria for years 2006 to 2010, Onakoya et al. 
(2014) investigated the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
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performance using ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis.  The authors found 
that the ownership structure and board size positively affect ROE, whereas corporate 
governance indicator has negative effect on the assets of the banks.  However, the authors 
found that the relationship between board composition and banks profitability was 
insignificant.  Furthermore, the authors showed that both economic conditions factors and 
regulatory influence have insignificant effect on ROA and ROE (Onakoya et al., 2014).  
Onakoya et al. (2014) recommended that government agencies and regulators should 
ensure stability in the country macroeconomic environment. 
 The relationship between corporate governance and firm value.  Similar to 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, most corporate 
governance scholars found that the corporate governance is an important factor for the 
firm value.  Most of the researchers found a significant and positive relationship between 
corporate governance and firm value, as corporate governance plays an important role in 
enhancing the value of the firm.  Among eight empirical research articles reviewed, six 
researchers found a positive relationship (Berthelot et al., 2010; Gill & Obradovich, 
2012; Kumar & Singh, 2012; Shin-Ping & Hui-Ju, 2011; Yang, 2011; Zerni, Kallunki, & 
Nilsson, 2010), while two researchers found a mixed relationship between corporate 
governance and market value (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012; Garcia-Meca & Juan Pedro, 
2011). 
Positive relationships.  Berthelot et al. (2010) examined whether the corporate 
governance rankings published by market information intermediary were reflected in the 
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values that investors accorded to firms.  The study sample composed of 289 firms 
covered by the Globe and Mail corporate governance ratings for years 2002 to 2005.  The 
authors used a price model relating share price to book value of equity (BVEjt) and 
current net income (NIjt).  The author found a significant relationship between the 
corporate governance rankings and firm market value and accounting results (Berthelot et 
al., 2010).  However, the results of this study are limited cannot be generalized, because 
the potential interrelations between contextual variables and corporate governance 
practices were not taken into account.  
 Zerni et al. (2010) investigated the effectiveness of two main corporate 
governance mechanisms, the auditing and board of directors, in alleviating the equity 
discounts that arise from the potential entrenchment problem between inside shareholders 
(managers) and outside shareholders.  The sample of this study consisted of 1,171 firm-
year observations for years 2000-2006; these firms listed on the SSE (Zerni et al., 2010).  
The authors found both higher quality auditors and boards with equity incentives may act 
as effective governance mechanisms with positive valuation implications (Zerni et al., 
2010).  
By taking data from publicly traded firms in Taiwan, covering a ten-year period 
from1995-2004, Shin-Ping and Hui-Ju (2011) examined the relationships among CEO 
compensation, ownership, and firm value.  Shin-Ping and Hui-Ju found that CEO 
compensation, CEO ownership, and firm value are related.  Furthermore, institution 
ownership, firm value, firm size, board size, and CEO ownership are positively 
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interdependent with CEO compensation.  Shin-Ping and Hui-Ju contended that the proper 
compensation package of executives could decrease agency costs between managers and 
shareholders.  As the previous studies provided inconclusive results on the relationship 
between corporate governance structure and firm value, Yang (2011) examined the 
impact of corporate governance on firm value in Canada.   The author found that the 
connection between firm value and corporate governance is sensitive to the methodology 
employed.  The author also found that adopting high-standard corporate governance may 
increase firm value (Yang, 2011). 
Kumar and Singh (2012) investigated if the monitoring by independent director 
and grey director (non-executive non-independent) affects firm performance.  The 
authors examined the relationship between outside directors and the efficacy of the 
boards of 157 non-financial Indian firms.  These firms listed on Bombay Stock Exchange 
in the year 2008.  The data obtained and extracted from the Prowess database of Centre 
for Monitoring Indian Economy and corporate governance reports annexed to annual 
reports.  The authors revealed that the proportion of grey directors on the board has 
marginally deteriorated effect on firm value, whereas the proportion of independent 
directors has an insignificant positive impact on market value of forms (Kumar & Singh, 
2012).  Therefore, the independent directors should have a greater representation on the 
board instead of other non-executive outside directors.  Using a sample of 333 publicly 
listed companies on New York Stock Exchange for a period of 3 years from 2009-2011, 
Gill and Obradovich (2012) examined the effect of financial leverage and corporate 
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governance on the value of American companies.   CEO duality, insider ownership, 
company size, the audit committee, returns on assets, and financial leverage were found 
positively impact the value of U.S. firms, whereas the larger board size negatively 
impacts the value of U.S. firms (Gill & Obradovich, 2012).   
Mixed relationships.  Garcia-Meca and Juan Pedro (2011) examined the effects 
on Tobin's Q of several dimensions of ownership structure in Spain likely to represent 
conflicting interests:  These dimensions are ownership concentration, bank ownership, 
and insider ownership.  The authors used a sample of non-financial traded firms listed on 
the Madrid Stock Exchange during 1999-2002.  Garcia-Meca and Juan Pedro found a 
positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm value, but the high levels 
of large shareholder ownership negatively affect the market value.   
Finally, Coskun and Sayilir (2012) investigated the relationship between 
corporate governance and company value of Turkish firms using a regression model.  The 
authors found no significant relationship between corporate governance and company 
value (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012).  On average, a sound set of corporate governance 
policies, principles, and practices positively affects the company value; thereby the 
companies should improve their corporate governance system before becoming 
investable to maximize the market valuation gains.  Good corporate governance standard 
along with a dual listing in a country enhances a firm’s corporate governance, thereby 
increase the market value (Ionescu, 2012). 
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Transition and Summary 
In Section 1 of this study, I addressed the fundamental issues that have led to the 
need for corporate governance’s progress as an emergent demand.  Furthermore, Section 
1 covered the key reasons for examining the relationships of corporate governance with 
corporate financial performance and market value in KSA’s publicly listed companies.  
In Section1 I described the general problem and specific business problem of the study.  
The general business problem is the controversial findings from previous studies failed to 
provide consensus with respect to the relationships between corporate governance, and 
financial performance and firm’s market value; these divergent findings may undermine 
business leaders’ adherence and compliance with the best corporate governance practices.  
The specific business problem is that some business leaders of KSA publicly listed 
companies do not have sufficient knowledge of the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms, financial performance, and market value to determine the 
relevance and importance of developing and implementing corporate governance rules 
and regulations.   
The theoretical framework of this study is based on two theories: Agency theory 
and institutional theory.  The theoretical underpinnings of the study were addressed in the 
literature review through 4 main parts that frame the research questions and hypotheses.  
The literature review comprises (a) corporate governance theories, (b) the concept and 
definitions of corporate governance, (c) corporate governance mechanisms, and (d) 
corporate governance effect on financial performance and market value.  In Section 2, I 
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addressed the study’s proposed methodology to explain (a) research method and design, 
(b) population and sampling, (c) data collection, (d) date analysis technique, and (e) 
reliability and validity of the study.  In Section 3, I presented and interpreted the findings 
obtained from the data process and analysis.  I also presented (a) the conclusions, (b) 
applications to professional practice, (c) recommendations for actions and further study, 
and (d) the implication for social change intended for improving business practice. 
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Section 2: The Project 
Proper implementation and sound enforcement of good corporate governance 
mechanisms are very important for the survival and growth of publicly listed firms 
(Mande, Ishak, & Idris, 2014).  Robust corporate governance helps firms’ leaders to meet 
their legal requirements and alleviate conflict of interests, as well as makes firms 
attractive to investors’ capital.   Examining and providing evidence on the relationship 
between corporate governance and both corporate financial performance and firm’s 
market value may enable firms’ executives to comply with the legal requirements of 
capital markets and develop socially responsible behaviors, which in return may help  
managers lower the cost of capital, and enhance market value and reputation for their 
firms (Bonna, 2011).  This section presents a detailed description of the proposed study’s 
methodology and design features. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between KSA corporate governance variables and financial performance and 
market value.  The independent variables are corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. 
board size, board independence, board committees, shareholding ownership structure, 
and executive compensation) and the dependent variables are corporate financial 
performance and market value.  Data sources were KSA Tadawul lists and other public 
records of 91 of the 116 companies for the years 2010-2014.  Findings from this study are 
to help firms’ leaders and boards to understand which variables are related to enhancing 
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their companies’ performance and market value.  Also, the legislators may benefit from 
the findings of this study in identifying the corporate governance mechanisms that can 
promote economic growth for the benefit of society. 
Role of the Researcher 
My role as the researcher was to (a) select the topic, (b) design the study, (c) 
collect the data, (d) provide peer-reviewed or seminal sources, and (e) plan the approach, 
as well as present (a) the summary, (b) conclusion, (c) recommendations, and (d) the 
social implications of the study integrated with the conclusion.  The population for this 
study was the publicly listed companies in KSA for the time period 2010 to 2014.  The 
choice of study sample was based on the availability of corporate governance data and 
trading years.  Management scholars called this type of sampling non-probability of 
convenience sampling (Berete, 2011; Parlalis, 2011).  All the 116 firms were considered 
for this study.  However, I only used 91 firms because 25 of them have become publicly 
traded firms after 2010.  These 25 companies do not have their 2010 corporate 
governance data and financial statements available.  For multiple regression studies, 
researchers suggest using Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2007) formula for establishing study’s 
sample size: N > 50 + 8(m).  N is number of selected firms, while m is number of study’s 
independent variables.  The sample size of this study should be at least: 50 + 8(5) = 90 
samples.  Therefore, the sample size of 91 firms was sufficient size for drawing 
generalization about the study’s population as a whole.   
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I worked independently to ensure that the data sources are reliable and valid, as 
well as the collected data are analyzed, interpreted, and presented in an ethical manner.  
The data of corporate governance mechanisms, financial performance, and market value 
came from firms’ printed or electronic annual reports and the Tadawul website amongst 
others.  The biases in data collection can be avoided by clear and careful planning of data 
collection process, using multiple sources of data, choosing sample representing the 
population, and using proper measurement metrics.  To ensure the reliability and validity 
of data and information in this study, I used standard procedure to collect secondary data 
and avoid the variation in collecting the primary data.   
Researchers should fairly select the participants, protect the participants from any 
harm, and ensure the confidentiality of participants.  Also, researchers should be honest 
and respectful to all individuals participating in the research (Berete, 2011).  In this study, 
no human participants were involved.  Therefore, participants’ protection procedures and 
documents, such as confidentiality protocols and informed consent forms, as well as 
precautions for preserving the integrity and impartiality of participants were not required.  
Because there were no participants in this study, the Belmont Report did not apply. 
In the Section 3 of application to professional practice and implications for 
change, I provided analysis descriptions and explained the characteristics of input 
variables related to corporate financial performance and market value, and ensured 
analyzing and interpreting the study’s data in an ethical manner.  I have worked as CFO, 
financial controller, finance manager, and auditor more than 24 years for various business 
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organizations and have accumulated expertise in corporate finance, financial analysis, 
corporate governance, and risk management; interfaced and experienced the corporate 
governance systems and mechanisms, corporate performance, and market value issues 
relevant to addressing the purpose and research questions for this study.  This 
accumulated expertise helped me better understand and facilitate the whole study.  My 
facilitating role ensured there was no bias to appear in data collection and sampling, and 
statistical analysis and interpretation. 
Research Method and Design 
There are three different types of approaches for conducting studies: qualitative, 
quantitative, and mixed methods.  The three research approaches are considered in the 
procedures of choosing a proper approach for this study.  The selection of research 
procedures should be in line with the research questions, therefore, the methodology may 
be quantitative, qualitative or a mixture of both approaches (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013; 
Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013).  The qualitative approach is appropriate if there have 
not been any studies conducted on a specific social problem or the study variables are not 
clearly identified.  Quantitative approach helps test theories by examining the 
relationships among independent and dependent variables; the quantitative approach 
relies on collecting and analyzing numerical data (Berete, 2011).  The mixed approach is 
appropriate if either the quantitative or qualitative approach is not sufficient or adequate 
to best address a specific research problem (Bonna, 2011).  The qualitative approach was 
not suitable for this study because the purpose of this study was examining the statistical 
88 
 
 
 
relationships of the variables, rather than examining themes based on interviews.  The 
mixed approach requires extensive data collection and the process for analyzing the data 
is time intensive (Stanley, 2011).  Therefore, the best way to examine the study’s 
questions was to use a quantitative method with secondary data analysis.  The key 
characteristics associated with quantitative research are numbers, objectivity, and 
generalizability. 
Research Method 
In this study, I used the quantitative correlational research method to test the 
resulting hypotheses and answer the research questions.  The quantitative research 
method mainly focuses on hypothesis and theory testing (Singleton & Straits, 2005).  In 
quantitative research questions, researchers inquire about the relationships and 
differences among variables while in quantitative hypotheses, researchers drive the 
testing of the expected relationship among variables (Singleton & Straits, 2005; Wester, 
Borders, Boul, & Horton, 2013; Young, 2011).  Researchers use quantitative method to 
examine the relationship among independent and dependent variables, which can be 
measured through instruments and/or secondary data, so the data can be analyzed and 
interpreted using statistical procedures (Singleton & Straits, 2005).  
 Pursuant to a post-positivist worldview, researchers use quantitative research to 
examine the associations or relationships between independent and dependent variables 
and pose the associations or relationships in terms of questions or hypotheses.  
Quantitative research is deductive and starts with a general case, and then moves toward 
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the specific (Singleton & Straits, 2005).  According to the post-positivist worldview, 
researchers use the quantitative approach to form the relationships between independent 
variables and dependent variables as research questions and hypotheses, and then 
examine these relationships (Berete, 2011).  There was alignment between this study and 
post-positivist worldview because the purpose for the study was testing the relationship 
between the corporate governance variables and corporate financial performance, as well 
as the relationship between corporate governance variables and market value of publicly 
listed companies in KSA.  Post-positivist assumptions are more appropriate for 
quantitative methods than qualitative research methods.  Therefore, a quantitative 
research method was the most suitable method to address this study, because the focus of 
the study was examining the relationship between independent variables (corporate 
governance variables) and dependent variables (corporate financial performance and 
market value). 
Research Design 
The most appropriate way to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance variables and both companies’ performance and companies’ value was to use 
a quantitative correlational research design.  The focus of quantitative correlational 
design is examining possible relationships among variables (Stanley, 2011).  A 
quantitative correlational design aligns with post-positivist worldview (Singleton & 
Straits, 2005).  Post-positivist worldview is a good support for using scientific methods in 
understanding a complex social problem through using numerical measures and testing 
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hypotheses.  A quantitative correlational design was best for the proposed study because 
the purpose for the study was investigating the relationship among known variables 
(Stanley, 2011).   
The experimental design and quasi-experimental designs were not appropriate for 
this study.  The experimental design is suitable for researchers examining cause-and-
effect relationships.  The quasi-experimental design is appropriate when the researcher 
wants assess the casual effect of an intervention on a target population of a study through 
control groups (Hamoudi & Dowd, 2013).  The significant difference between 
correlational designs and both experimental and quasi-experimental designs is that 
correlation design does not imply causation and establishing causality by the 
manipulation of research independent variables is difficult or impossible (Stanley, 2011).  
Accordingly, a quantitative correlational design best serves the investigation of the 
relationship between corporate governance variables and both financial performance and 
market value.  
The independent variables in the regression model were corporate governance 
mechanisms of (a) board size, (b) board independence, (c) board committees, (d) 
executive compensation, (e) and ownership structure.  The dependent variables in the 
study were corporate financial performance and market value.  I used ROA and ROE to 
measure the corporate financial performance.  ROA and ROE are the most popular value-
based measures of performance (Habbash et al., 2014; Taiwo Adewale & Adeniran 
Rahmon, 2014).  ROA determines a firm’s growth over the study period while ROE 
91 
 
 
 
compares one firm's profitability against the other firms’ profitability for the same period.  
ROA and ROE are frequently used by analysts and investors who perceive that the higher 
return on equity and assets, the better the financial performance of the firm (Al-Matari et 
al., 2014; Habbash & Bajaher, 2014; Vo & Nguyen, 2014).  Tobin’s q was used as a 
measure of firm’s market value, which is the most common measure in empirical 
corporate governance research, because it considers the risk and is not as likely to distort 
the findings as other accounting measures (Al-Matari et al., 2014; Habbash et al., 2014).  
Table 1 presents a summary of the study’s independent and dependent variables names, 
measurement types, scale types, and measurement scales.  These data were important for 
developing three multiple regression models of this study.  
Table 1 
 Independent Variables, Measurement Types, Scale Types, and Measurement Scale 
Population and Sampling 
There were 163 companies listed on Saudi Stock Exchange.  In this study, I 
excluded the firms belonging to financial and insurance sectors.  The exclusion of 
 
Variable name 
Measurement 
type 
Scale type Measurement scale 
Board size Quantitative Ratio Assigning 1 point to each board member    
Board independence Quantitative Ratio The ratio of independent directors to the 
total board members 
Board committees Quantitative Ratio Assigning one point to each committee  
Executive compensation Quantitative Ratio Total monetary and non-monetary benefits 
issued to five senior executives 
Ownership structure Quantitative Ratio Total board members’ shares divided by 
total shares 
ROA Quantitative Ratio Net income divided by total assets 
ROE Quantitative Ratio Net income divided by book equity 
Tobin’s q Quantitative Ratio Market value of equity plus total book value 
of liabilities divided by total book value of 
assets 
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financial institutions and insurance companies was due to the different accounting 
standards applicable to these companies, making it difficult to compare the financial 
performance and market value against those of firms in other sectors (Ferreira Caixe & 
Krauter, 2014; Moradi et al., 2012).  I used the remaining 116 publicly listed companies 
in KSA as the general population.  The firms from the sample belonged to the remaining 
13 sectors (Tadawul, 2015).  
There are various sampling techniques, such as (a) purposive, (b) convenience, (c) 
simple random, and (d) stratified random sample.  The choice of the study sample was 
based on the availability of the data and trading years.  Researchers called this type of 
sampling non-probability or convenience sampling (Berete, 2011).  According to non-
probability sampling technique, researchers select studies’ samples based on their 
convenient accessibility (Parlalis, 2011).  The specific sample was 91 publicly listed 
companies in KSA for the years 2010-2014.  Newly established companies were 
excluded from the sample of this study, because new companies do not have enough time 
to implement corporate governance mechanisms (Bonna, 2011).  In addition, new 
companies’ financial performance can be negatively affected from cash flow problems 
and poor financial stability as the leaders of these companies concentrate on growing the 
business (Bonna, 2011).  The companies with at least 5 years in existence are assumed to 
have had sufficient time to implement corporate governance practices and improve 
financial performance (Bonna, 2011).  These companies tend to have more attention from 
regulators, analysts, and outside parties, as well as the effect of their corporate 
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governance practices are more directly apparent.  The selected companies have become 
publicly listed companies before 2010.  The selection of 2010-2014 time frames was 
motivated by the (a) availability of trading data and financial statements, (b) corporate 
governance, and (c) financial data of population over the period of test, such as ROA, 
ROE, and Tobin’s q.  Corporate governance and financial data of the selected companies 
are available on the websites of these companies and Tadawul.  The fiscal year of these 
companies is consistent with the calendar year and there was no change in their fiscal 
year for those years under examination.   Furthermore, these companies were listed on 
Saudi Stock Exchange throughout all of the study’s years.   
Ethical Research 
Researchers are responsible for demonstrating their trustworthiness, and the 
reliability and credibility of the methodologies they use in their research (Berete, 2011).  
For this quantitative study, I developed an ethical approach that was applicable to every 
stage of this study (Jondle, Ardichvili, & Mitchellach, 2014).  Each of Walden’s doctoral 
students must obtain proposal approval by Institutional Review Board (IRB) to gather 
and analyze the required data for completing their studies.  The key role of the IRB 
members is to ensure the doctoral proposals meet the acceptability criteria of practices 
standards and professional conducts, institutional regulations, and applicable laws 
(Berete, 2011).   
Data collection sources were from publicly financial reports available from 
Tadawul and from the 91 KSA firms’ websites.  The selection of the study data were by 
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company name along with the Tadawul code, and then saving these data to a password 
protected file and arranged by company name.  No involvement of the human participants 
in this study.  Therefore, no need for participants’ protection procedures and documents, 
such as confidentiality protocols and informed consent forms.  For protection purpose, 
these data were subject to strict security measures.  I will store data files for a period of 5 
years succeeding the publication of the study, and will thereafter delete the files. 
Data Collection 
This heading includes three subheadings: instruments, data collection techniques, 
and data organization techniques.  The instruments are tools to collect, determine, and 
process the information and data gathered for the study (Hoffschwelle, 2011).  The data 
collection technique in this study is the method used to gather data for analysis and 
interpretation through different secondary sources.  Data organization techniques depict 
the organization of the data for statistical analysis and interpretation.   
Instruments 
There are no generally accepted corporate governance mechanisms and 
management scholars have used different corporate governance definitions, 
instrumentations, metrics, and indexes in corporate governance studies.  Consequently, 
numerous definitions of corporate governance have emerged depending on the 
researcher’s interest and purpose (Mulili & Wong, 2011).  As a result, previous 
researchers have used several instruments, indexes, and metrics to examine corporate 
governance, financial performance, and market value to measure the variables.  Since the 
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study data were secondary, the data sheets were the instruments of this study for 
reflecting the values of the independent variables.  Therefore, the construction of a series 
of indices and ratios was appropriate for the purpose of this study.   
Various corporate governance indexes have been explored in the review of the 
professional and academic literature of this study.  G-index is becoming the most widely 
used measure of corporate governance in the academic research because of its consistent 
scores (Bebchuk et al., 2004; Brown & Caylor, 2004).  G-index construction is simple 
and straightforward.  Also, G-index is transparent and easily reproducible (Gompers et 
al., 2003).  Furthermore, G-index objectively reflects the relationships between the 
corporate governance and both corporate financial performance and market value 
(Bonna, 2011; Brown & Caylor, 2004).  Based on the research questions and literature 
review, accomplishing the purpose of this study required using different sets of indexes 
following the equal-weighting approach used in G-Index construction (Bonna, 2011).  In 
this study, the index for each variable was calculated for each year for the time period 
2010 to 2014 and added up to estimate the total score of each variable index, and then 
divided by 5 years to calculate average score index.  The measurement of the independent 
and dependent variables are addressed as follows: 
Board size.  I developed a board size index values by assigning an equal-
weighted approach of 1 point for each board member.  A board of seven members is 
considered small and seven points were assigned; conversely, a large board size of 10 
members was assigned 10 points (Dhamadasa et al., 2014; Reddy & Locke, 2010).  
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Researchers argued that the size of the board of directors should be no greater than 8 or 9 
members (Reddy & Locke, 2010; Uwuigbe & Fakile, 2012).  Larger board faces 
coordination and communication problems and hence board effectiveness.  Therefore, 
small board size is expected to be more effective in monitoring corporate management 
(Bonna, 2011; Vintila & Gherghina 2012).  
Board independence.  Board independence is measured as the ratio of non-
executive and independent directors to the total number of board members (Pandya, 
2011).  In this study, an independent director was defined as the member who (a) was not 
an employee in the company and/or its subsidiaries within the last three years, (b) did not 
have any business relationship with the company, and (c) did not represent a major 
shareholder of the company.  A major shareholder is the shareholder who owns 5% or 
more of the total shares of the company.  
Board committees.  Board committees were measured by assigning one point to 
each independent committee.  For example, a company with no independent committees 
was assigned zero point.  Conversely, a company that had four committees, namely 
executive, auditing, investment, and nomination and remuneration committees was 
assigned four points.  The total score depends on the number of independent committees 
a company had. 
Executive compensation.  Executive compensation is total of the financial 
payments and non-monetary benefits provided to executives in exchange for their work 
on behalf of an organization (Lin, 2010).  In general, executive compensation packages 
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include a mix of long-term incentives and short-term incentives; long-term incentives, 
such as restricted shares and stock options while short-term incentives, such as salary, 
benefits, annual bonus, and perquisites (Lin, 2010).  The executive compensation was 
measured by total financial payments paid and non-monetary benefits issued to five 
senior executives who received the highest compensation.  Saudi stock market’s 
regulators impose using this measure for disclosing the executive compensations in the 
annual report of firms (KSA’s Corporate Governance Regulations, 2006).   
Ownership structure.  The ownership structure affects the presence of the 
independence and professional education of the board of directors (Michal, Maria, & 
Anna, 2011).  There are several ways to measure the ownership structure, such as (a) 
percentage of shares owned by all members of the board of directors by total shares, (b) 
percentage of shares owned by institutional investors, (c) percentage of shares owned by 
top five shareholders, and (d) shares owned by the five major families (Reyna, 2012).  In 
this study, based on the availability of the data, the ownership structure of a corporation 
was determined by the proportion of shares owned by all members of the board of 
directors by total shares. 
Financial performance.  Corporate financial performance was measured by 
ROA and ROE.  ROA is ratio or measure used to evaluate the profitability of a company.  
A higher ratio means a higher profitability of a company.  It is calculated as net income 
by total assets.  ROE is the ratio of net income by book equity; the higher the ratio, the 
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greater the rate of return investors is earning (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012; Dimitropoulos & 
Tsagkanos, 2012). 
Market value.  Market value of a firm was measured by Tobin’s q, which is the 
most common measure in empirical corporate governance research.  Tobin’s q is the 
market value of equity plus total book value of liabilities divided by total book value of 
assets.  Market value of equity is the number of shares multiplied by the closing price per 
share (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012). 
Data Collection Techniques 
The collection of the financial statements and corporate governance factors of 
each sampled firm was public documents, including annual reports, Tadawul, and 
company’s website for a 5-year period from January 2010 to December 2014 financial 
years.  I used content analysis techniques to analyze the available data (Bonna, 2011).  
Content analysis is a method for studying the communication content; these techniques 
include empirical measurement and theoretical definition.  The purpose of using content 
analysis is to create objective and systematic criteria for transforming written text in 
highly reliable data that can be analyzed for the symbolic content of communication 
(Bonna, 2011; Simmons, Conlon,  Mukhopadhyay, & Yang, 2011).  The financial 
statements included balance sheets and income statements.  The collections of corporate 
governance factors were from the annual reports; these factors, for example, are (a) board 
size, (b) board independence, (c) board committees, (d) executive compensation, and (e) 
ownership structure.  The collection of financial information, such as (a) net income, (b) 
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company’s capital, (c) common stocks, (d), and total value of assets were from financial 
statements.  Combining the collected data is a necessary step to create indexes, scores, 
and ratios.  The indexes, ratios, and scales help condense the data collected by multiple 
indicators into a scale score and single number.  These data and information serve as 
excellent tools that enabled me to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
and both financial performance and market value. 
Data Organization Techniques 
The data sources for this study included Tadawul filings for the fiscal years 2010 
through 2014 and annual reports for the sample firms.  Organizing the data is an 
important step for developing several statistics that describe and summarize the important 
characteristics of the data sets.  The next step was standardizing the organized data and 
identifying their importance for addressing the research questions by testing the 
hypotheses.  Exporting study data into a spreadsheet was for further review and 
calculation.  The manual review of spreadsheet content was for avoiding any mistakes or 
duplication of the independent and dependent variables data.  Excel spreadsheet is a good 
tool for calculating (a) ROA, (b) ROE, (c) Tobin’s q, (d) mean, (e) median, (f) mode, and 
(g) standard deviation.   
I grouped all the study data by calendar year and labeled a worksheet for each 
year, and then created a compiled worksheet for the 5 years.  The data file included a mix 
of both raw and transformed data, such as (a) firms’ board sizes, (b) board committees, 
(c) ROA, (d) ROE, and (e) Tobin’s q.  Organizing the data in a SPSS file was for 
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statistical analysis.  The SPSS file contained both descriptive and inferential statistics 
regarding the financial performance and market value of the sampled firms.  The 
descriptive data included, for example, mean and standard deviation.  Inferential statistics 
included, for example, ANOVA analysis, t test, and multiple regression analysis.  I 
backed up the data on safe thumb drives, which will be stored in fireproof lockboxes for a 
period of 5 years following the publication of the study.  I will delete the data from my 
computer using a freeware called CyberShredder.  Only I had access to these data. 
Data Analysis Technique 
Prior to conducting multiple regression, I analyzed a simple correlation matrix.  
This correlation matrix allowed me to accept or reject individual null hypotheses for each 
of the mechanisms of the independent variable.  The correlation matrix helped identify 
which variables I should include in the actual regression analysis.   
After collecting and analyzing the relevant data, and creating the appropriate 
scores and index for each variable, I analyzed the data statistically.  In order to test the 
resulting hypotheses and answer the research questions, In Section 1, I developed the 
theoretical framework based on agency and institutional theories to create a relationship 
or linkage between independent variables of corporate governance and the dependent 
variables ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q.  I addressed the research questions and tested the 
hypotheses using SPSS (20) multiple regression statistical software program. 
Management scholars have used multiple regression models in corporate 
governance studies to examine the relationship of corporate governance with corporate 
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financial performance and market value.  For example, Moradi et al. (2012) examined the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms and financing activities on companies' 
performance using multiple regression models.  Ibrahim et al. (2010) used multiple 
regression models to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance.  Rambo (2013) used multiple regression models to specify the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and the financial performance of commercial 
banks.  Martani and Saputra (2009) used multiple regression to examine the effect of 
corporate governance on firm performance measured by economic value added (EVA).  
Also, Bonna (2011) used multiple regression to investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance.   
Multiple regression analysis is a statistical tool for analyzing the data within 
several types of designs for understanding the relationship between/among two or more 
variables.  In this study, the use of multiple regression analysis was to investigate the 
relationships of corporate governance, financial performance, and market value in KSA’s 
listed companies.  The goal was to determine if sound corporate governance 
implementation was correlated with a better corporate financial performance and market 
value.  The study model is given in the equation: Y= α +β1X1 + β2X2+ β3X3+ β4X4 +. . 
.  βnXn + ε where Y is the dependent variable, X1. . . Xn are the independent variables, α 
is the intercept and ε is a random error variable.  The β1. . .  βn are the beta coefficients 
of the independent variables (Bonna, 2011).     
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I used standard (simultaneous) multiple linear regression.  I chose multiple 
regression models after careful consideration of other quantitative tools choices including 
correlation analysis, simple linear analysis, and ANOVA analysis of variance (Bonna, 
2011).  Correlation analysis and simple linear analysis examine the relationships between 
only two variables (Rodriguez, Araneda, Pedraja, & Rodriguez, 2011).  The choice of 
multiple regression approach was mainly based on the purpose of the study and the nature 
of the independent and dependent variables.  Multiple regression analysis enabled me to 
examine the strengths of relationships between the five independent variables and the 
three dependent variables (Rodriguez et al., 2011).  The generic equations for the model 
are 
ROA = α0 + β1.SIZE + ß2.IND + ß3.COM + ß4.OWN + ß5. EXEC + ε   (1) 
ROA = α0 + β1.SIZE + ε                           (2) 
ROA = α0 + ß2.IND + ε                  (3) 
ROA = α0 + ß3.COM + ε  (4) 
ROA = α0 + ß4.OWN + ε         (5) 
ROA = α0 + ß5. EXEC + ε  (6) 
ROE = α10 + β11.ISIZE + β12.IND+ β13.COM + β14.OWN + β15.EXEC + ε      (7) 
ROE = α10 + β11.ISIZE + ε (8)     
ROE = α10 + β12.IND + ε  (9)                                                    
ROE = α10 + β13.COM + ε  (10)     
ROE = α10 + β14.OWN + ε          (11) 
ROE = α10 + β15.EXEC + ε                                                             (12)  
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TOBIN’S q = α20 + β21.SIZE+ β22.IND + β23.COM + β24.OWN + β25.EXEC + ε (13)   
TOBIN’S q = α20 + β21.SIZE + ε   (14) 
TOBIN’S q = α20 + β22.IND + ε            (15) 
TOBIN’S q = α20 + β23.COM + ε            (16) 
TOBIN’S q = α20 + β24.OWN + ε            (17) 
TOBIN’S q = α20 + β25.EXEC + ε            (18) 
Where, ROA is the return on assets, α0 = the intercept of the model, SIZE = board 
size, IND = board independence, COM = committees, OWN = ownership structure as a 
proxy for shareholder rights, EXEC = executive compensation, β1. . . β5 are the beta 
coefficients of the regression model, and ε is a random error.  I used the same 
independent variables to determine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
approximate return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s q, the other two dependent variables.  I 
used three types of statistical analyses: descriptive and inferential statistical techniques to 
analyze the data, range, and standard deviation to measure the dispersion of the data from 
their mean and inferential statistics of sampled firms using multiple regression 
techniques.   
ANOVA is a part of the output of the multiple regression.  ANOVA helps identify 
whether or not to reject the null hypotheses via the p value.  The results produced by 
multiple regression analysis are four main values: R
2
, F statistic, Beta weight, and t 
statistic.  The use of p values is to identify whether there is an overall statistically 
significant linear regression relationship between independent variables of corporate 
governances and the dependent variables of ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q.  The test of 
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statistical hypothesis for the existence of a linear relationship between independent 
variables and dependent variables is formulated as  
H01: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 =β6 = 0 
Ha1: Not all the βi are zero 
H02: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = 0 
Ha2: Not all the βi are zero 
H03: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = 0 
Ha3: Not all the βi are zero 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the conclusion would be that no linear 
relationship exists between the independent variables and dependent variables (Bonna, 
2011).  However, if the null hypothesis is rejected the conclusion would be that there is 
statistically significant linear relationship between the independent variables and 
dependent variables in the model (Bonna, 2011).  The multiple regression technique 
automatically produces the t-statistics.  Therefore, there were six t tests for each one of 
the correlation coefficients to identify which independent variables explain the variation 
in the three dependent variables values (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q).  I used multiple 
correlation coefficient determination (adjusted R
2
) to examine the overall percentage of 
the variation in the dependent variable that was explained by the independent variables.  
The null hypotheses of this study rejected if p-value is less than α, .05. 
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Reliability and Validity 
This heading includes means for assuring the reliability and validity of the study’s 
findings, such as documenting the processes for collecting and analyzing the data.  
Reliability is concerned about the precision of the study’s results, while validity is 
concerned about the achievement of the study in accurately measuring what the 
researcher set out to measure, or its accuracy (Bleijenbergh, Korzilius, & Verschuren, 
2011).  Furthermore, the assurance of reliability increases when the collected data are 
from peer reviewed and scholarly business sources.  The improvement of validity can 
stem from the clear definition of the study goals and objectives (Hoffschwelle, 2011). 
Reliability 
Reliability is the consistency of scores and stability, consistency, and repeatability 
of a measure to represent the scores of an item (Stanley, 2011).  Reliability results from a 
process that produces consistent, dependable, replicable findings and confirmed by 
previous studies and past events (Hoffschwelle, 2011).  Reliability should build upon the 
measurement quality and accuracy.  In the case of using multiple measurements, the 
values of reliable measures are consistent, stable, repeatable, and accurate (Eeva-Mari & 
Lili-Anne, 2011).  Lack of reliability refers to chance error or random error (Eeva-Mari & 
Lili-Anne, 2011).  However, lack of reliability can also be related to the use of intra rater 
variation, which may not be random.   
The key reliability issue of this study was whether G-Index was reliable to 
measure the robustness of corporate governance of publicly listed companies in KSA 
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(Bonna, 2011).  Previous studies provided several methods for measuring the strength of 
corporate governance, however, the most commonly used has been the G-index because 
of its consistent scores (Bebchuk et al., 2004; Brown & Caylor, 2004).  Furthermore, 
collecting the data and information for supporting the business problem within the study 
needs to be consistent in the study documentation process and technique (Hoffschwelle, 
2011).  I evaluated the internal consistency to determine if the collected data were 
consistent and uniform throughout the data set.  I reviewed processes and procedures 
used for data collection to assure consistency (Schultes, 2011).  The review of 
consistency in data gathering is very important to ensure the gathering occurred in an 
unbiased way.  Also, gauging the consistency is a good tool to ensure the data will be the 
same if it were to be gathered for a second time (Schultes, 2011).  The coefficient of 
determination (R
2
) is an important tool in identifying the degree of linear-correlation of 
study variables (LaFalce, 2012).  Finally, creating metric reliability is important for 
creating validity, although a reliable assessment is not necessarily valid assessment and a 
valid assessment is not usually reliable (Stanley, 2011).   
Validity 
The study validity refers to the extent to which certain measurement satisfies the 
purpose for which it is selected (Stanley, 2011).  This study used secondary data, because 
I obtained the data from data bases and companies’ documents.  There are two types of 
validity: Internal and external.  Internal validity confirms that the variations in the 
dependent variable are due to variations in the independent variable (s), rather than from 
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other external factors (Eeva-Mari & Lili-Anne, 2011).  There was no consideration of the 
internal validity for this study, because internal validity is only relevant for research that 
addresses cause-effect of casual relationship (Berete, 2011; Bleijenbergh et al., 2011).  I 
examined external validity.  In quantitative research, external validity is a key criterion in 
determining the generalization of the findings of the research to the entire population or 
to other samples (Eeva-Mari & Lili-Anne, 2011).  For this study, inferential statistical 
techniques including hypothesis testing and ANOVA were good statistical analyses for 
making generalization about the study’s population as a whole.   
 In this study, I created a group of metrics following the G-index approach and 
ensured the metrics covered all needed material for the study.  The review of the study 
data was to test whether the data set reflected data on financial performance, market 
value, and corporate governance mechanisms to ensure the items measured the 
hypothetical concepts consistently (Schultes, 2011).  I used appropriate sampling 
procedures and statistical tests, and reliable measurement procedures to avoid a type I and 
type II errors for having statistical conclusion validity of the study.  Improving statistical 
conclusion validity requires selecting proper sampling procedures, proper statistical tests, 
and appropriate measurement procedures of the study (George, 2011; Petter, Rai, & 
Straub, 2012).   
 Multiple regression models’ validity was confirmed by addressing the underlying 
assumptions for multiple regression analysis.  The assumptions of multiple regression 
models are (a) outliers, (b) linearity, (c) multicollinearity, (d) homoscedasticity, (e) 
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normality, (f) and independence of residuals (Osborne & Waters, 2002).  If the 
assumptions are not met, the results may not be trustworthy, leading to under- or over-
estimation of effect size(s) or significance, or a Type I or Type II error.  There are a 
number of outlier tests, such as Dixon, Grubbs, Tietjen-Moore, Generalized Extreme 
Studentized Deviate (ESD) tests.  There are three key ways to detect non-linearity: (a) 
using previous research or theory for informing current analyses, (b) examination of 
residual plots, and (c) routine running of regression analyses that incorporate curvilinear 
components.  There are some analyses used to detect multicollinearity, such as the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) and collinearity (collin) analysis.  Homoscedasticity 
assumption is verified or checked by visual examination of a plot of the standardized 
residuals via the regression standardized predicted value and the Levene’s test.   
 Normality assumptions are tested by several ways, such as visual inspection of 
data plots, kurtosis, and skew (Osborne & Waters, 2002).  Researchers use several 
nonparametric statistical techniques when the assumptions of a parametric statistical 
technique are in doubt or not met, such as transformations or bootstrapping.  
Transformations can enhance or improve normality, but make the interpretation of the 
findings more difficult and complex.  Therefore, researchers should use transformations 
technique in a thoughtful manner.  However, bootstrapping eliminates the need for data 
transformation.  For this study, when parametric assumptions such as normality of 
homoscedasticity were not satisfied, I used bootstrapping.  In such situation, it is useful 
for computing bootstrap confidence intervals that do not depend on those parametric 
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assumptions.  Bootstrapping is a useful method for obtaining a more robust 
nonparametric estimate of the confidence intervals (Bibbona & Ditlevsen, 2013; 
Hashemi, Mousavi, & Mojtahedi, 2011; Preuss, Vetter, & Dette, 2013).   
Transition and Summary 
Section 2 started by restating the purpose statement and the reasons for 
conducting this study.   Section 2 presented (a) a description of my role as the researcher, 
(b) the methodologies, (c) strategies, (d) techniques, (e) variables’ metrics, and (f) 
reliability and validity of the study.  Section 2 presented the reasons for selecting the 
quantitative method to conduct this study.  Furthermore, Section 2 addressed the reasons 
for choosing the 91 publicly listed companies listed on Tadawul as the sample size from 
January 2010 to December, 2014 financial years.  The source of secondary data was the 
Tadawul website and the sampled companies’ websites.  Section 2 included a discussion 
of the data collection techniques, the reasons for choosing multiple regression modeling, 
as well as a description of the reliability and validity of the study’s instruments.  Section 
3 presented and interpreted the findings obtained from the data analysis, as well as 
contained (a) summary, (b) conclusion, (c) recommendations, and (d) the social 
implications of the study integrated with the conclusion.   
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 Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change  
The relationship between corporate governance and both corporate performance 
and market value of corporations has gained widespread prominence in the stock market 
economy.  Researchers examined this relationship; however, the findings are mixed and 
not convergent as well as researchers have no concurrence toward these findings.  
Researchers found positive, neutral, negative, and mixed relationship between corporate 
governance and both financial performance and market value (e.g., Abels & Martelli, 
2011; Chahine & Safieddine, 2011; Coskun & Sayilir, 2012; Ivashkovskaya & Stepanova 
,2011; Lama, 2012; Moradi, Aldin, Hevrani, & Iranmahd, 2012).  This study was an 
attempt to enhance the understanding of the relationships between corporate governance 
and the financial performance and market value of the publicly listed companies in KSA.  
The theoretical framework of this study is based on agency theory and institutional 
theory.  This section is organized into eight principal headings: (a) introduction, (b) 
presentation of findings, (c) applications to professional practice, (d) implications for 
social change, (e) recommendations for action, (f) recommendations for further study, (g) 
reflections, and (h) conclusions. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance and (a) financial performance and (b) market 
value in KSA from 2010 to 2014.  The key target of this study was to clarify the 
importance of corporate governance on corporate financial performance and market 
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value.  The aim of this study was to help firms’ leaders and legislators to understand 
which corporate governance mechanisms influence companies’ performance and market 
value, as well as economic growth of society.   
In general, the findings of this study revealed a statistically significant 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and both corporate financial 
performance and market value.  However, the findings provided that not all the individual 
corporate governance mechanisms had significant relationships with both financial 
performance and market value.  Board size had a positive significant relationship with 
both ROA and ROA.  However, board size had a negative significant relationship with 
Tobin’s q.   
The findings evidenced that board independence had a negative significant 
relationship with ROA, whereas had an insignificant relationship with ROE and Tobin’s 
q.  Board committees had an insignificant relationship with financial performance and 
market value.  The ownership structure had an insignificant relationship with financial 
performance and market value.  Furthermore, executive compensation had a positive 
significant relationship with financial performance, whereas had an insignificant 
relationship with market value.  
Presentation of the Findings 
The key purpose of this study was to find answers to 12 research questions.  
These 12 questions are  
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 RQ1: Is there a statistically significant relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate financial performance for publicly listed 
companies in KSA? 
RQ2: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board size and 
corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA? 
RQ3: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board independence 
and corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA? 
RQ4: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board committees and 
corporate financial performance for publicly listed companies in KSA? 
RQ5: Is there a statistically significant relationship between shareholding 
ownership structure and corporate financial performance for publicly listed 
companies in KSA? 
RQ6: Is there a statistically significant relationship between executive 
compensation and corporate financial performance for publicly listed 
companies in KSA? 
RQ7: Is there a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance 
and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA? 
RQ8: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board size and market 
value for publicly listed companies in KSA? 
 RQ9: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board independence 
and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA? 
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 RQ10: Is there a statistically significant relationship between board committees 
and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA?  
RQ11: Is there a statistically significant relationship between shareholding 
ownership structure and market value for publicly listed companies in 
KSA?  
RQ12: Is there a statistically significant relationship between executive 
compensation and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA?  
To answer the research questions, this section includes descriptive statistical 
analysis, inferential statistical analysis, and detailed description of the study’s research 
findings.  I concluded data analyses using SPSS (20).  The SPSS file contained both 
descriptive and inferential statistics regarding the financial performance and market value 
of the sampled firms.  The descriptive data included, for example, the mean, standard 
deviation, mode, and median.  The calculation of the mean is the average of all 
observations, which is the sum of the study’s observations in the data set divided by 
number of these observations.  Standard deviation expresses how much the variation of 
the study’s observations.  The definition of the mode is the number in the study 
observations or data set that is repeated most often.  Median is the middle number that 
divides the data distribution into two halves.  Both mean and median are useful in the 
projection of the future results.   
 Inferential statistics included, for example, ANOVA analysis, t test, and multiple 
regression analysis.  ANOVA helps identify whether or not to reject the null hypotheses 
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via the p value.  A t test explains the variation in dependent variables and which 
independent variable has explanatory power. 
Descriptive Statistical Analysis of Sampled Firms 
The 91 sampled firms belonged to 13 sectors: (1) cement (9.89%), (2) building 
material and construction (13.19%), (3) tourism and hotels (2.20%), (4) media (2.20%), 
(5) transportation (3.30%), (6) real estate (4.40%), (7) multi investment (7.69%), (8) 
information technology (3.30%), (9) power and utilities (1.10%), (10) retail (8.79%), (11) 
petrochemical (16.48%), (12) agriculture (13.18%), and (13) industrial investment 
(14.28%) sectors. Corporate governance mechanisms, financial performance data, and 
market value data from January 2010 to December 2014 were collected from the websites 
of the sampled firms and Tadawul.  The sampled firms are listed in appendix A.  The 
heading of the descriptive statistical analysis presented (a) mean, (b) median, (c) mode, 
(d) range, and (e) standard deviation of (a) ROA, (b) ROE, (c) Tobin’s q, and (d) the 
study’s explanatory variables of sampled companies.  
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the 13 sectors of sampled firms 
and their financial performance and market value.  Financial performance was measured 
by ROA and ROE, while market value was measured by Tobin’s q.  The sectors that 
experienced above average financial performance in the sampled firms had a higher ROA 
and ROE.  Likewise, the sectors that seemed to experience above average market value in 
the sampled firms had a Tobin’s q of at least 1.00.  On the contrary, the sectors seemed to 
experience lower average financial performance in KSA’s market had a lower mean ROA 
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and ROE.  Also, the sectors experienced lower average market value had a lower mean 
Tobin’s q.  The higher ROA and ROE the better the financial performance the sector had.  
Also, the sector with a Tobin’s q > 1.00 is an indication for sector growth. 
Table 2 
 Descriptive Statistical Analysis of Sampled Sectors  
 
Sector 
Mean 
ROA 
(%) 
Financial 
performance 
Mean 
ROE 
(%) 
Financial 
performance 
Mean 
Tobin’s 
q 
Market value  
Cement 16.35 Above average 20.08 Above average 2.41    Above average 
Building and construction. 5.05 Lower average 7.61 Above average 1.47 Above average 
Tourism and hotels 6.30 Average  6.95 Average  3.20  Above average 
Publication and media 2.63 Lower average 4.86 Lower average  1.14 Above average 
Transportation .90 Lower average 2.32 Lower average  2.02 Above average 
Real estate development. 7.19 Above average 8.53 Above average 1.01 Average  
Multi investment. -1.37 Lower average -29.75 Lower average 1.46 Above average 
Information tech. 4.63 Lower average 2.53 Lower average 1.43 Above average 
Power and utilities. 8.49 Above average 11.70 Above average 1.51 Above average 
Retail 10.56 Above average  19.26 Above average 2.54 Above average 
Petrochemical 5.73 Lower average 8.99 Above average 1.44 Above average 
Agriculture 2.21 Lower average  3.96 Lower average 2.18 Above average 
Industrial investment. 7.18 Above average 11.60 Above average 1.69 Above average 
The mean ROA of the all sectors was 6.16%.  The cement sector had the highest 
ROA of 16.35% followed by retail sector of 10.56, power and utilities sector of 8.49%, 
real estate development of 7.19%, industrial investment of 7.18%, and tourism and hotels 
of 6.30%.  Petrochemical, building material and construction, information technology, 
publication and media, agriculture, transportation, and multi investment sectors had mean 
ROA lower than the average of sampled firms.  Among all sectors, multi investment 
sector had the lowest mean ROA of negative 1.37%. 
The mean ROE for all the sectors was 6.98%.  Cement, retail, and power and 
utilities sectors also had the highest ROE of 20.08%, 19.26%, and 11.70% respectively.  
Industrial investment sector with mean ROE of 11.60%, petrochemical sector with mean 
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ROE of 8.99%, real estate development sector with mean ROE of 8.53%, and building 
material and construction sector with mean ROE of 7.61% had a greater than 6.98% 
mean ROE.  Tourism and hotels sector had almost the same mean ROE of all sampled 
firms.  Publication and media, agriculture, information technology, transportation, and 
multi investment sectors had a lower than 6.98% mean ROE.  The higher ROA and ROE 
of above average can be resulted of high net income, efficient use of debts, and efficient 
use of company’s current and noncurrent assets (Bonna, 2011). 
The mean Tobin’s q for sampled firms was 1.80.  Tourism and hotels had the 
highest Tobin’s q of 3.20.  Retail sector with mean Tobin’s q of 2.54, cement sector with 
mean Tobin’s q of 2.41, agriculture sector with mean Tobin’s q of 2.18, and 
transportation sector with mean Tobin’s q of 2.02 had a greater than 1.80 mean Tobin’s q.  
Also, all other sectors, including industrial investment, power and utilities, building 
material and construction, multi investment, petrochemicals, information technology, and 
publication and media sectors, had a greater than 1.00 mean Tobin’s q.  Sector’s Tobin’s 
q of 1.00 could explain that the market value of equity of that sector was higher than the 
carrying value of its current and noncurrent assets, which is an indication of sector 
growth and over average performance in terms of market value.  It is noted that firms 
with highest mean Tobin’s q do not necessarily have highest mean ROA and ROE.  Table 
3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the sampled companies using the mean, 
standard deviation, mode, and median.   
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Financial Performance, Market Value, and Corporate 
Governance (n = 91)  
 
 
M SD Mode Median 
Board size 8 1.48 9    8 
Board independence 78% 18% 100% 82% 
Board committees 3 0.64 3  3 
Executive compensation 7.10 million 8.39 million 1.15 million 4.91 million 
Ownership structure 17% 21% 9% 7% 
ROA 6.16% 9.97% 1.19% 4.97% 
ROE 6.98% 49.02% 1.19% 7.98% 
Tobin’s q 1.80 1.21 .87 1.37 
Market value 10.11 billion 33.20 million 2.67 million 1.72 million 
The lowest ROA of sampled firms was negative 78%, whereas the highest ROA 
was 44%, the range was 122%%.  The mean ROA of these firms was 6.16%, the standard 
deviation was 9.97%, the mode was 1.19%, and the median was 4.97%.  The lowest ROE 
for sampled firms was negative 984%, whereas the highest ROE was 57%, the range was 
1041%.  The mean ROE of the sampled firms was 6.98%, the standard deviation was 
49.02%, the mode was 1.19%, and the median was 7.98%.   
The best symmetrical distribution is achieved when the mean, mode, median are 
equal.  When the mean and the median are close together in distribution center, the 
distribution will not be perfect, but roughly symmetrical.  The mean, mode, and median 
are different when the distribution is skewed.  In a negative skewed distribution, the order 
of the mean, median, and mode of central tendency from the smallest value to highest 
value is the mean, median, and mode.  Conversely, in a positive skewed distribution, the 
order from the smallest to highest is the mode, median, and mean.  The higher ROA and 
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ROE is an indication of a firm’s ability to generate internal funds for financing its assets 
and operations.   
The lowest Tobin’s q for sampled firms was .53, while the highest Tobin’s q was 
9.44, the range was 8.91.  The mean Tobin’s q of the sampled firms was 1.80, the 
standard deviation was 1.21, the mode was .87, and the median was 1.37.  13% of the 
total observations had Tobin’s q of lower than 1.00.  Three observations had Tobin’s q of 
1.00.  Thus, 86% of the total observations had Tobin’s q of higher than 1.00.  The higher 
percentage of the higher Tobin’s q is a sign of firms’ growth and over average 
performance in terms of market value.  The highest market value in the study sample was 
SR 334.50 billion, whereas the lowest market value was SR .19 billion, the range was SR 
334.31 billion.  The average market value of sampled firms was SR 10.11 billion, the 
standard deviation was SR 33.20 billion, the mode was SR 2.67 billion, and the median 
was SR 1.72 billion.  Figure 1 illustrates that the market value of equity appeared to be 
positively skewed with most firms in the study’s sample with higher market values.   
 
Figure 1. The probability distribution of the market value of sampled companies.  
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The smallest board size of sampled firms was three members, while the greatest 
board size was 12 members, the range was 9.  The mean board size was 8, the standard 
deviation was 1.48, the mode was 9, and the median was 8.  Figure 2 illustrates that the 
sampled board size had a normal symmetrical distribution. 
 
Figure 2. The probability distribution of the board size of sampled companies.  
Board independence is very important corporate governance mechanism because 
of its ability to help mitigate financial scandals and corporate failures.  The lowest board 
independence of sampled firms was 20%, while the highest board independence was 
100%, the range was 80%.  The mean board independence was 78%, the mode was 1 or 
100%, the median was 82%, and the standard deviation was 18%.   
The smallest board committees of sampled firms were one committee, while the 
greatest board committees were five committees, the range four committees.  The board 
committees had a perfect symmetrical distribution with mean of 3, mode of 3, median of 
3, and standard deviation of .64.  The lowest executive compensation of sampled firms 
was SR .32 million, while the highest executive compensation was SR 72.10 million, the 
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range SR 71.78.  Executive compensation seemed negatively skewed with a mode value 
of SR 1.15 million, a median of SR 4.91 million, and a mean of SR 7.10 million with a 
standard deviation of SR 8.39 million.   
Descriptive statistics provided evidence to conclude that there were relationships 
between the payment of executive compensation and both ROA and ROE.  Additionally, 
the ownership structure is very important corporate governance mechanism because the 
ownership structure shapes governance system of any country and lays down the 
discipline of managers, company’s objectives, and shareholder wealth.  The lowest 
ownership structure of sampled firms was 00%, while the highest ownership structure 
was 96% and the range was SR 96%.  Descriptive statistics showed a mean ownership 
structure of 17%, a mode of 9%, a median of 7%, and a standard deviation of 21%. 
 Table 4 summarizes proportion of companies that implemented specific corporate 
governance mechanisms using frequency distribution.  The table illustrates the frequency 
distribution of the companies that were above, equal, and lower than the mean of each 
corporate governance mechanism.  These descriptive statistics are a sign of companies’ 
compliance to corporate governance rules and regulations.  
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Table 4 
Frequency Distribution Table Shows Corporate Governance Mechanisms of 
Study Sample (n = 91) 
 
Corporate governance mechanisms 
Proportion (%) of 
firms with 
corresponding 
corporate governance 
mechanisms 
Board size 
mean (8) 
Board 
independence 
mean (0.78) 
Board 
committee 
mean (3) 
Executive 
comp. mean 
(7.1 million) 
Ownership 
structure 
mean (0.17) 
Above the mean 49% 56% 22% 32% 40% 
Equal the mean 8% 0% 46% 0% 0% 
Below the mean 43% 44% 32% 68% 60% 
For board size, about 49% (n = 91) of the 91 sampled companies had a board size 
more than the mean (eight members).  About 8% of the companies had a board size equal 
the mean, whereas 43% had a board size less than the mean.  Therefore, most of the 
companies had board sizes more than eight members during the study period.  Similarly, 
56% (51 companies) of the companies had non-executive and independent board 
members more than the mean (78%), whereas 44% (40 companies) of the sampled 
companies had non-executive and independent board members less than the mean.   
I concluded from the descriptive statistics that 22 % of the sampled companies 
had board committees more than the mean (3) and 46 % had committees equal the mean, 
whereas 32% of the sample had committees less than the mean.  Therefore, most of 
companies believed that three committees are sufficient for helping board members take 
right and efficient decisions.  Furthermore, 68% of the companies paid executive 
compensation less than the mean (7.1 million) believed that the less executive 
compensation, the more financial performance a company would achieve. The last 
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feature emerged from the descriptive statistics is that 60% of the companies had 
ownership structure less than the mean, believed that the more ownership stakes in hands 
of board members, the less financial performance and market value the company had. 
Inferential Statistical Analysis of the Study Sampled Firms  
 This heading presents the relationships between corporate governance 
mechanisms and dependent variables of the study.  The heading includes the analysis of 
the linear relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and dependent 
variables, and then presents multiple regression findings and ANOVA tables.  The first 
subheading presents the relationship between corporate governance in KSA and ROA.  
The second and third subheadings present the relationship between corporate governance 
and both ROE and Tobin’s q respectively.  
Before examining the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms 
and dependent variables, I checked the multicollinearity among the independent variables 
using multiple regression.  Multicollinearity exists when two or more predictors in a 
multiple regression model are highly related or correlated, as one independent variable 
can be predicted from other independent variables.  Multicollinearity is not a problem in 
the multiple regression model if the tolerance static between two explanatory variables 
falls above .40.  Low tolerance means high multicollinearity and high tolerance means 
low multicollinearity.  
Table 5 presents the correlation of all the study explanatory variables for multiple 
regression models for testing the multicollinearity among these variables.  The table 
123 
 
 
 
illustrates that multicollinearity does not represent a problem in the study.  As per the 
correlation matrix the highest correlation between two explanatory variables is negative 
65.9% between board committees and ownership structure.  The second highest pairwise 
correlation between executive compensation and board size is 34.4%.  Similarly, the 
correlation between the board committee and board size is 13.7% and that of ownership 
structure and board size is 13.1%.  The pairwise correlation among the other explanatory 
variables ranges from negative 1.4% to 11.7%.  Therefore, including all the independent 
variables in the multiple regression models would not lead to multicollinearity problem. 
Table 5 
Correlation Matrix of Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
 
 
 
SIZE IND COM OWN EXEC 
SIZE 1.000     
IND -.105 1.000    
COM .137 .085 1.000   
OWN  .131 -.659 .051 1.000 . 
EXEC .344 -.014 .117 .052 1.000 
I also checked the multicollinearity problem among the explanatory variables by 
VIF values.  If the VIF values are approximately 1, the correlation or multicollinearity 
among predictors may not cause a serious problem and the multiple regression model can 
be used for the prediction between the independent and dependent variables (Bonna, 
2011).  VIF values ranging from 5 to 10 indicate high correlation between variables that 
may be a serious problem.  Table 6 contains VIF values for multiple regression models.  
The VIF for explanatory variables are 1.166 for board size, 1.821 for board 
independence, 1.053 for board committees, 1.815 for ownership structure, and finally 
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1.142 for executive compensation.  Based on these values, I did not find multicollinearity 
problem in the multiple regression models. 
Table 6 
 VIF Values for Multiple Regression Models 
 
 
SIZE IND COM OWN EXEC 
VIF 1.166 1.821 1.053 1.815 1.142 
Corporate governance and ROA.  The test of statistical hypothesis for the 
existence of a linear relationship between independent variables and dependent variables 
is formulated as  
H01: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = 0 
Ha1: Not all the βi are zero 
I tested the relationship between ROA and corporate governance mechanisms 
using multiple regression analysis.  The R value explains the variation in ROA and the 
betas explain which independent variables have explanatory power.  The multiple 
regression analysis was conducted using SPSS (20).  The multiple regression results, the 
ANOVA table, and the model summary for the multiple regression findings are included 
in Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9.   
Table 7 
 Regression Results for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = ROA  
 
 
Intercept SIZE IND COM OWN EXEC 
S(b)   .130 -.133 .073 .074 .130 
p-value  .663 .007 .028 .111 .222 .007 
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Table 8 
 ANOVA Table for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = ROA  
Model df F F critical 
value 
p 
1 Regression 5 9.825 2.2341 < .001 
Residual 449      
Total 454      
Table 9 
 Model Summary for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = ROA  
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .314a .099 .089 .066793 
Multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine if the corporate 
governance mechanisms as independent variables predicted the ROA as dependent 
variable.  I used the standardized coefficients because the study’s variables were 
measured in different units.  Table 7 illustrates the standardized coefficients and p values.  
The regression equation is   
ROA =.130*SIZE - .133*IND + .073*COM + .074*OWN + .130*EXEC 
Table 8 illustrates that p value of less than .001 is significant.  The multiple 
coefficient of determination R
2
 is .099 and adjusted R
2
 is .089.  The adjusted R
2
 of .089 
explains that approximately 9% of the variability in ROA is caused by the independent 
variables, corporate governance mechanisms.  The decision is to reject the null 
hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero and accept the alternative hypothesis. 
Therefore, there is an evidence to confirm a relationship between ROA and at least one of 
the five corporate governance mechanisms.   
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A hypothesis test for the individual corporate governance variables of the 
regression formula would identify which of the coefficients are not zero.  The beats 
explain which independent variables have explanatory power.  The relationship between 
the board size of sampled firms and ROA is inconclusive.  Board size hypothesis is 
formulated as 
H0: β1 = 0 
H1: β1 ≠ 0 
Table 7 illustrates that the p value for board size (SIZE) is .007, which is below 
the .05 significant level.  The beta coefficient of board size is .130.  Thus, a one-member 
increase in the board size leads to a 13% increase in the ROA.  Thus, I reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of H1.  Therefore, board size variable is statistically significant and 
can be used to predict and explain ROA. 
It is expected that board independence variable predicts ROA and increases 
corporate financial performance.  Board independence is hypothesized as 
H0: β2 = 0 
H1: β2 > 0 
Table 7 illustrates that the p value for board independence (IND) is .028, which is 
below the .05 significance level.  The standardized beta of board independence is 
negative .133; so a one-unit increase in board independence leads to a 13.3% decrease in 
the ROA.  Thus, I reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that β2 
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is not zero.  Therefore, board independence variable is statistically significant and explain 
ROA. 
The impact of number of board committees on ROA is inconclusive.  For board 
committees the hypothesis is 
H0: β3 = 0 
H1: β3 ≠ 0 
Table 7 illustrates that the p value for board committees (COM) is .111, which is 
above the .05 significance level.  The beta coefficient of board committees is low of .073.  
Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β3 is zero. Therefore, the number of board 
committees is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to predict and explain ROA.  
It is expected that the higher the ownership stakes owned by the board member, 
the better the ROA of a firm.  Ownership structure is hypothesized as 
H0: β4 = 0 
H1: β4 > 0 
Table 7 illustrates that the p value for ownership structure (OWN) is .222, which 
is greater than the .05 significance level.  The beta coefficient of the ownership structure 
is only .074.  Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β4 is zero.  Therefore, the 
ownership structure is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to predict and explain 
ROA.  
It is expected that the greater the executive compensation, the lower the ROA of a 
firm.  Executive compensation is hypothesized as 
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H0: β5 = 0 
H1: β5 < 0 
The multiple regression results in Table 7 show that the p value for executive 
compensation (EXEC) is .007, which is less than the .05 alpha level.  The beta coefficient 
of the executive compensation is .130.  Thus, a one-unit increase in board independence 
leads to a 13% increase in ROA.  Thus, I reject the null hypothesis that β5 is zero.  
Therefore, executive compensation variable is statistically significant and can be used to 
explain and predict ROA. 
The multiple regression results showed that only board size, board independence, 
and executive compensation are the significant variables that explain and predict the most 
variation in ROA.  The multiple regression results in Table 7 illustrate that board size and 
executive compensation had positive relationships with ROA, whereas board 
independence had a negative relationship with ROA.  Board committees and ownership 
structure had insignificant relationships with ROA.  Board independence was expected to 
have positive relationship and increase ROA, but the finding did not support that 
expectation.  Also, it was expected that the larger ownership of stocks in the hands of 
board members increases ROA and the higher the executive compensation the lower the 
ROA of the firm, but the regression results did not prove that expectations.   
The lack of the relationship between board committees and ROA indicates that 
shareholders are not interested in many board committees likely because of lack of 
suitable coordination and overlapping of responsibilities and duties that can result in 
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inefficiencies.  Similarly, the lack of relationship between ownership structure and ROA 
indicates that shareholders do not like excessive ownership stakes in the hands of board 
members, which reduces corporate financial performance.   
Figure 3 illustrates that the residuals are normally distributed as the residuals 
approximately follow a straight line, which is an indication on the quality of the 
regression model or the normal distribution is a good model for the data set of the study. 
 
Figure 3. The normal probability plot of the residuals for ROA.  
Regarding the relationship between all independent variables of corporate 
governance mechanisms and ROA, the adjusted R
2
 of .089 was extremely low because 
the adjusted R
2
 was below 20%.  The insignificant variables were board committees and 
ownership structure.  I removed the two insignificant variables from the regression model 
and re-conducted the multiple regression analysis to determine if the amount of variance 
in the ROA explained by significant independent variables increased.   
Table 11 illustrates that the revised adjusted R
2
 with board size, board 
independence, and executive compensation in the model was .083.  Although excluding 
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the insignificant variables from the model, the adjusted R
2
 was decreased at .083.  The 
adjusted R
2
 slightly decreased by .006 from .089 to .083.  The revised adjusted R
2
 of .083 
explains that about 8.3% of the variability in ROA is caused by the independent 
variables, board size, board independence, and executive compensation.  Table 10 
illustrates the standardized beta and p values of the highest predictive variables.  The 
multiple regression model with the highest predictive power with ROA as a dependent 
variable is   
ROA = .143*SIZE - .174*IND + .137*EXEC 
Table 10 
Regression Results for Significant Variables (n = 91), y = ROA  
 
 
Intercept SIZE IND EXEC 
S(b)   .143 -.174 .137 
p-value  .050 .003 < .001 .004 
Table 11 
 Model Summary for Significant Variables (n = 91), y = ROA  
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .299a .089 .083 .066989 
Corporate governance and ROE.  The test of statistical hypothesis for the 
existence of a linear relationship between independent variables and dependent variables 
is formulated as  
H01: β11 = β12 = β13 = β14= β15= 0 
Ha1: Not all the βi are zero 
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The relationship between ROE and corporate governance mechanisms was tested 
using multiple regression analysis.  I conducted the multiple regression analysis using 
SPSS.  The multiple regression results, ANOVA table, and the model summary for the 
multiple regression analysis are presented in Table 12, Table 13, and Table 14 
respectively.   
Table 12 
 Regression Results for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = ROE  
 
 
Intercept SIZE IND COM OWN EXEC 
S(b)   .121 -.095 .032 .099 .204 
p-value  .559 .012 .114 .482 .100 < .001 
Table 13 
 ANOVA Table for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = ROE  
Model df F F critical 
value 
p 
1 Regression 5 11.753 2.2341 < .001 
Residual 449      
Total 454      
Table 14 
 Model Summary for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = ROE  
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 . .340a .116 .106 .099795 
Multiple regression analysis was conducted to identify if the corporate 
governance mechanisms as explanatory variables explained and predicted the ROE as a 
measure of financial performance.  Table 12 illustrates the standardized betas and p 
values.  The regression equation is   
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ROE =.121*SIZE - .O95*IND +.032*COM + .099*OWN + .204*EXEC 
Table 13 illustrates that the regression was significant (p < .001).  The multiple 
coefficient of determination R
2
 is .116 and adjusted R
2
 is .106.  The adjusted R
2
 of .106 
explains that only about 10.6% of the variability in ROE is caused by corporate 
governance mechanisms as independent variables.  The decision is to reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are not 
zero.  Therefore, there is an evidence to confirm a relationship between ROE and at least 
one of the five corporate governance mechanisms.   
A hypothesis test for the individual corporate governance variables of the 
regression formula would identify which of the slope coefficients are not zero.  The betas 
explain which independent variables have explanatory power.  The relationship between 
the board size of sampled firms and ROE is inconclusive.  Board size is hypothesized as 
H0: β11 = 0 
H1: β11 ≠ 0   
 Table 12 illustrates that the p value for board size (SIZE) is .012, which is below 
the .05 significance level.  The beta coefficient of board size is .121.  That means that a 
one-member increase in the board size leads to a 12.1% increase in the ROA.  Thus, I 
reject the null hypothesis and accept alternative hypothesis.  Therefore, board size 
variable is statistically significant and predict and explain ROE. 
It is expected that board independence variable predicts ROE and increases 
corporate financial performance.  Board independence is hypothesized as 
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H0: β12 = 0 
H1: β12 > 0 
Table 12 illustrates that the p value for board independence (IND) is .114, which 
is above the .05 significance level.  The standardized beta of board independence is 
negative .095.  Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β12 is zero.  Therefore, board 
independence variable is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to predict and 
explain the ROE. 
The impact of number of board committees on ROE is inconclusive or not clearly 
known.  For board committees, the hypothesis is 
H0: β13 = 0 
H1: β13 ≠ 0 
The beta coefficient of board committees is low of .032.  The p value for board 
committees (COM) is .482, which is greater than the .05 significant level.  Thus, I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that β13 is zero.  Therefore, the number of board committees is 
statistically insignificant and cannot be used to predict and explain ROE.  
I expected that the higher the ownership stakes owned by board members, the 
better the ROE of a firm.    Ownership structure is hypothesized as 
H0: β14 = 0 
H1: β14 > 0 
Table 12 illustrates that the beta coefficient of the ownership structure is only 
.099.  The p value for ownership structure (OWN) is .100, which is greater than the .05 
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significance level.  Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β14 is zero.  Therefore, 
the ownership structure is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to predict and 
explain ROE.  
It is expected that the greater the executive compensation, the lower the ROE of a 
company.  Executive compensation is hypothesized as 
H0: β15 = 0 
H1: β15 < 0 
The multiple regression results in Table 12 show that the p value for executive 
compensation (EXEC) is < .01, which is less than the .05.  The beta coefficient of the 
executive compensation is .204.  Thus, a one-unit increase in executive compensation 
yields a 20.4% increase in the ROA.  Thus, I reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
alternative hypothesis that β15 is not zero.  Therefore, executive compensation variable is 
statistically significant and can be used to explain and predict ROE. 
The multiple regression results showed that only board size and executive 
compensation are the significant variables that explain and predict the most variation in 
ROE.  Table 12 illustrates that board size and executive compensation had positive 
significant relationships with ROE as the higher the board size and executive 
compensation, the higher ROE a firm had.  Board independence, board committees, and 
ownership structure had insignificant relationships with ROE.  Board independence was 
expected to have a positive relationship and increase ROE, but regression results did not 
support that expectation.  Similarly, there was expectation that a larger ownership stakes 
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in the hands of board members enhance ROE, but the regression results did not prove that 
expectation.  The results also did not support the expectation that the larger the executive 
compensation, the lower the ROE of a company; the results revealed a significant and 
positive relationship between executive compensation and ROE. 
Similar to the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on ROA, the 
insignificant relationship between board committees and ROE indicates that shareholders 
are not interested in several board committees likely because of improper coordination 
among board members and overlapping of duties that can result in inefficient decisions.  
Also, the insignificant relationship between ownership structure and ROE indicates that 
shareholders do not like high ownership stakes in the hands of board members, which 
negatively affects corporate financial performance.   
Figure 4 illustrates that the residuals are normally distributed as the residuals 
looks fairly straight, which is an indication on the quality of the regression model. 
 
Figure 4. The normal probability plot of the residuals for ROE.  
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Concerning the relationship between all independent variables of corporate 
governance mechanisms and ROE, the adjusted R
2
 of .106 was extremely low because 
the adjusted R
2
 was below 20%.  The insignificant variables were board independence, 
board committees, and ownership structure.  I removed the three insignificant variables 
from the regression model and re-conducted the multiple regression analysis to determine 
if the amount of variance in the ROE explained by significant independent variables 
increased. 
Table 16 illustrates that the revised adjusted R
2
 with board size and executive 
compensation in the model was .081.  Despite excluding the insignificant variables from 
the mode, the adjusted R
2
 was decreased at 0.081.  The adjusted R
2
 decreased by .025 
from .106 to .081.  The revised adjusted R
2
 of .081 explains that about 8.1% of the 
variability in ROE is caused by the independent variables, board size and executive 
compensation.  Table 15 illustrates the standardized betas and p values of the highest 
predictive variables.  The multiple regression model with the highest predictive power 
with ROE as a dependent variable is   
ROE =.148*SIZE + .205*EXECROE   
Table 15 
Regression Results for Significant Variables (n = 91), y = ROE  
 
 
Intercept SIZE EXEC 
S(b)   .148 .205 
p-value  .682 .002 < .001 
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Table 16 
 Model Summary for Significant Variables (n=91), y=ROE  
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 . .291a .085 .081 .101199 
Corporate governance and Tobin’s q.  The test of statistical hypothesis for the 
existence of a linear relationship between independent variables and dependent variables 
is formulated as  
H01: β21 = β22 = β23 = β24 = β25 = 0 
Ha1: Not all the βi are zero 
I used multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship between the 
market value measured by Tobin’s q and corporate governance mechanisms.  I conducted 
the multiple linear regression analysis using SPSS.  The multiple regression results, 
ANOVA table, and the model summary for the multiple regression analysis are presented 
in Table 17, Table 18, and Table 19 respectively.   
Table 17 
 Regression Results for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = Tobin’s q  
 
 
Intercept SIZE IND COM OWN EXEC 
S(b)   -.192 .002 -.057 .044 .035 
p-value  < .001 . < .001 .975 .232 .481 .485 
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Table 18 
 ANOVA Table for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = Tobin’s q  
Model df F F critical 
value 
p 
1 Regression 5 3.628 2.2341 .003 
Residual 449      
Total 454      
Table 19 
 Model Summary for Corporate Governance (n = 91), y = Tobin’s q  
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .197a .039 .028 .887193 
Multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine if the corporate 
governance mechanisms as independent variables explained and predicted the Tobin’s q.  
Table 17 illustrates the standardized betas and p values.  The regression is   
Tobin’s q = - .192*SIZE + .002*IND -. 057*COM + .044*OWN + .035*EXEC 
Table 18 illustrates that the p value of .003 is less than the .05 alpha level.  The 
multiple coefficient of determination R
2
 is .039 and adjusted R
2
 is .028.  The adjusted R
2
 
of .028 indicated a weak relationship and explained that only about 2.8% of the 
variability in Tobin’s q is explained by corporate governance mechanisms as independent 
variables.  However, the decision is to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative 
hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are not zero. Therefore, there is an evidence to 
support a linear relationship between market value and at least one of the corporate 
governance mechanisms.   
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A hypothesis test for the individual corporate governance variables of the 
regression formula would identify which of the slope coefficients are not zero.  The beats 
explain which independent variables have explanatory power.  The relationship between 
the board size and market value is inconclusive.  Board size is hypothesized as 
H0: β21 = 0 
H1: β21 ≠ 0   
Table 17 illustrates that the regression was significant (p < .001).  The beta 
coefficient of board size is negative .192.  Thus, a one-member increase in the board size 
leads to a 19.2% decrease in the ROA.  Thus, I reject the null hypothesis in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis that B21 is not zero.  Therefore, board size variable is statistically 
significant and predict and explain Tobin’s q. 
It is expected that board independence variable predicts Tobin’s q and increases 
market value.  Board independence is hypothesized as 
H0: β22 = 0 
H1: β22 > 0 
Table 17 illustrates that the standardized beta of board independence is only .002.  
The p value for board independence (IND) is .975, which is greater than the .05 
significance level.  Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis, H0, that beta coefficient is 0.  
Therefore, board independence variable is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to 
predict and explain Tobin’s q. 
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The impact of number of board committees on Tobin’s q is inconclusive or not 
clearly known.  For board committees, the hypothesis is 
H0: β23 = 0 
H1: β23 ≠ 0 
Table 17 illustrates that the beta coefficient of board committees is negative .057.  
The p value for board committees (COM) is .232, which is above the .05 significant level.  
Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β23 is 0.  Therefore, the number of board 
committees is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to predict and explain Tobin’s 
q.  
It is expected that the larger the ownership stakes owned by board members, the 
better the market value of a firm.  Ownership structure is hypothesized as 
H0: β24 = 0 
H1: β24 > 0 
 Multiple regression results show that the beta coefficient of the ownership 
structure is only .044.  The p value for ownership structure (OWN) is .481, which is 
greater than the .05 significance level.  Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis, H0, that 
β24 is zero.  Therefore, the ownership structure is statistically insignificant and cannot be 
used to predict and explain the market value.  
It is expected that the higher the executive compensation, the lower the market 
value of a firm.  Executive compensation is hypothesized as 
H0: β25 = 0 
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H1: β25 < 0 
The multiple regression results in Table 17 illustrate that the beta coefficient of 
the executive compensation is only .035.  The p value for executive compensation 
(EXEC) is .485 which is greater than the .05 significance level.  Thus, I cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, H0, that beta coefficient is zero.  Therefore, executive compensation 
variable is statistically insignificant and cannot be used to explain and predict Tobin’s q. 
The multiple regression results showed that the board size only had a significant 
but negative relationship with the market value, whereas board independence, board 
committees, ownership structure, and executive compensation had statistically 
insignificant relationships with the market value.  Some results were contrary to my 
expectation because the higher the board independence and the greater the stocks owned 
by board members, the higher market value and vice versa.   The results revealed that 
executive compensation had an insignificant and negative relationship with the market 
value.  The expectation of relationship between board committees and Tobin’s q was not 
clear, but the findings showed that the number of board committees had a negative 
insignificant relationship with the market value of a firm.  
 Figure 5 illustrates that the residuals are normally distributed as the residuals 
approximately follow a straight line, which is an indication on the quality of the 
regression model. 
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Figure 5. The normal probability plot of the residuals for Tobin’s q. 
Concerning the relationship between all independent variables of corporate 
governance mechanisms and Tobin’s q, the adjusted R2 of .028 was extremely low 
because the adjusted R
2
 was below 20%.  The insignificant variables were board 
independence, board committees, ownership structure, and executive compensation.  I 
removed the four insignificant variables from the regression model and re-conducted the 
multiple regression analysis to identify if the amount of variance in the Tobin’s q 
explained by significant independent variable, board size, increased.  Table 21 illustrates 
that the revised adjusted R
2
 with board size in the model was .031.  The adjusted R
2
 
increased by .003 from .028 to .031, which is still low.  The revised adjusted R
2
 of .031 
indicated a weak relationship and explained that only about 3.1% of the variability in 
Tobin’s q is caused by the independent variable, board size.  Table 20 illustrates the 
standardized beta and p value of the highest predictive variable.  The multiple regression 
model with the highest predictive power with Tobin’s q as a dependent variable is   
Tobin’s q = - .182*SIZE 
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Table 20 
Regression Results for Significant Variables (n = 91), y = Tobin’s q  
 
 
Intercept SIZE 
S(b)   -.182 
p-value  < .001 . < .001 
Table 21 
Model Summary for Significant Variables (n = 91), y = Tobin’s q  
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .182a .033 .031 .885824 
Board size had a significant relationship with the ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q in the 
study’s regression models.  The indication is that board size is useful in corporate 
governance studies.  Conversely, the board committees and ownership structure had 
insignificant relationships with the ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q in all regression models.  
The implication is that the number of board committees and ownership structure are less 
useful in the studies of corporate governance.  Executive compensation had a significant 
relationship with the financial performance, but had an insignificant relationship with the 
market value.  Board independence had a significant but negative relationship with the 
ROA, but had an insignificant relationship with the ROE and Tobin’s q.  The 
insignificant relationship between the study’s corporate governance mechanisms as 
independent variables and measures of corporate financial performance and market value 
as showed by the adjusted R
2
 indicates that other significant mechanisms were not 
considered in this study.  
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Interpretation of Findings 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationships between corporate 
governance mechanisms and financial performance and market value.  In order to 
examine these relationships and answer research questions, a theoretical framework was 
based on agency and institutional theories to create a relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms as independent variables and the measures of corporate financial 
performance and market value.  Financial performance was measured by ROA and ROE, 
while market value was measured by Tobin’s q.  I conducted multiple regression to find 
linear relationships between both financial performance and market value as dependent 
variables and corporate governance mechanisms as predictors.  I used correlation matrix 
of the predictors and VIF values to check the correlation or multicollinearity problem 
among predictors.  Multicollinearity was not issue in the multiple regression models.  
Also, I used the R value for explaining the variation in dependent variables and the beats 
for identifying which independent variables have explanatory power.  The findings of the 
study are presented below. 
Corporate governance mechanisms and corporate financial performance.  
The first six research questions of the study address the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and corporate financial performance for publicly listed 
companies in KSA.  The literature of corporate governance provided controversial 
findings regarding the relationship between corporate governance and corporate financial 
performance (Coskun & Sayilir, 2012).  The multiple regression analysis results revealed 
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a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
financial performance measured by ROA.  The p values at 5% level of significance and 
adjusted R
2
 in Table 8 and Table 9 confirmed the existence of a positive significant 
relationship between the study predictors and ROA.  However, the findings revealed that 
only board size, board independence, and executive compensation had significant 
relationships with ROA.  Also, the p values and adjusted R
2
 in Table 13 and Table 14 
supported a statistical evidence of a significant relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and financial performance measured by ROE.  However, I found 
that only board size and executive compensation had significant relationships with ROE. 
The regression results in Table 7 provided statistically significant evidence of a 
positive relationship between board size and financial performance measured by ROA.  
Similarly, the results in Table 12 provided statistically significant evidence of a 
relationship between board size of sampled firms and financial performance measured by 
ROE.  The literature has not concurred on the relationship between board size and 
corporate financial performance, which confirms my expectations that relationships 
between the board size and both ROA and ROE are inconclusive.  Some scholars found 
an inverse relationship between board size mechanism and corporate financial 
performance.  Other researchers found that a bigger board size may result in higher 
financial performance because of the different expertizes knowledge and skills of board 
members.  The findings of this study are consistent with some research findings that a 
larger board size may increase financial performance.  
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The regression results in Table 7 provided statistically significant evidence of a 
negative relationship between board independence and corporate financial performance 
measured by ROA.  Conversely, the statistical results in Table 12 proved that board 
independence had an insignificant relationship with financial performance measured by 
ROE.  There were mixed findings in the previous studies regarding the relationship 
between board independence and corporate financial performance.  Many researchers 
found board independence increase financial performance, whereas others concluded 
negative impact or no significant impact of board independence on firm performance 
(Kumar & Singh, 2012).  There are several reasons for these contrasting results, such as 
performance measures, time frames, and differences in samples (Dimitropoulos & 
Tsagkanos, 2012).  I expected a significant and positive relationship between board 
independence and corporate financial performance, but the statistical results proved 
otherwise.  I was surprised to find a negative relationship between board independence 
and financial performance, thereby independent directors reduces firm performance. 
The literature has not fully explored the relationship between the mechanism of 
board committees and corporate financial performance.  However, previous researchers 
found positive effect of number of board committees on disclosure and transparency of 
accounting information (Bonna, 2011).  My expectation was that the impact of number of 
board committees on ROA and ROE is not clearly known.  The regression results in 
Table 7 and Table 12 provided insignificant relationship between the mechanism board 
committees and financial performance measured by ROA and ROE.  The results are 
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consistent with the studies on organizational behavior and management principles, as 
several committees within a firm may lead to improper coordination, duplication of 
duties, and high costs and inefficiency, thereby affect negatively financial performance 
(Bonna, 2011).  
The empirical research on the relationship between shareholding ownership 
structure and corporate financial performance found a mixed relationship between 
ownership structure and firm financial performance.  I expected that a higher ownership 
stake in hands of board members improves firm financial performance.  Contrary to my 
expectation, the regression results in Table 7 and Table 12 provided insignificant 
relationship between ownership structure and financial performance measured by both 
ROA and ROE.  The findings indicate that investors dislike high ownership stakes in the 
hands of board members, which reduce company financial performance. 
The previous studies about the relationship between executive compensation and 
corporate financial performance found mixed relationship between executive 
compensation and financial performance.  Some researchers found that the excessive 
executive compensation could reduce financial performance; however, others found that 
increasing executive compensation can directly improve firm performance based on 
supervision mechanisms (Lin, 2010).  I expected that the larger the executive 
compensation, the lower the corporate financial performance measured by ROA and 
ROE.  Therefore, the positive significant relationship between executive compensation 
and financial performance was not expected.  However, the regression results indicated 
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that the higher executive compensation can be used to attract, retain, and motivate 
experienced executives, which affect positively corporate financial performance.   
 Regarding the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and ROA, 
the combination of board size, board independence, and executive compensation as 
supported by the adjusted R
2
 of 8.9% revealed a weak relationship, thereby there were 
other useful mechanisms that were not involved in this study.  Furthermore, the results 
revealed that both board committees and ownership structure had insignificant 
relationships with ROA.  Also, the combination of board size and executive 
compensation in their relationship with ROE as evidenced by the adjusted R
2
 of 10.6% 
provided a weak relationship; so the findings proved that other useful mechanisms such 
as leverage were not explored by this study as predictors.   
In general, the relationships between all independent variables of corporate 
governance mechanisms and corporate financial performance measured by ROA and 
ROE were weak.  The regression results of the relationships between the independent 
variables and financial performance indicated that the adjusted R
2
 was below 20%.  
Therefore, I excluded all insignificant variables from the regression models and re-
conducted the multiple regression analysis to determine if the amount of variance in the 
financial performance explained by significant independent variables increased.  The 
regression results showed that no material change of the adjusted R
2.
  
In conclusion, the study’s findings revealed significant relationships between 
corporate governance and financial performance measured ROA and ROE.  Board size 
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and executive compensation had positive significant relationships with ROA, while board 
independence had a negative significant relationship with ROA.  Board committees and 
ownership structure had positive but insignificant relationships with ROA.  Board size 
and executive compensation had positive significant relationships with ROE, whereas 
board committees and ownership structure had positive but insignificant relationships 
with ROE.  Board independence had a negative but insignificant relationship with ROE. 
Corporate governance mechanisms and market value.  The study research 
questions from 7 up to 12 focus on the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and market value for publicly listed companies in KSA.   The multiple 
regression results evidenced that there was statistically significant relationship between 
corporate governance and Tobin’s q.  The p values at 5% significant and adjusted R2 in 
Table 18 and Table 19 supported a statistical evidence of a relationship between 
corporate governance and market value.  The results supported statistical evidence of a 
weak relationship between the predictors and Tobin’s q because R2 is only 2.8%.  I only 
found that board size had a significant but negative relationship with Tobin’s q.  The 
implication is that board size mechanism lowers a firm’s market value, which is 
inconsistent with some of the previous studies findings (Bonna, 2011).  Most corporate 
governance scholars in the literature concluded that the corporate governance is an 
important factor for the firm value.  Most of researchers found a positive significant 
relationship between corporate governance and firm value; whereas a fewer scholars 
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found a mixed relationship (Berthelot et al., 2010; Coskun & Sayilir, 2012; Gill & 
Obradovich, 2012; Kumar & Singh, 2012). 
The regression results supported a statistical evidence of a significant but negative 
relationship between board size and market value.  The previous studies have not 
concurred on the relationship between board size and market value, which concurs with 
my expectation that the relationship between board size and market value is inconclusive.  
The corporate governance scholars have not concurred on one optimal size for board of 
directors.  Some scholars concluded that there is a negative relationship between board 
size and market value, as a small board can help improve firm market value (Tai, 2015).  
When the board members grow too big, boards become more symbolic, as the 
incremental cost of poor communication may exceed the benefit associated with a large 
board (Habbash & Bajaher, 2014).  Fewer researchers found that a larger board may 
provide better management supervision and access to a variety of resources (Brédart, 
2014).  The findings of this study are consistent with some research findings that a larger 
board size may lower firm market value. 
The regression results supported a statistical evidence of an insignificant 
relationship between board independence and market value.  Corporate governance 
researchers also concluded mixed relationship between board independence and market 
value.  Some researchers found a positive relationship, whereas others concluded an 
inverse or insignificant relationship between board independence and market value.  
Some scholars consider board independence is a good mechanism in controlling the 
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board and can mitigate the concentrated power of the CEO, resulting in better market 
value.  However, others believe that independent directors are more likely to align their 
interests with the management, leading to lower market value (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011).  
The study’s findings are consistent with some previous studies’ results that there is no 
significant relationship between board independence and market value. 
In general, board committees are formed to help corporate directors to perform 
and discharge their responsibilities and duties effectively, so committees help improve 
the financial performance and market value of a company.  The relationship between 
board committees and market value of a company has not been fully studied in the 
literature; however, Bonna (2011) concluded a negative relationship between board 
committees and market value.  The implication is that too many board committees 
formed by a firm may lead to improper coordination among different committees and 
inefficiency, resulting in less market value.  My expectation was that the relationship 
between board committees and market value is not known clearly.  The regression results 
provided a statistical evidence of a negative insignificant relationship between board 
committees and market value.  However, the findings of this study to some extent are 
consistent with the findings of Bonna (2011) that there is a negative relationship between 
the mechanism of board committees and market value. 
The proponents of agency theory recommend a higher overlap between stock 
ownership and business management to mitigate conflict of interest, leading to better firm 
market value (Mangunyi, 2011).  Therefore, my expectation was that a higher ownership 
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stake in hands of board members increases firm market value.  The regression results 
provided a statistical evidence of an insignificant relationship between ownership 
structure and market value.  The previous studies produced mixed findings regarding the 
relationship between the ownership stakes owned by board members and firm market 
value (Leung & Horwitz, 2010).  The findings of this study are inconsistent with agency 
theory regarding the ownership concentration by board members, but the results are 
consistent with the findings of some previous researches that the relationship between 
ownership structure and market value is insignificant. 
There were mixed results in the previous studies regarding the relationship 
between executive compensation and firm market value.  Some researchers concluded 
that the higher executive compensation may reduce firm resources, leading to lower 
market value.  According to equity theory, excessive executive compensation may lower 
the motivation of investors in buying a firm stock.  However, some scholars found that 
the higher compensation can be used to motivate experienced managers, leading to better 
market value.  Others found no relationship between executive compensation and firm 
market value (Lin, 2010).  The results provided a statistical evidence of an insignificant 
relationship between executive compensation and market value.  The expectation was 
that the excessive executive compensation lowers firm market value, but the findings 
proved otherwise. 
In general, the relationship between all independent variables of corporate 
governance mechanisms and market value measured by Tobin’s q was weak.  The 
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regression results of the relationship between the independent variables and market value 
indicated that the adjusted R
2
 was below 20%.  Therefore, I excluded all insignificant 
variables from the regression model and re-conducted the multiple regression analysis to 
determine if the amount of variance in the Tobin’s q explained by significant independent 
variable, board size, increased.  The regression results showed that no material change of 
the adjusted R
2.
 
In conclusion, the study’s findings revealed significant relationships between 
corporate governance mechanisms and market value.  However, board size had a 
significant but negative relationship with market value, while board committees had a 
negative and insignificant relationship with market value.  Board independence, 
ownership structure, and executive compensation had insignificant relationships with 
market value.   
Applications to Professional Practice 
The main purpose of this study was to enhance the understanding of business 
leaders on the importance of corporate governance for corporate financial performance 
and market value of the publicly listed companies in KSA.  The findings of the study 
were consistent with some previous research on the significant relationship between some 
of corporate governance mechanisms and both corporate financial performance and 
market value, showing significant, negative, and insignificant relationships as discussed 
earlier.  Also, the findings provided evidence contrary to the other previous studies.   
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The findings of the study may help business leaders know which corporate 
governance mechanisms affect their firms’ success and growth.  This understanding may 
inspire business leaders to comply with the rules and regulations of corporate 
governance.  Also, the legislators may capitalize on the findings in identifying the 
corporate governance mechanisms that can enhance country’s economic growth.  The 
study provides an important knowledge for researchers, regulators, and investors to 
enhance investment return, financial performance, and market value, as well as mitigate 
corporate failures.  These findings could reduce investment risk and increase investor 
confidence in the companies’ performance.  The findings can help shareholders invest in 
firms that adopt and exercise the best practices of corporate governance.  The investors 
will properly and efficiently allocate the raised and investable funds to the more 
compliant firms, resulting in better ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q.  Thus, the non-compliant 
companies to good corporate governance practices would find difficulties to raise capital 
in stock markets and financial institutions.  Therefore, boards of directors and executives 
are enforced to comply and adopt the best practices of corporate governance to 
effectively use corporate assets and mitigate conflicts of interest among different 
stakeholders.  That is, the compliance could help companies raise the fund required for 
operation and expansion (Bonna, 2011).   
Most studies revealed that the corporate governance is an important factor for the 
overall growth of the firm performance, as well as the country’s economy.  However, the 
findings of some research on the relationships between corporate governance and firm 
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performance and market value are mixed.  Business leaders want more clear evidences 
with respect to these relationships, which is the main responsibility of researchers.  The 
findings of this study represent a unique added value and benefits for business leaders 
and investors, especially those working and investing in Saudi stock market, because this 
research is one of the few studies examining the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance in terms of corporate financial 
performance and market value in KSA.   
Implications for Social Change 
Because of the significance of the relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate performance as discussed earlier, the implications of this study for social 
change became more understandable and much clearer.  This significance creates a place 
for social change within a society.  If the business leaders understood that the more 
adherence to corporate governance, the better financial performance and market value, 
they may increase their compliance to corporate governance.   
The business leaders that endeavor to improve their firms’ financial performance 
and market value without negatively affecting the different stakeholders, a positive and 
significant correlation will attract and retain experienced managers and employees, as 
well as capture potential investors, leading to a better society.  Thus, this study supports a 
need for more compliance by business leaders to corporate governance rules and 
regulations for creating more positive and significant impact on beneficiaries such as 
suppliers, customers, employees, and community as a whole.  Therefore, through this 
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study, I urge business leaders, regulators, investors, and other stakeholders to work 
together to create a better community.   
Along with commercial activities in decision making, I encourage business leaders 
to consider the benefits of communities and society in which they work.  This change in 
business leaders’ decisions result in economic benefits and social change such as better 
firm performance, developing capital market, and increasing employees’ job satisfaction 
and job security.  Thus, the compliance to corporate governance by business leaders as 
clarified in this study has implications help build confidence in Saudi Capital Market, and 
improve the lives of stakeholders and community in general, leading to positive social 
change.  Therefore, the findings and knowledge of this study may contribute to social change 
by motivating and encouraging business leaders to increase their compliance to the best 
practice of corporate governance, leading to better performance.   In return, the enhancement 
of firm performance could positively affect the community and create some social benefits 
such as improvements in the lives of employees, suppliers, customers, investors, and 
community in general. 
In this study, the researcher stressed that a lot of benefits associated with sound 
corporate governance practices for society and business.  The knowledge and findings of 
this study may result in a lot of benefits for community as well as investors and firms.  
The benefits of the community or society include fighting corruption, encouraging more 
investments, and developing capital markets.  The benefits for firms and investors include 
decreasing cost of capital, improving firms’ financial and non-financial performance, 
enhancing firms’ reputations, impacting positively shareholders’ values, and lowering the 
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risk.  From more macro perspective, the implementation of knowledge and findings of 
this study could affect a country’s financial stability, leading to economic growth.  
Sustainability issue has become the vital factor for shareholders in making their 
investment decisions.  Sustainable development is built on sound corporate governance, 
which balances between the economic growth and social pillars.   
Recommendations for Action 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and (a) financial performance 
and (b) market value in KSA.  Some corporate governance scholars called for small 
board sizes, more board independence, increase the number of board committees, 
increase ownership stakes in hands of board members, and excessive executive 
compensation.  Similarly, some shareholders and legislators advocated for large board 
size, decrease the number of board committees, greater concentration ownership stakes in 
hands of board members, and less executive compensation.  However, the findings of this 
study were contrary to some of above assertions.   
The findings provided that board size had positive relationships with financial 
performance and market value.  Board size is an important corporate governance 
mechanism that could mitigate an agency problem.   Board size is considered an 
important factor of the effectiveness of corporate governance (Shin-Ping & Hui-Ju, 
2011).  The findings proved that larger board size result in better financial performance.  
I recommend that corporate governance regulators and organizers in Saudi stock market 
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encourage and urge publicly firms to increase the number of their board directors to at 
least eight members, which is the average board size of the sampled firms of this study.  
A larger board size may provide better management supervision, access to more 
resources and financial funds, and more experienced members, leading to better financial 
results. 
The findings provided evidence that excessive executive compensation increases 
financial performance, although there was no evidence about the impact of executive 
compensation on market value.  I recommend that firms can use compensation schemes 
for rewarding corporate executives financially to align firm interests with shareholder and 
other stakeholders’ interests.  These schemes should link levels of benefits and executive 
compensation to corporate financial performance and market value.  The big portion of 
executive compensation must be “locked” in for a period above five years and based 
upon the firm achievement in the long-term rather than the short-term performance. 
The findings evidenced that board independence had a negative relationship with 
ROA, but it had no relationship with both ROE and Tobin’s q, which is opposite of the 
findings of some previous studies.  Board independence improves efficient and effective 
control on firm executives; the more board independence, the better firm performance.  
Also, the increase of board independence guarantees more integrity of financial 
statements, which reduces threat of bankruptcy and financial distress of firms.  Consistent 
with the most previous studies’ results and contrary to the study’s findings, I recommend 
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that Stock Market Authority encourage firms to hire a larger portion of independent 
board members to monitor firms’ activities.   
Board committees ensure that corporate executives behave in the best interest of 
the stakeholders.  The findings of this study revealed that the number of board 
committees had an insignificant relationship with financial performance and market 
value.  Based on literature review and experience, I recommend that Saudi firms should 
reduce the number of board committees to a maximum of three.  These committees are 
executive committee, nomination and remuneration committee, and audit committee.  
Each corporation should have its own corporate governance setting out clear 
responsibilities of each committee to prevent duplication of duties and avoid improper 
coordination among committees, leading to efficient decisions.  Responsibilities also 
should be broad of each committee to contain related areas.  For example, an executive 
committee can perform other functions, such as capital investment functions and strategic 
planning.  Furthermore, nomination and remuneration committee, and executive 
committee should have at least one experienced member in their related area like audit 
committee.  
The last recommendation is that regulators should enact acts set forth stiff 
penalties for noncompliance to corporate governance.  The acts set forth harsh penalties 
for both companies, and their officers and directors for noncompliance.  Given the 
demand for better corporate governance, defining good corporate governance to 
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encourage and enforce them to make decisions in the best interest of the stakeholders.  
These acts will balance the power between firms and stakeholders.     
  The parties should pay attention and capitalize on the findings of this study are, 
but not limited to, academic researchers, regulatory bodies, business leaders, board of 
directors,  CEOs, CFOs, financial analysts, experts in the area of corporate governance, 
and so forth.  I will disseminate the results of this study through finance and accounting 
periodicals, professional conferences and workshops, as well as informational meetings 
with community forums and key decision makers.  I will also publish the entire study in 
ProQuest/UMI dissertation database. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
This research is one of the few researches investigating the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate financial performance and market value in KSA.  As 
discussed in previous sections, such as Applications to Professional Practice and 
Recommendations for Action sections, the findings of this study were contrary to some of 
previous studies and consistent with the others.  This study has some limitations; which 
can be avoided by the future studies.   
The study used the available existing data, rather than primary data.  The 
available secondary data could be a potential source of errors, which may preclude the 
results to be generalized to all population.  Future studies can collect primary data 
through interviews and surveys or making the necessary adjustments or recalculation to 
corporate financial reports.  The adjustments or recalculation to corporate financial 
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reports to standardize accounting methods and practices may result in different 
components in the financial statements, and consequently different results.   
 This study used ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q, which are accounting measures, for 
measuring financial performance and market value.  Scholars do not concur on specific 
measures assessing corporate financial performance and market value.  Future studies can 
use market-based measures of financial performance and market value, such as economic 
value added, equity prices, market value added.  These measures may change the research 
findings. 
The focus of this study is on the internal processes of a company, rather than 
external factors.   The external factors play a significant role in firm performance.  
Interest rate policy, foreign exchange, macro economy, inflation, and other external 
factors may have a significant impact on firm financial performance and market value.  
Future studies can use the external factors instead of the internal process of a company 
for investigating their impact on financial performance and market value. 
I only used five corporate governance mechanisms, which are (a) board size, (b) 
board independence, (c) board committees, (d) ownership structure, (e) and executive 
compensation in the current study.  Future studies can use different mechanisms, such as 
leverage, voting rights, dividend policies, takeover defenses, and number of board 
meetings.  Most of these mechanisms did not receive much focus and attention by 
contemporary corporate governance researches and literature.  Using different corporate 
governance mechanisms may provide different findings. 
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Reflections 
I work as CFO for one of the biggest publicly listed companies in KSA.  As a 
practitioner in corporate governance field, I examined the relationship between the 
corporate governance and financial performance and market value with preconceived 
belief that corporate governance mechanisms are significantly and positively affect both 
financial performance and market value.  I used secondary data in the current study; 
thereby my previous belief did not influence the findings.  The findings of this study 
revealed that some corporate governance mechanisms, not all, play a significant role in 
firm performance.   
In this study, no human participants were involved; thereby researcher had no any 
possible effects on the participants.  The DBA journey helped me to gain a new 
knowledge and experience of different processes and techniques involved in conducting 
this study.  The findings of this study helped me to have an open mind with respect to the 
importance of the relationship between corporate governance and both financial 
performance and market value.  Also, the findings of this study motivated me and create 
an interest in conducting further research in the field of corporate governance considering 
different sample, different corporate governance mechanisms, and different statistical 
techniques to help improve business performance and environment. 
Conclusion  
 The goal of this study was to identify if significant relationships existed between 
corporate governance and corporate financial performance and market value in KSA’s 
116 companies for the time period 2010 to 2014.  The independent variables were (a) 
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board size, (b) board independence, (c) board committees, (d) shareholding ownership 
structure, and (e) executive compensation, while the dependent variables are corporate 
financial performance and market value.  Standard multiple regression was used to test 
these relationships.   
The findings revealed that corporate governance has a significant role in 
improving firm performance.  The results indicated that leaders should consider good and 
robust governance in the areas of mechanisms of larger board size, excessive executive 
compensation, minimal number of board committees to improve corporate financial 
performance.  However, the findings revealed that smaller board size and greater board 
independence may weaken financial performance.  Larger board size and greater number 
of board committees negatively affect market value.  The negative relationship between 
board independence and corporate financial performance is surprising result and contrary 
to the findings of some previous studies.  Other corporate governance mechanisms 
considered by the study had insignificant relationships with financial performance and 
market value.   
 In conclusion, the study findings regarding the relationships between the 
individual corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance in terms of financial 
performance and market value are divided into three groups: (a) the significant 
relationships, (b) the negative or inverse relationships, and (c) the non-significant 
relationships.  For the first group, board size and executive compensation had significant 
relationships with financial performance measured by ROA and ROE.  For the second 
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group, which related to the negative relationships, board independence had inverse 
relationships with both ROA and ROE, while board size and board committees had 
inverse relationships with market value measured by Tobin’s q.  For the third group, 
board committees and ownership structure had insignificant relationships with financial 
performance, while board independence, ownership structure, and executive 
compensation had insignificant relationships with the market value.   
Based on the literature review presented in Section 1and the findings of this study, 
my recommendations are (a) publicly listed firms should increase the number of their 
board directors to at least eight members, (b) firms should use long-term compensation 
schemes for rewarding corporate executives financially to align firm interests with 
shareholder and other stakeholders’ interests, (c) Stock Market Authority should pass a 
law enforcing companies to hire a larger portion of independent board members to 
monitor companies’ activities, and (d) in general,  regulators should enact acts set forth 
harsh penalties for firms and business leaders for noncompliance to corporate 
governance.  The implementation of these recommendations may improve financial 
performance and market value, and creates a positive business environment and social 
change via building a confidence in stock markets.  In return, this would enhance the 
wealth of stockholders and country’s stability.  The results indicate a need for further 
studies in corporate governance field, using primary data rather than secondary data, 
market-based measures of financial performance and market value, external factors, 
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rather than the internal processes of a firm, and different corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
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Appendix A: List of Sampled Companies 
Serial Name Code No. 
1 Al Asmak 6050 
2 Al Maraie 2280 
3 Aljouf Agriculture 6070 
4 Anaam International Holding Co 4061 
5 Halwani Bros 6001 
6 Jazan Development Co 6090 
7 Nadec 6010 
8 Qassim Agriculture Co 6020 
9 Savola Group 2050 
10 Sharqia Development Co 6060 
11 Tadco 6040 
12 Wafrah 2100 
13 Al-Babtin Power & Telecom. 2320 
14 Al-Zamil Industrial Ivestment 2240 
15 Amiantit 2160 
16 Arabian Pipe 2200 
17 Middle East Especialized Cables 2370 
18 National Gypsum 2090 
19 Red See Housing Services 4230 
20 Saudi Cables Company 2110 
21 Saudi Ceramic 2040 
22 Saudi Industrial Development 2130 
23 Saudi Steel Pipe 1320 
24 Saudi Vertified Clay Pipe 2360 
25 AL-Jouf Cement Co. 3091 
26 Arabian Cement Co 3010 
27 Eastern Province Cement Co. 3080 
28 Saudi Cement Company. 3030 
29 Southern Province Cement Co. 3050 
30 Tabuk Cement Co. 3090 
31 The Qassim Cement Co 3040 
32 Yamama Cement Company 3020 
33 Yanbu Cement Co. 3060 
34 Al Abdullatif For Industrial Investment 2340 
35 Al Hassan Ghazi Co 1214 
36 Alsorayai 1213 
37 Astra Industries 1212 
38 Basic Chemical Industries 1210 
39 Fipco 2180 
40 National Glass Industrial Co 2150 
41 National Metals Manufacturing & Casting Co 2220 
42 Saudi Arabian Mining Company 1211 
43 Saudi Chemical Co 2230 
44 Saudi Industrial Export Co 4140 
45 Saudi Paper Manufacturing 2300 
46 Spimaco Addwaeih 2070 
47 Mobaily 7020 
48 STC 7010 
49 Zain 7030 
50 Al-Ahsa Development 2140 
51 Al-Baha Investment & Development 4130 
52 Aseer Company 4080 
53 Kingdom Holding 4280 
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54 Masafi Saudi Arabia 2030 
55 Saudi Advanced Industries 2120 
56 Saudi Industrial Services 2190 
57 Advanced Petrochemical 2330 
58 Allogeen 2170 
59 Methanol Chemicals Company 2001 
60 Nama Chemicals 2210 
61 National Industrial Company 2060 
62 Petro Rabigh 2380 
63 Petrochem 2002 
64 Sabic 2010 
65 Safco 2020 
66 Sahara Petrochem 2260 
67 Saic 2120 
68 Saudi Kayan 2350 
69 Siig 2250 
70 Sipchem 2310 
71 Yansab 2290 
72 Gasco 2080 
73 Saudi Printing & Packing Co. 4270 
74 Saudi Research & Marketing Group 4210 
75 Dar Al-Arkan For Real Estate Development 4300 
76 Riyadh For Development (Tameer) 4150 
77 Saudi Real Estate (AL-AKARIA) 4020 
78 Taiba Holding 4090 
79 Al Khaleej Training & Education 4290 
80 Aldress 4200 
81 Alfetahy Group 4180 
82 Jarir Marketing Co. 4190 
83 Mouwasat  Medical Services 4002 
84 Othaim 4001 
85 Sasco 4050 
86 Thimar 4007 
87 Saudi Hotels And Resorts - Door Hospitality 4010 
88 Tourism Enterprises Co. 4170 
89 Saptco 4040 
90 Saudi Transport & Investment Co. 4110 
91 The National Shipping Co. Of Saudi Arabia 4030 
